Robert F. Goldstein

The offender was convicted of sexual assault and choking after attacking an intoxicated stranger in a public park.

The Crown sought a sentence of four years, while the defence sought a sentence at the lower end of the three to five-year range.

The court emphasized the brutality of the assault, the vulnerability of the victim, and the need for general deterrence, while noting the offender's alcohol issues and potential for rehabilitation.

The offender was sentenced to four years in the penitentiary, along with mandatory ancillary orders including a 20-year SOIRA order, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay and refusing to re-open the application after the release of R. v. Jordan.

He also argued the trial judge erred by admitting in-car video evidence of his impairment after finding a s. 10(b) Charter breach.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly characterized a 4.5-month delay caused by a judge's recusal as a discrete event/neutral delay.

The court also held the trial judge properly exercised his discretion not to re-open the delay application and correctly admitted the video evidence, which merely confirmed the officers' lawful observations of impairment.

The Crown appealed the trial judge's decision to exclude breath samples and dismiss 'over 80' charges against the respondent.

The trial judge found that the investigating officer failed to administer the approved screening device 'forthwith' in violation of s. 8 of the Charter, and failed to implement the respondent's right to counsel of choice in violation of s. 10(b).

The Superior Court of Justice found no error in the trial judge's analysis, concluding that the officer prioritized privacy over the statutory imperative to administer the test forthwith, and took a 'short-cut' by calling duty counsel instead of facilitating the respondent's counsel of choice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was a passenger in a vehicle involved in a shootout with police in a nightclub parking lot.

The driver was killed, and the accused fled by crawling under a nearby pickup truck.

A prohibited firearm was later found under the truck.

The accused denied crawling under the truck or possessing the firearm.

The court rejected the accused's testimony, finding it not credible and contradicted by video evidence and officer testimony.

Applying the test for circumstantial evidence, the court concluded that the only rational inference was that the accused possessed the firearm and discarded it while hiding.

The accused was found guilty of both firearms offences.

Derrick Harvey, an American citizen, appealed his 2011 guilty pleas for assault and failing to comply with a recognizance, which subsequently led to his permanent residence application being refused due to criminality.

He argued his plea was not informed as his trial counsel failed to advise him of the significant immigration consequences.

The Superior Court of Justice, on summary conviction appeal, found that Harvey's plea was not informed because he was unaware of the critical ramifications, specifically the distinction between border entry and criminal inadmissibility for permanent residence.

The court emphasized that a plea must be voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, including collateral consequences.

It was not necessary to find counsel ineffective.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty plea set aside, and a new trial ordered, with the decision to re-prosecute left to the Crown.

Following a summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff franchisors for unpaid royalties, the court determined costs, the terms of the draft order, and post-judgment interest.

Despite a contractual clause providing for substantial indemnity costs, the court exercised its discretion to award a reduced lump sum of $15,000, finding the plaintiffs' claimed costs excessive for a straightforward motion.

The court also formally dismissed the defendants' counterclaim, which lacked merit, and enforced the contractual post-judgment interest rate of 24% per annum, finding no exceptional circumstances to override freedom of contract.

The plaintiff staked unpatented mining claims on Crown land where the Ministry of Transportation (MTO) planned to build a realigned highway.

The plaintiff subsequently applied for aggregate permits, which were delayed and limited due to the highway construction.

The plaintiff brought an action claiming the MTO expropriated the property and sought compensation for the lost aggregate value.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that an unpatented mining claim is not 'land' under the Expropriations Act.

The court further held that even if it were land, the claims had no value because the plaintiff could not have obtained an aggregate permit for the entire property, and the property was not wrongfully downzoned.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and choking following an encounter with the complainant in a park.

The complainant, who was highly intoxicated and lost, testified that she was sexually assaulted and choked by the accused, a stranger.

The accused claimed the encounter was consensual and that the complainant suddenly began yelling 'rape'.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as not credible and found that the complainant lacked the capacity to consent due to alcohol impairment.

The court further found that the complainant did not consent and that the accused did not have an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The accused was found guilty of both charges.

The Plaintiffs, co-owners of an income property, successfully opposed a motion by the Defendants to add the Estate of Gabriel Zimmerman as a party to their action against property managers.

This endorsement addresses the Plaintiffs' request for substantial indemnity costs.

The court found substantial indemnity costs appropriate given the Estate was out of time and the motion was a delaying tactic, and the Plaintiffs' offer to settle was reasonable.

The court awarded joint and several costs of $45,000.00 against the Defendants and the Estate, with the Estate's liability limited to $36,982.50.

The court rejected the Defendants' argument to pay costs from the disputed funds, stating it would penalize the Plaintiffs for winning.

The appellant, Imtiaz Bakhash, appealed his convictions for assault and threatening death, arguing the trial was unfair due to the trial judge's management, curtailing of cross-examination, and reliance on prior misconduct evidence.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge's extensive interventions, while well-intentioned to assist the self-represented accused, compromised the appearance of fairness by usurping defence counsel's function and forcing the disclosure of defence strategy.

The court also found that the trial judge's actions undermined the duty of confidentiality between court-appointed counsel and the accused, even if a full solicitor-client relationship did not exist.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

Walter Creglia appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient and that his Charter rights were violated due to a lack of reasonable grounds for arrest.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge's reasons for both dismissing the Charter motion and convicting on impaired driving were convoluted, difficult to understand, and failed to demonstrate a clear path to conviction by linking the evidence, law, and conclusions.

The court also noted the trial judge's irrelevant discussion of "care and control." Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered, as meaningful appellate review was not possible, and the curative proviso was deemed inapplicable.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that breath samples were not taken "as soon as practicable" due to a 22-minute delay waiting to enter a police station sally port.

The trial judge relied on extensive experience to find the delay reasonable and not requiring specific explanation.

The Superior Court upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in concluding that the samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The court emphasized that the "as soon as practicable" standard does not require an accounting for every minute of delay, especially when the overall time is reasonable and within the two-hour statutory limit.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay charges against W.R., an intellectually disabled man, for sexual assault, due to unreasonable delay under R. v. Jordan.

The trial judge found a 21-month delay, exceeding the 18-month ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice, and no exceptional circumstances.

The Crown argued errors in assessing complexity, discrete events, and transitional provisions.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the case was not complex, the Crown failed to act diligently in securing expert evidence, and the delay was unreasonable even under pre-Jordan guidelines.

Nathan Buress appealed a 10-year driving prohibition imposed after he pleaded guilty to driving while disqualified and dangerous driving.

The appellant had a lengthy criminal record including multiple driving offences and was on probation and a conditional sentence at the time of the offences.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the prohibition was necessary for specific and general deterrence and public protection, given the appellant's history and the dangerous nature of his conduct.

The appellant, Steve Katsikaris, appealed the imposition of a common law peace bond by a trial judge following his acquittal on a charge of threatening death.

The trial judge had dismissed the threatening charge, finding the Crown had not proven intent, but issued a peace bond due to concerns for the safety of a doctor and a police chief, based on a reasonable apprehension of a breach of the peace.

On appeal, Katsikaris raised various unrelated issues.

The Superior Court affirmed the trial judge's jurisdiction to impose the common law peace bond, citing R. v. Parks, and found no error in the exercise of discretion, dismissing the appeal. interesting_citations_summary: > This decision affirms the common law jurisdiction of a trial judge to impose a peace bond, even after an acquittal, where there is a reasonable apprehension of a breach of the peace.

It relies on the principle established in R. v. Parks, which confirms the inherent authority of the court to prevent breaches of the peace.

The case highlights that an appellant must address the legal issues relevant to the appeal, rather than extraneous matters, for their submissions to be considered pertinent. final_judgement: The appeal is dismissed, and the common law peace bond is upheld. winning_degree_applicant: 5 winning_degree_respondent: 1 judge_bias_applicant: 0 judge_bias_respondent: 0 year: 2017 decision_number: 3640 file_number: "CR-17-10000006-00AP" source: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2017/2017onsc3640/2017onsc3640.html" cited_cases: legislation: [] case_law: - title: "R. v. Parks, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 871" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1992/1992canlii78/1992canlii78.html" keywords: - Criminal law - Appeal - Peace bond - Common law jurisdiction - Threatening death - Mental Health Act - R. v. Parks areas_of_law: - Criminal Law - Civil Procedure --- # Court File and Parties **Court File No.:** CR-17-10000006-00AP **Date:** 2017-06-13 **Ontario Superior Court of Justice** **Between:** Her Majesty the Queen – and – Steve Katsikaris **Counsel:** Danielle Carbonneau, for the Crown Steve Katsikaris on his own behalf **Heard:** June 12, 2017 **Before:** R.F. Goldstein J. --- ## Reasons for Judgment [1] On November 18, 2015 Mr. Katsikaris attended at the Ryerson Medical Centre for a mental health assessment.

Dr. Hogarth saw him.

She became concerned about his stability.

He became agitated and angry.

Mr. Katsikiaris told her that police officers were trying to kill him.

He specifically mentioned killing Paul Martin, the Chief of Durham Regional Police.

In the course of her assessment Dr. Hogarth became concerned that there was a risk he would cause harm to others.

She issued a Form 1 under the Mental Health Act.

He was taken to St. Michael’s Hospital for a psychiatric assessment. [2] Mr. Katsikaris was arrested and charged with threatening death.

He was tried by Justice Bigelow of the Ontario Court of Justice.

Justice Bigleow dismissed the charge.

His Honour found that the Crown had not proven that the Mr. Katsikaris intended to threaten Chief Martin or that he meant that the threat be taken seriously. [3] After the acquittal the Crown requested a common law peace bond.

Justice Bigelow was concerned about the safety of Dr. Hogarth and Chief Martin.

He explained that Mr. Katsikaris was simply required to stay away from them. [4] Mr. Katsikaris appeals.

He raised multiple issues before me.

Most of the issues had nothing to do with the case.

He asked for disclosure, although it was not clear to me what he was asking for disclosure of.

He made a number of allegations relating to conspiracies by various police forces.

He seemed to suggest that the government of the United States was also involved.

It appears that there might be some kind of history between Mr. Katsikaris and the police force and the local government in the Town of Kawartha Lakes.

It was unclear to me if there was any connection between that and the appeal.

In any event, none of his submissions directly addressed the real issue, which was whether or not the trial judge had the jurisdiction to impose a common law peace bond and whether it was justified. [5] It is clear that Justice Bigelow had the jurisdiction under his authority at common law: [R. v. Parks, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 871 at para. 63](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1992/1992canlii78/1992canlii78.html).

It is also clear that there was evidence before him that there was a reasonable apprehension that Mr. Katsikaris may breach the peace.

His mental health is an issue.

He lives next door to Chief Martin.

He also indicated that he might want to reach out to Dr. Hogarth. [6] There was a clearly basis for the trial judge to issue the peace bond.

I see no error and no reason to interfere with what was essentially the exercise of his discretion.

The appeal is dismissed. --- R.F. Goldstein J. Released: June 13, 2017

Matthew Wawrykiewicz was convicted of multiple drug trafficking and proceeds of crime offences across two indictments.

Following a dismissed Charter application, he did not contest the Crown's facts.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the significant quantities of cocaine and heroin, the commission of second offences while on bail, and the presence of weapons.

Mitigating factors included his youth, lack of prior criminal record, and the efficient defence of the Charter motion.

The court found him to be a high-level professional drug dealer and imposed a global sentence of ten years in the penitentiary, with specific concurrent and consecutive sentences for each count, and credit for pre-sentence custody and house arrest.

The accused, Derek Oppong, brought a Corbett application to prohibit the Crown from cross-examining him on his criminal record if he testified.

The Crown sought to introduce the full record for credibility.

The court applied the Corbett factors, balancing probative value against prejudicial effect, considering the nature and remoteness of convictions, similarity to current charges, and the defense's attack on the Crown witness's character.

The court ultimately edited the record, prohibiting cross-examination on assault and robbery convictions, but permitting it on theft under, fail to comply, and threatening death convictions, to avoid an unbalanced portrayal of the accused's character to the jury.

Following a successful summary judgment motion for wrongful dismissal, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of $35,000.

The defendant argued for proportionality and costs on the Small Claims Court scale, asserting the plaintiff did not achieve a more favourable result than their settlement offers.

The court rejected the defendant's arguments, finding that the plaintiff's judgment was indeed more favourable than their settlement offers.

The court also dismissed the proportionality argument, emphasizing that a just result is paramount and that the defendant's "hardball litigation" tactics contributed to the costs.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The Plaintiffs' motion for a third inspection was dismissed, leading to this costs endorsement.

The Defendants, having succeeded on the motion, sought partial indemnity costs.

The Plaintiffs argued for "costs in the cause" contending that the motion was premature rather than a final determination of inspection entitlement.

The court, however, found no reason to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the event, as the motion was dismissed outright.

The court awarded the Defendants partial indemnity costs of $48,880.70, deeming the amount fair and reasonable given the complexity of the technical issues and the parties' sophistication.

Nedeljko Mikasinovic was convicted by a jury of assault causing bodily harm, an included offence of aggravated assault.

The sentencing judge rejected the defense's claim of self-defense, finding the assault unprovoked, gratuitous, and disproportionate, resulting in severe and permanent brain injury to the victim.

Despite mitigating factors such as the offender's efforts to rehabilitate and positive character references, the judge found the offender lacked genuine remorse and had a history of violent offenses.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 2.5 years, while the defense sought a suspended or intermittent sentence.

The court imposed a 14-month reformatory sentence, two years probation, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a non-communication order.