Bradley W. Miller

The appellant appealed a judgment declaring valid a continuing power of attorney for property executed by his father in favour of the respondent, and the dismissal of a motion to consolidate the respondent's application with pending proceedings.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by treating the respondent's application as separate from the pending proceedings, which involved the same parties and raised identical issues of undue influence and suspicious circumstances.

The appeal was allowed, the application judge's decision was set aside, and the application was converted to an action and consolidated with the pending proceedings.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of robbery, having their faces masked, assault with an imitation handgun, and using an imitation handgun.

One appellant was also convicted of resisting a peace officer.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in his instructions on party liability for the firearm offences.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the jury was not properly instructed that a non-gun-wielding intruder must know the other intruder had a firearm to be found guilty as a joint principal.

The appeal was allowed for the joint convictions and disguise charges, but the conviction for resisting arrest was upheld as the appellant's actions constituted active resistance.

The appellant brought an application under Rule 14 for a mandatory order enforcing an undertaking to pay money related to construction bonds.

The application judge dismissed the application on procedural grounds, finding it was not properly brought under Rule 14.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application was properly founded under subrules (d), (g), and (h) as there were no material facts in dispute and the interpretation of the contract was conceded.

The matter was remitted to the application judge for a decision on the merits.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision, arguing that ambiguities in the written agreement required viva voce evidence and credibility findings at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's interpretation of the contract and security terms, which rejected the appellants' claim that they never intended to guarantee the principal amount.

The court found no genuine issue for trial requiring further evidence.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment that allowed the respondent's action for wrongful dismissal and awarded damages based on a one-year notice period.

The motion judge had refused to admit new evidence regarding an employment contract the respondent signed with another firm shortly after termination.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in failing to admit the new evidence, which raised issues about the respondent's actions and intentions.

The Court set aside the order and referred the entire matter for trial alongside the existing counter-claim and oppression action.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal for driving with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The trial judge had excluded breath sample evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a s. 8 breach because the police officer lacked reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol in the respondent's body, despite smelling alcohol and an admission of consumption 10 hours prior.

The summary conviction appeal court upheld the acquittal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the odour of alcohol and admission of consumption were sufficient to form reasonable suspicion, and the absence of impairment signs or the possibility of alcohol elimination did not negate that suspicion.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order finding that its relationship with the respondent was that of franchisor and franchisee, entitling the respondent to rescind their agreements under the Arthur Wishart Act due to a lack of disclosure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding on liability but found the motion judge's reasons for quantifying damages insufficient.

The appeal was dismissed regarding liability, and the matter was remitted to the motion judge to determine the quantum of damages in excess of the conceded amount.

The appellants sought to re-open their appeal of a decision dismissing their action against the respondent for terminating a commercial contract.

The appellants sought to advance a new legal argument based on repudiation, which had not been raised at trial or on the initial appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that it would be unfair to permit a new legal issue after more than 10 years of litigation and that re-opening the appeal was not in the interests of justice.

The appellant was convicted of importing and possession for the purpose of trafficking 175 kilograms of cocaine and sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge placed undue emphasis on denunciation and deterrence and insufficient weight on his rehabilitation and first-time offender status.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly weighed all relevant factors, including the appellant's age and positive pre-sentence report, and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the large quantity of cocaine involved.

The appellant appealed an order staying an action against a court-appointed receiver and refusing leave to sue the receiver.

The appellant argued that the receiver had already consented to the action and that the motion judge erred in finding the test for leave was not met.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the prior consent did not encompass the new claim for conversion arising from a subsequent agreement of purchase and sale.

The Court also found no error in the motion judge's discretionary refusal to grant leave, as there was no evidence that the appellant suffered damages.

The appellant, who had a history of bringing meritless proceedings against the respondent professional association following his suspension for unpaid fees, sought to appeal a Superior Court order denying him leave to appeal an internal disciplinary decision.

The respondent requested the Court of Appeal dismiss the appeal and related motion under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal found the proceedings to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, as they attempted to re-litigate previously decided issues.

The appeal and motion were dismissed, and the Court provided new procedural directions for future Rule 2.1 requests.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following a bar fight where the complainant was stabbed.

The appellant admitted to being present and involved in the fight but denied stabbing the complainant.

The conviction relied heavily on the complainant's eyewitness testimony.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to provide a specific jury instruction on the frailties of eyewitness identification.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge was obligated to specifically call the jury's attention to the dangers of eyewitness identification, both generally and in the specific circumstances of the case.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their solicitor negligence action, arguing the trial judge failed to consider the solicitor's duty to warn about the consequences of signing a mortgage discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that at trial, the appellants claimed they never met the solicitor, and their counsel conceded the action would fail if the trial judge found they had indeed signed the documents.

Because the trial judge accepted the solicitor's evidence that the meeting occurred, the duty to warn was not a live issue.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order transferring his damages claim to the Small Claims Court and striking his claim for declaratory relief regarding professional misconduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the transfer as the damages claimed were within the Small Claims Court's jurisdiction.

The Court also upheld the striking of the declaratory relief claim, noting that allegations of professional misconduct are properly matters for the Law Society.

The parties appealed a trial decision regarding financial issues following their separation.

The Court of Appeal corrected the trial judge's error in imputing income to the respondent, finding she was not deliberately underemployed due to health challenges.

The court adjusted spousal support to the high end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines range based on correct income figures.

The court also upheld the appellant's obligation to pay for extraordinary expenses (music lessons) despite the respondent's mother having paid for them, and maintained the trial judge's order regarding medical insurance.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to address why accepted Crown witness evidence failed to raise a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the facts found by the trial judge created an overwhelming inference of guilt that was not displaced by the matters relied on by the appellant.

The City of Hamilton appealed a decision declaring its equipment installation by-law inoperative against Canada Post's installation of community mailboxes.

The by-law imposed a moratorium and permit fees on Canada Post.

The Court of Appeal found that while the by-law's pith and substance—regulating municipal rights of way—was within provincial jurisdiction, it conflicted with the federal purpose of the Canada Post Corporation Act and its regulations, which grant Canada Post sole decision-making power over the location of mail receptacles.

The appeal was dismissed under the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action against the respondent bank for allegedly negligently negotiating a cheque for $35,518.95.

The cheque was made payable jointly to the appellant and a property management company.

The trial judge found that the bank acted properly in negotiating the cheque, which was endorsed by both payees and deposited into the account of the presenting payee.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's findings of fact or application of the law and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding a profit-sharing agreement for construction projects.

The trial judge found no negligence on one project and that both parties were responsible for the failure to earn a profit on the other, declining to apportion liability or award compensation.

The appellant also argued the trial judge erred in excluding its expert witness for lacking impartiality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings on liability and holding that the exclusion of the expert was a discretionary decision open to the trial judge.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment under the Succession Law Reform Act that found her to be the common law spouse of the deceased, awarded her a $30,000 support order, and ordered her to pay $20,000 in costs to the respondent.

The appellant argued she should have been awarded the deceased's house, that a constructive trust should have been found, and that costs should have been paid out of the estate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's findings of fact, credibility assessments, or discretionary costs award.