Bradley W. Miller

The appellants purchased a swine farm from the respondent but suffered a loss when they could not secure a supply of pigs due to adverse market conditions.

They appealed the trial judge's dismissal of their claim for damages, arguing breach of good faith, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract because the barn was empty on closing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants had waived a condition regarding the supply of pigs and thereby assumed the risk of market changes.

The court also found no negligent misrepresentation due to an entire agreement clause and the appellants' direct discussions with the supplier, and concluded the contract did not require pigs to be in the barn on closing.

The appellant clinic and respondent chiropractor had a business arrangement that broke down over a fee-splitting dispute.

The respondent abruptly left the clinic, leading to claims and counterclaims.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondent for loss of income.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by granting summary judgment in the face of conflicting evidence without explaining how the conflict was resolved or deploying the fact-finding powers under Rule 20.04.

The judgment was set aside and the parties were left to pursue their claims.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against two young children who attended his home daycare.

The trial judge had admitted the children's unsworn statements under the principled exception to the hearsay rule and rejected the appellant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred by relying on defence counsel's trial tactics to impugn the appellant's credibility and by finding the necessity criterion for hearsay met without expert evidence of psychological trauma or a proper voir dire on the children's ability to recollect.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon following a road rage incident.

On appeal, he argued his s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached when police failed to provide a second opportunity to consult counsel after informing him of the additional assault charge.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the new charge significantly increased his jeopardy and moral blameworthiness.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the appellant's police statement under s. 24(2), allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed an order retroactively reducing the respondent's child and spousal support obligations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the respondent's job loss and subsequent re-employment at a lower salary constituted a material change in circumstances.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the motion judge erred by retroactively varying support without conducting the proper legal analysis under the D.B.S. framework.

The matter was remitted to the motion judge to determine whether retroactive change is warranted, the date of retroactivity, and the quantum of support.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for a declaration that a laneway on his property was private and not a public highway.

The municipality asserted the laneway was built on an existing public road to which it held title.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's assessment of the survey and historical evidence, which established that the road had been dedicated and accepted as a public highway.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions related to a drive-by shooting, arguing that the trial judge's factual findings were unreasonable.

Specifically, he challenged the findings that the stolen vehicle apprehended in a church parking lot was the same vehicle involved in the shooting, and that he was in the vehicle during the incident, citing differing evidence on the number of occupants and insufficient fingerprint and saliva evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge reasonably relied on a constellation of direct and circumstantial evidence to support his conclusions and eliminate alternative inferences.

The appellant's personal injury action was administratively dismissed for delay.

An order was obtained setting aside the dismissal on terms, but the appellant failed to take the required procedural steps or have the order entered.

Years later, the appellant moved to vary the terms of the order.

The motion judge dismissed the motion and stayed the action, finding extreme, unexplained delay and inferred prejudice to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the Reid factors or his conclusion that the delay was unexplained and prejudicial.

The appellants were convicted of kidnapping, extortion, and assault following a home invasion involving sexual assault and confinement.

They appealed their respective sentences of 13 and 12 years' imprisonment, arguing the trial judge failed to consider mitigating factors and the parity principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the sentences fit given the heinous nature of the crimes and the trial judge's proper application of sentencing principles, including denunciation and deterrence.

The respondent successfully brought an application to enforce payment of $263,600 on a promissory note.

The appellant appealed, arguing the application judge erred by refusing to consider the broader factual matrix, including a side-agreement that allegedly converted the demand note into one payable from future profits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the matter involved material facts in dispute regarding the interpretation of the broader transaction and could not be resolved by application under Rule 14.05(3).

The judgment was set aside and the matter directed to proceed as a trial of an action.

The appellant appealed a judgment declaring valid a continuing power of attorney for property executed by his father in favour of the respondent, and the dismissal of a motion to consolidate the respondent's application with pending proceedings.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by treating the respondent's application as separate from the pending proceedings, which involved the same parties and raised identical issues of undue influence and suspicious circumstances.

The appeal was allowed, the application judge's decision was set aside, and the application was converted to an action and consolidated with the pending proceedings.

The appellant brought an application under Rule 14 for a mandatory order enforcing an undertaking to pay money related to construction bonds.

The application judge dismissed the application on procedural grounds, finding it was not properly brought under Rule 14.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application was properly founded under subrules (d), (g), and (h) as there were no material facts in dispute and the interpretation of the contract was conceded.

The matter was remitted to the application judge for a decision on the merits.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of robbery, having their faces masked, assault with an imitation handgun, and using an imitation handgun.

One appellant was also convicted of resisting a peace officer.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in his instructions on party liability for the firearm offences.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the jury was not properly instructed that a non-gun-wielding intruder must know the other intruder had a firearm to be found guilty as a joint principal.

The appeal was allowed for the joint convictions and disguise charges, but the conviction for resisting arrest was upheld as the appellant's actions constituted active resistance.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision, arguing that ambiguities in the written agreement required viva voce evidence and credibility findings at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's interpretation of the contract and security terms, which rejected the appellants' claim that they never intended to guarantee the principal amount.

The court found no genuine issue for trial requiring further evidence.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment that allowed the respondent's action for wrongful dismissal and awarded damages based on a one-year notice period.

The motion judge had refused to admit new evidence regarding an employment contract the respondent signed with another firm shortly after termination.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in failing to admit the new evidence, which raised issues about the respondent's actions and intentions.

The Court set aside the order and referred the entire matter for trial alongside the existing counter-claim and oppression action.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order finding that its relationship with the respondent was that of franchisor and franchisee, entitling the respondent to rescind their agreements under the Arthur Wishart Act due to a lack of disclosure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding on liability but found the motion judge's reasons for quantifying damages insufficient.

The appeal was dismissed regarding liability, and the matter was remitted to the motion judge to determine the quantum of damages in excess of the conceded amount.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal for driving with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The trial judge had excluded breath sample evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a s. 8 breach because the police officer lacked reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol in the respondent's body, despite smelling alcohol and an admission of consumption 10 hours prior.

The summary conviction appeal court upheld the acquittal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the odour of alcohol and admission of consumption were sufficient to form reasonable suspicion, and the absence of impairment signs or the possibility of alcohol elimination did not negate that suspicion.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellants sought to re-open their appeal of a decision dismissing their action against the respondent for terminating a commercial contract.

The appellants sought to advance a new legal argument based on repudiation, which had not been raised at trial or on the initial appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that it would be unfair to permit a new legal issue after more than 10 years of litigation and that re-opening the appeal was not in the interests of justice.

The appellant was convicted of importing and possession for the purpose of trafficking 175 kilograms of cocaine and sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge placed undue emphasis on denunciation and deterrence and insufficient weight on his rehabilitation and first-time offender status.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly weighed all relevant factors, including the appellant's age and positive pre-sentence report, and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the large quantity of cocaine involved.

The appellant appealed an order staying an action against a court-appointed receiver and refusing leave to sue the receiver.

The appellant argued that the receiver had already consented to the action and that the motion judge erred in finding the test for leave was not met.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the prior consent did not encompass the new claim for conversion arising from a subsequent agreement of purchase and sale.

The Court also found no error in the motion judge's discretionary refusal to grant leave, as there was no evidence that the appellant suffered damages.