Wendy M. Matheson

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal decision which found that the respondent police service did not discriminate against her when officers apprehended her under the Mental Health Act.

The applicant, who was experiencing a mental health crisis, was taken to the hospital after officers spent an hour trying to convince her to attend voluntarily.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found no defect in the Tribunal's proceedings or its conclusion that the officers had cause to apprehend the applicant.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a letter from the Pharmacy Examining Board of Canada denying his request to write the pharmacist qualification examination for a fifth time.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the letter was not a reviewable decision but merely a statement of the existing rule limiting attempts.

The court also rejected the applicant's arguments that the Act creating the Board and the rule limiting examination attempts were ultra vires, noting that the Board does not regulate the profession but merely administers an examination that provincial licensing bodies may use.

The plaintiff, EcoConcepts Management Services Inc., and the third parties (former board members) each moved for summary judgment against Peel Condominium Corporation No. 260.

The dispute arose from the termination of EcoConcepts' management contract, which included a highly contentious termination clause requiring payment for the remainder of a five-year term.

Allegations of fabricated documents, improper board authorization, and bad faith were central to the defendant's counterclaim and third-party claim for contribution and indemnity.

The court dismissed both motions for summary judgment, concluding that genuine issues of material fact, particularly concerning credibility and the circumstances surrounding the 2013 Agreement's authorization, required a full trial for a fair and just determination.

The plaintiff sought to enforce a Quebec default judgment against the personal defendant, Lorenzo Panarese, in Ontario.

Panarese challenged the Quebec court's jurisdiction and argued that the judgment should not be enforced due to breach of natural justice or fraud.

The court found that the Quebec court had a real and substantial connection to the dispute and that Panarese had attorned to its jurisdiction by participating in the Quebec proceedings without reserving on jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the defences of natural justice and fraud, concluding that the evidence did not support a finding of fraud and that issues of service and the right to be heard were already litigated and decided in Quebec.

The Ontario court granted recognition and enforcement of the Quebec judgment against Panarese.

The Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) sought to enforce a personal guarantee against Sunny Bhasin, a director of Surje & Company Inc., for a corporate line of credit.

Default judgment had already been granted against the corporate defendant.

Bhasin argued that he was misled into signing the personal guarantee, claiming misrepresentation and non est factum.

The court found no misrepresentation by the Bank's employees, noting that the signed agreements clearly indicated personal liability and that Bhasin, a well-educated businessman, was careless in not reading the documents.

The court granted judgment in favour of RBC, enforcing the personal guarantee.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss a social host liability claim arising from a party where an underage guest became intoxicated and was seriously injured in a car accident after leaving.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues of material fact that could not be fairly and justly determined on summary judgment.

The court also held that the established law on social host liability, particularly *Childs v. Desormeaux*, did not preclude a duty of care in this case, especially given the presence of underage drinking and the host's supervisory role.

The applicant lender sought a declaration of coverage under a title insurance policy after a private mortgage transaction was discovered to be an identity fraud.

The respondent insurer denied coverage, relying on an exception that applied if mortgage proceeds were paid to anyone other than the registered titleholder.

The funds had been disbursed to the borrower's lawyer in trust.

The court held that the exception was ambiguous and did not clearly require direct payment to the titleholder.

Construing the ambiguity against the insurer, the court found the exception did not apply and declared that the policy provided coverage for the loss.

The defendant solicitors requested an order dismissing the action against them under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing it was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff corporation alleged misappropriation of trust funds under the Construction Lien Act.

The court declined to dismiss the action, finding that the core allegation of misappropriation of trust funds was not plainly an abuse of process on its face, though noting the plaintiff risked adverse costs and must be represented by a lawyer.

The defendant in a civil action for sexual assault brought a motion seeking a declaration that he had not breached the deemed undertaking rule (Rule 30.1.01) or, alternatively, an order to exempt certain documents from it.

The defendant's civil counsel had provided the plaintiff's compelled documentary productions, including sensitive medical and counselling records, to his criminal defence counsel for use in parallel criminal proceedings to impeach the plaintiff's credibility, without prior notice or court directions.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the impeachment exception in Rule 30.1.01(6) is not automatic and requires parties to seek directions from the civil court, ordinarily on notice to the producing party, before using discovery evidence for impeachment in another proceeding.

The court found that the defendant had breached the deemed undertaking.

The plaintiff sued the police and Crown Attorneys for negligent investigation, unlawful arrest, and intentional infliction of mental suffering following an acquittal on a murder charge that involved a 'Mr. Big' operation.

The Crown Attorneys moved to strike the plaintiff's claim and a crossclaim brought by the police for negligent legal advice.

The court struck the plaintiff's claim against the Crown Attorneys, finding it barred by absolute common law immunity, which only allows claims for malicious prosecution.

However, the court refused to strike the police crossclaim for negligent legal advice, finding it was not plain and obvious that Crown Attorneys do not owe a duty of care to police when providing legal advice during an investigation.

The court also held that statutory immunity under s. 8 of the Ministry of the Attorney General Act applied to the plaintiff's claim but not the crossclaim.

The applicant brought a motion under Rule 59.06 and the court's inherent jurisdiction to reopen a previous decision dismissing her application to set aside an arbitral award.

She alleged fraud regarding statements made by opposing counsel during the arbitration and sought to introduce new evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence of fraud and concluding that the applicant was improperly attempting to reargue the merits of her application without meeting the test for fresh evidence.

The appellant insurer appealed an arbitration decision regarding a priority dispute over statutory accident benefits for a claimant injured on an all-terrain vehicle (ATV).

The arbitrator found that the respondent's policy, which specifically insured the ATV, met the definition of an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS).

However, the arbitrator erred by concluding that the appellant's general automobile policy, which did not cover the ATV, was still subject to the priority scheme in s. 268(2) of the Insurance Act.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the threshold for statutory accident benefits must be met under each specific policy before the priority scheme is engaged.

Since only the respondent's policy provided coverage, the priority scheme did not apply, and the appeal was granted.

The defendant Gregory Carter brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action against him, primarily relying on expert witness immunity.

The plaintiff Rory Sheehan had sued Carter for a report prepared for his ex-wife's family law proceedings, alleging issues with Carter's qualifications as a Psychological Associate and his out-of-court statements regarding his credentials.

The court found that Carter's role as an expert witness, including his report and related out-of-court communications about his qualifications, fell within the scope of absolute expert witness immunity.

The court also noted serious causation and damages issues for the plaintiff.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against Gregory Carter.

The applicant insurer sought an order compelling six statutory accident benefits (SABS) claimants to attend examinations under oath (EUOs) as a test case on whether a justification is required under s. 33(2) of the SABS.

The court held that s. 33(4)3 mandates the insurer to provide a specific reason or reasons for the EUO, beyond a general statement of purpose or scope.

The court found that the insurer failed to provide such meaningful reasons to any of the respondents, thus they were not obligated to attend the examinations.

The application was dismissed.

This costs endorsement followed the dismissal of an application to set aside an arbitral award.

The applicant, Anthea Koon, sought to delay the costs decision pending a potential Rule 59.06 motion and requested an oral hearing for costs, both of which were denied.

The respondent, Lawyers Professional Indemnity Company, as the successful party in the underlying application, sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $36,000.

The applicant also sought costs of about $54,000.

The court, applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, found no circumstances to depart from the general rule that the successful party receives costs.

The respondent was awarded costs fixed at $10,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

Bell Canada sought an interlocutory injunction against Cogeco Cable Canada GP Inc. regarding two aspects of Cogeco's new advertising campaign: the phrase "the best Internet experience in your neighbourhood" and the rebranding of Internet packages with the prefix "Ultra" (e.g., UltraFibre 250).

Bell alleged false and misleading representations under the Competition Act and Trade-marks Act, as well as common-law claims.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test for interlocutory injunctions.

It found a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favored granting an injunction against the use of "the best Internet experience in your neighbourhood" as Cogeco could not objectively claim to offer the best speed and performance in all areas.

However, the court denied an injunction regarding the "UltraFibre" branding, deeming it puffery when accompanied by specific speed commitments.

The plaintiffs, a franchisee and its principals, moved for partial summary judgment seeking rescission of a franchise agreement due to alleged failures of disclosure under the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000.

The defendants brought a cross-motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claim.

The court found that the franchisor's disclosure document was egregiously deficient, specifically lacking a materially complete form of lease (including the head lease) and proper cost estimates for a conversion-type franchise.

The court rejected arguments that disclosure was impossible due to an undetermined location or that franchisee sophistication waived disclosure obligations.

The deficiencies amounted to a failure to provide a disclosure document, entitling the franchisee to rescission under s. 6(2) of the AWA.

The court also determined which corporate defendants were "franchisor's associates" and dismissed claims for misrepresentation and breach of good faith due to lack of focused argument.

All damages issues were referred to a Master.

Following the defendant's successful motion for summary judgment, the court determined the quantum of costs.

The defendant sought approximately $331,500 on a partial and substantial indemnity basis, relying on a favourable offer to settle.

The plaintiff argued for $210,000.

The court found the matter complex but noted excessive hourly rates for junior counsel and insufficient delegation.

Costs were fixed at $240,000 all-inclusive.

The Minister of Finance appealed an arbitrator's preliminary award concerning an automobile insurance policy.

Echelon General Insurance Company had attempted to cancel a six-month policy for non-payment, but the cancellation was invalid due to non-compliance with the notice requirements of s. 236 of the Insurance Act.

The arbitrator ruled the policy expired at the end of its term, not extended by s. 236.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that s. 236(5) unambiguously states a contract of insurance remains in force until the statutory notice provisions for renewal or non-renewal are complied with.

The court found that Echelon's policy was not properly cancelled and therefore remained in force at the time of the accident, overriding common law contract principles regarding policy expiry.

The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice claim against several physician and hospital defendants following the death of his common-law spouse from aggressive brain cancer.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing a lack of expert evidence to establish professional negligence and causation, and that the duty to obtain informed consent rested with the physicians, not the hospital pharmacies.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial as the plaintiff's expert evidence was insufficient and causation was not established.