P. Andras Schreck

The accused was charged with failing to provide an approved screening device (ASD) sample contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

After being stopped for a traffic investigation, the accused was asked to provide a breath sample into an ASD but failed to do so despite 26 attempts.

The accused challenged the admissibility of evidence of his refusal on the grounds that his Charter rights to counsel (section 10(b)) and protection against arbitrary detention (section 9) were violated.

The court found that the accused was not handcuffed prior to arrest and that evidence of his refusal to provide a sample, as opposed to evidence obtained from compelled participation, was admissible.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

A police officer arrested the accused for impaired driving but failed to immediately advise him of his right to counsel, instead choosing to search for identification and seize an item from the vehicle.

The Crown conceded this constituted a breach of s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found the breach sufficiently serious to warrant exclusion of the breath test results, particularly given systemic failures by the Peel Regional Police to comply with the immediacy requirement.

The accused was convicted of impaired driving based on observations of erratic driving and physical indicia of impairment, but the charge of exceeding the legal limit was dismissed due to the exclusion of the breath test evidence.

The accused was charged with driving while impaired and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

At trial, the Crown relied on an unsigned certificate of a qualified technician to establish the accused's blood alcohol concentration pursuant to section 258(1)(g) of the Criminal Code.

The court determined that while a signature is typically required, the lack of a signature does not foreclose reliance on the certificate provided that the conditions set out in section 258(1)(g) have been established.

The court found that the certificate identified the qualified technician, was provided by him after administering breath tests, and was corroborated by a signed test record.

The accused was found guilty on the count of driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit and acquitted on the impaired driving count.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a roadside stop and arrest.

The accused applied to exclude breath sample evidence on the grounds that the arresting officer failed to advise her of her right to counsel immediately upon arrest, in violation of s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The Crown conceded the Charter breach.

The court found the breach serious due to systemic failures by the Peel Regional Police to comply with the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Suberu, which established that "without delay" means "immediately." Despite the reliability of the evidence and the accused's decision not to contact counsel, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter to maintain the repute of the administration of justice.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with driving while impaired and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of his arrest and detention on Charter grounds, arguing that the officer violated his section 8 and 9 rights by entering his property without consent and by detaining him for an excessive period after breath testing.

The court found that the officer lawfully entered the property pursuant to an implied licence to investigate a report of impaired driving, and that the accused's statement that he did not wish to speak was not a clear withdrawal of that licence.

The court further found that the detention period was justified based on the accused's blood alcohol level and other relevant factors.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The accused was stopped by police ostensibly for speeding and running red lights, but the officer's actual purpose was to investigate impaired driving.

The officer failed to immediately advise the accused of the true reason for the detention, conducted an unjustified pat-down search, and unlawfully detained the accused in the back of a police cruiser before administering a roadside screening device.

Although the officer made reasonable efforts to facilitate contact with counsel of choice, the court found violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The breath sample evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, and the charge was dismissed.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of 81 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and possession of proceeds of crime under $5000 contrary to the Criminal Code.

The offender was a street-level dealer and addict who had no prior criminal record.

The court imposed a nine-month custodial sentence for the trafficking count and an 18-month concurrent conditional sentence for the proceeds count, followed by 12 months of probation.

The court emphasized that while deterrence and denunciation are important principles in drug trafficking cases, rehabilitation remains significant, particularly for first-time offender addicts.

The court rejected the Crown's initial position of 30 months imprisonment and instead imposed a more lenient sentence that reflected the offender's status as a street-level dealer motivated by addiction rather than greed, his genuine efforts at rehabilitation post-arrest, and his improved family circumstances.

The accused was charged with impaired driving after police conducted a roadside stop for speeding.

Officers detected an odour of alcohol on the driver's breath and requested an approved screening device (ASD).

Although the officers informed the driver that another officer would attend with an ASD, they did not advise him of his right to counsel or make a formal demand at that time.

A formal ASD demand was made 12 minutes later, which registered a fail.

The driver was arrested and subsequently provided breath samples showing alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The driver applied to exclude the breath test results under sections 8, 10(b), and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found no section 8 violation but determined there was a section 10(b) violation warranting exclusion under section 24(2).

The charge was dismissed.

Applicants charged with serious drug trafficking offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging delay in trial.

The trial was scheduled approximately 29 months after charges were laid, well exceeding the 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that defence delay should be subtracted, bringing the net delay below the ceiling, or alternatively that exceptional circumstances applied.

The court found that the Crown's failure to provide timely disclosure, particularly the Information to Obtain the search warrant and surveillance materials, constituted the primary cause of delay.

The court rejected the Crown's characterization of defence delay and found no exceptional circumstances justified the delay.

The application was granted and proceedings were stayed.

An indigenous woman pleaded guilty to importing 347 grams of cocaine into Canada contrary to s. 6(3)(a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown sought a three-month custodial sentence in addition to time served, relying on principles of general deterrence.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 24 months probation, finding that the offender's circumstances as an indigenous woman, combined with her significant personal trauma, systemic disadvantage, and demonstrated rehabilitation efforts, warranted a departure from the ordinary sentencing range.

The court applied the Gladue and Ipeelee framework, emphasizing that the Gladue principles apply to serious offences and that general deterrence cannot override the requirement to consider the unique circumstances of indigenous offenders.

The accused was arrested on impaired driving charges on November 28, 2014, but no Information was sworn until February 4, 2015—over two months later.

The trial commenced almost 22 months after arrest.

The accused challenged the delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing it exceeded the 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued delay should be calculated from the swearing of the Information, not arrest.

The court held that delay must be calculated from arrest, as the accused was subject to court process through the Promise to Appear.

After subtracting defence delay, the net delay exceeded 18 months, and the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances.

The charges were stayed.

The accused, a cabinetmaker with over 20 years of business experience, was charged with three counts of fraud over $5,000 relating to contracts entered into between November 2012 and April 2013.

During a period of financial difficulty, the accused accepted deposits representing 50% of estimated project costs from multiple customers but used the deposits to pay personal debts rather than purchase materials for the work.

None of the projects were completed and customers lost their deposits.

The Crown alleged fraud; the defence claimed the accused honestly believed the work would be completed.

Count 1 was conceded by the Crown.

The court found the accused guilty on Count 2 (relating to a January 2013 contract with one customer) but not guilty on Count 3 (relating to a contract with another customer).

Two accused pleaded guilty to importing cathinone (the active ingredient in khat) contrary to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown initially sought imprisonment but later revised its position to seek fines.

Both accused sought absolute discharges.

The court established that absent significant aggravating factors, custodial sentences are rarely appropriate for khat importation given the substance's limited harmfulness.

Both accused received absolute discharges, with mandatory firearm prohibition orders imposed.

The accused pleaded guilty to exposing his genital organs to his 11-year-old step-daughter contrary to section 173(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by indictment.

The offence was the beginning of a pattern of sexual exploitation of the victim.

The accused is a recidivist with a prior conviction for sexual assault on his niece.

The court considered 812 text messages exchanged between the accused and the victim over a six-month period as evidence of uncharged conduct under section 725(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The parties disagreed on the amount of presentence custody to be attributed to the sentence, with the Crown seeking 10 months and the defence seeking 5 months and 29 days to avoid immigration consequences.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with three years probation and ancillary orders.

A young person (C.L.), age 14 at the time of the alleged offences, was charged with sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault against a younger complainant (J.P.), age 9 at the time.

The complainant alleged that C.L. forced him to perform oral sex on multiple occasions between November and December 2014.

The defence denied all allegations.

The case turned primarily on credibility assessment.

The court found that while the complainant was an impressive witness for his age, significant discrepancies existed regarding how the allegations were initially disclosed.

The court concluded that the Crown had not proven the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on all counts.

A young person charged with sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault applied under section 276 of the Criminal Code to adduce evidence of prior sexual activity by the complainant.

The applicant sought to cross-examine the complainant about an alleged incident from summer 2013 to challenge the complainant's credibility regarding a prior inconsistent statement made to police.

The court granted the application, finding that the evidence met the requirements of section 276(2): it was a specific instance of sexual activity, relevant to the credibility issue at trial, and had significant probative value that was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The accused was charged with two counts of aggravated assault following a stabbing incident outside a bar in Brampton.

Two victims were stabbed during an altercation.

The Crown's case relied primarily on security video evidence and circumstantial evidence, as no eyewitness directly identified the accused as the perpetrator.

The court found that while the evidence established guilt on a balance of probabilities and the accused was very likely guilty, a reasonable doubt remained regarding identification based on the video evidence and other circumstantial factors.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm against his father.

The accused admitted to the assault but claimed self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the accused's father had thrown a roast and a beer bottle at the accused, and then advanced toward him.

The accused responded by forcing his father to the ground and restraining him.

The court accepted the accused's evidence over the complainant's, finding the complainant's testimony unreliable due to inconsistencies regarding the cause of the argument, understatement of alcohol consumption, and poor recollection of events.

The court found that the accused's response was reasonable in the circumstances and dismissed the charge.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit and impaired driving following a motor vehicle collision.

The Crown was unable to rely on the statutory presumption under s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code because breath samples were not taken within two hours of the alleged offence.

The Crown sought to rely on a toxicologist's report and invited the trial judge to perform retrograde extrapolation calculations to determine the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The trial judge declined to perform such calculations and dismissed both charges.

The accused, an unlicensed massage therapist, was convicted of sexual assault after touching the victim's breasts and vaginal area during a massage at a wellness clinic.

The victim believed the accused was a registered massage therapist based on the clinic's website.

The Crown sought 15 months imprisonment; the defence sought a 9-month conditional sentence.

The court imposed a 6-month custodial sentence followed by 12 months probation, finding that denunciation and specific deterrence were the primary sentencing objectives.

The court rejected a conditional sentence due to the breach of trust, the victim's vulnerability, the non-momentary nature of the assault, and the accused's lack of remorse or acceptance of responsibility.