Brian P. O'Marra

The applicant sought a stay of firearms charges under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The court analyzed the total delay, defence delay, and exceptional circumstances, including the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and co-accused counsel's medical emergency.

The court found the net delay was below the presumptive ceiling and dismissed the application, concluding the delay was not unreasonable.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from arrest to the anticipated end of trial was 31.89 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The court analyzed periods of delay attributable to the defence (42 days for election of mode of trial, 70 days for counsel unavailability) and found that after deducting these, the net delay fell below the Jordan ceiling.

The court also considered the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

The application for a stay was dismissed as the net delay was not unreasonable.

The applicant, a self-represented accused in custody facing serious sexual assault charges, sought an order for broader internet and email access to prepare for his upcoming jury trial.

He argued that his current limited access to and disclosure review was insufficient for researching complex legal, technical, and scientific issues, and for contacting potential counsel or experts.

The court dismissed the application, affirming that while an accused has the right to self-representation, this right is not absolute and does not entitle them to the same resources as if they were not in custody.

The court considered the significant security risks and practical difficulties for correctional staff in monitoring broad internet access, and noted that Amicus counsel was available to assist with research.

The applicant, Elijah Hall, pleaded guilty to three counts of selling fentanyl and cocaine.

He sought a stay of these charges based on entrapment, arguing that the initial drug transaction was initiated by an undercover police officer without reasonable suspicion.

The Crown conceded the lack of reasonable suspicion for the first transaction but argued that this did not taint subsequent transactions.

The court, applying the principles of entrapment, found that the lack of reasonable suspicion at the outset did taint the subsequent transactions, distinguishing the case from R. v. Williams where firearm charges were not stayed.

The court followed R. v. Gambin, concluding that the subsequent transactions were "fruit poisoned by the tree of the first transaction." The application for a stay was allowed, and the three counts were stayed.

The applicant sought a variation of his judicial interim release terms, specifically to add his wife as a surety and delete the non-contact term related to her.

This application was based on an alleged material change in circumstances, primarily the withdrawal of a previous assault charge against his wife.

The Crown opposed, citing a new, albeit unproven, assault allegation involving the wife.

The court found a material change in circumstances, noting the wife's consistent denial of the alleged assaults and the circumstantial nature of the Crown's case on the new charge.

The application was allowed, modifying the bail conditions to include the wife as an additional surety, remove the non-contact term, increase one surety's pledge, and maintain house arrest and a driving prohibition.

The applicant, facing extradition to the U.S. for fraud and money laundering, sought disclosure of materials related to his provisional arrest warrant.

He alleged that the respondent (Crown) misled the issuing justice by misrepresenting his planned departure as an attempt to escape, despite his regular contact with CBSA.

The applicant argued this constituted an abuse of process, requiring a stay of proceedings.

The court applied the Larosa test for exceptional disclosure in extradition proceedings, finding that the allegations were capable of supporting the remedy, had an air of reality, and the sought documents were likely relevant.

The court granted the application for disclosure of various materials related to the provisional arrest warrant, including those from law enforcement, CBSA, Department of Justice, and the affiant's own investigation, subject to privilege and redaction.

The accused, Richard Isaac, was found guilty of the second-degree murder of Victoria Selby-Readman.

This decision concerns the sentencing, specifically the period of parole ineligibility.

The court considered the brutal nature of the killing, the accused's extensive criminal history of violence against women, and his callous conduct post-offence.

The victim was found to be highly vulnerable, and the crime occurred in her home.

The jury recommended a maximum of 25 years parole ineligibility, the Crown sought 18 years, and the defence sought 12 years.

The accused, Danna Millan, sought a bail review after being detained on tertiary grounds for serious charges including drug trafficking, firearms offences, aggravated assault, kidnapping, and extortion.

The application was based on a material change in circumstances, specifically the COVID-19 crisis and the addition of a third surety.

The court found that the proposed release plan, including three sureties and strict house arrest, sufficiently addressed the tertiary grounds, and granted release.

The accused, Ferenc Feher, applied to the Superior Court of Justice for a review of a detention order issued by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The original detention was based on secondary grounds due to an inadequate release plan and concerns about proposed sureties.

On review, the court considered a new proposed release plan featuring an additional residential surety and a plan for daily employment.

The court was satisfied that the revised plan adequately addressed the secondary ground concerns, leading to the overturning of the detention order.

The accused was released on terms, including three sureties pledging a total of $25,000 without deposit, continuous supervision, non-contact orders, and prohibitions on possessing firearms.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment.

He appealed the conviction, alleging that the trial judge made several errors, including failing to properly appreciate material evidence, applying uneven scrutiny to defence evidence, failing to address credibility issues, misapplying reasonable doubt principles, relying on inadmissible material, and providing inadequate reasons.

The appeal court found that the trial judge properly applied the W.D. test, made findings of fact contrary to the appellant's evidence, and sufficiently articulated how credibility concerns and contradictory evidence were resolved.

The trial judge's disbelief of the appellant's evidence, combined with the accepted evidence of the complainant, led to a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, Dushane Peart, was found guilty of possession of a loaded handgun following a shooting incident.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on video evidence and the accused's pre-arrest statement.

The court applied principles for identity proof in circumstantial cases and dismissed a mistrial application brought by the defence, finding no prejudice despite initial communication issues regarding the Crown's strategy for proving identity.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence (a loaded handgun, ammunition, and illegal drugs) found during a vehicle search incident to arrest and a subsequent strip search at the police station, alleging violations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the application, finding both the vehicle search (justified as incident to arrest and an inventory search) and the strip search (justified as incident to arrest and for custodial safety) were lawful.

The court also upheld the validity of the telewarrants used for a later search of the vehicle, finding the grounds for their issuance and the resort to the telewarrant process were reasonable.

Christopher Husbands was on trial for murder and aggravated assault following a shooting incident.

The defence sought verdicts of Not Criminally Responsible on account of Mental Disorder (NCRMD) due to a dissociative state.

During jury deliberations, a question arose regarding whether the accused should be found NCR if he was able to appreciate the nature and quality of some, but not all, of the shots fired.

The judge instructed the jury to consider the defence's onus to prove NCRMD for the shots that caused the deaths and injuries, emphasizing the lack of evidentiary basis to parse the shots.

The jury ultimately found Husbands guilty of two counts of manslaughter, five counts of aggravated assault, and other firearm-related counts.

Christopher Husbands, facing a retrial for murder and aggravated assault stemming from the Toronto Eaton Centre shooting, applied to exclude viva voce evidence or prior testimony of a 13-year-old victim and his family.

The defence argued that given the accused's admissions and the live issues at trial (specifically, a Not Criminally Responsible defence based on PTSD), the prejudicial impact of such emotional testimony would outweigh its probative value.

The Crown opposed, suggesting the evidence would balance sympathy for the accused.

The court allowed the defence's application, ruling that the evidence of the victim and his family would be presented via agreed statements of fact, read to the jury and filed as exhibits, rather than through live testimony or prior audio, as the latter would be highly prejudicial without significant probative value on the contentious issues.

The Crown applied to admit an audio-taped hearsay statement from Nisan Nirmalendran, a deceased witness, regarding the 2012 Eaton Centre shooting where the accused, Christopher Husbands, admitted firing shots.

Husbands' defence was not criminally responsible due to PTSD and dissociation.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding the statement lacked necessity due to other available evidence and failed to meet the threshold reliability criteria.

Key reasons for denying admissibility included the absence of an oath or affirmation, lack of cross-examination, potential tainting from news reports, and significant motives for the declarant to fabricate or downplay his actions.

Christopher Husbands, facing a retrial for murder and aggravated assault, asserted a Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) defence based on mental disorder automatism due to PTSD.

The defence applied to exclude expert references to Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) and to limit references to malingering.

The court dismissed both applications, ruling that ASPD could be referenced, with limitations on propensity aspects, focusing on its manipulation, malingering, and deception components relevant to the NCR defence.

The court also allowed Crown experts to refer to malingering concerns, emphasizing its relevance to the NCR issue and providing jury instructions to distinguish it from the presumption of innocence regarding the elements of the offence.

Christopher Husbands, facing charges including second-degree murder, applied to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on potential bias related to mental illness, specifically concerning a "not criminally responsible" defence.

The defence proposed a third challenge question regarding preconceptions about mental illness, in addition to agreed-upon challenges for race and publicity.

The court considered expert testimony on public stigma against mental illness but found that the evidence did not establish a widespread bias specific to the mental disorder at issue (PTSD) or that jurors would be unable to set aside such bias despite judicial instructions.

The application for the additional challenge for cause question was dismissed.

The applicant, Gary Eunick, sought a reduction in his parole ineligibility period under section 745.61 of the Criminal Code, having been convicted of first-degree murder and attempt murder in 2004.

The Crown opposed the application.

Applying the pre-2011 Criminal Code amendments test, the court assessed whether there was a reasonable prospect that a unanimous jury would reduce the parole ineligibility.

While the applicant's conduct in prison had improved, his persistent denial of guilt and lack of remorse were significant negative factors.

Considering the brutal nature of the offences and the profound, ongoing impact on the victims' family, the court found no reasonable prospect of a unanimous jury reducing the parole ineligibility period.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant, a young person, was charged with sexual assault, robbery, and uttering threats related to an incident in 1990.

The Crown's case relied heavily on DNA evidence found on the complainant's underwear, which matched the defendant's profile.

The defence challenged the complainant's reliability and the chain of continuity of the DNA evidence.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible on critical issues and accepted the DNA analysis, concluding that the only rational inference was that the defendant was one of the attackers.

The defendant was found guilty on all counts.

The accused, Simon Gares, was charged with assault causing bodily harm and breach of probation after violently attacking a 5-year-old child.

The trial proceeded by judge alone after a mistrial.

The central issue was whether Gares was not criminally responsible (NCR) due to mental disorder under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

Two forensic psychiatrists provided divergent opinions on Gares' mental state and capacity to know his actions were morally wrong.

The court found Gares guilty, concluding that he failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that he was NCR, as his post-offence conduct suggested an awareness of wrongdoing and there was evidence of malingering.