Robert F. Goldstein

The accused was charged with assault, sexual assault, and extortion following encounters with a complainant he met on a dating app.

The accused provided a timely and particularized alibi for the extortion charge, supported by employment and Ministry of Transportation records, which the court found highly persuasive.

The court also found significant reliability and credibility issues with the complainant's evidence regarding the assault and sexual assault allegations, including inconsistencies about a photograph of her alleged injuries.

The court was left with a reasonable doubt on all counts and found the accused not guilty.

The accused was charged with five counts of counselling the commission of offences that were not committed, including counselling the murder of his wife, planting a gun and drugs in her car, and the murder of her family lawyer.

The Crown's case relied heavily on recordings of the accused's conversations with a police agent and an undercover officer posing as a hitman.

The accused claimed the police altered the recordings to frame him.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding the recordings accurate and the accused's claims baseless.

The court found the accused guilty on all five counts, concluding he actively induced the undercover officer to commit the offences and intended for them to be carried out.

Taha Shaikh pleaded guilty to multiple charges including assault causing bodily harm, uttering threats, assault, and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The court considered aggravating factors such as intimate partner violence, the victim's vulnerability, and the commission of offences while on a peace bond and house arrest.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, genuine remorse, family support, employment prospects, and sparing the victim from testifying at trial.

The court also addressed the "Coke Rule" regarding subsequent convictions and the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit (Duncan credit) for harsh jail conditions.

A global sentence of two years was deemed appropriate, but due to pre-sentence custody credit, the final sentence was one day in custody followed by three years probation with specific conditions.

Sarai Lopez Iglesias, charged with first-degree murder, applied for bail.

The Crown opposed, citing the strength of the case, the gravity of the offence, and concerns on primary and secondary grounds.

The applicant proposed a robust bail plan including house arrest with sureties (her mother and step-father), electronic monitoring, and a substantial pledge.

The court, while acknowledging the strong Crown case and serious nature of the charge, found that the proposed plan, particularly the full-time supervision by the mother, was sufficient to address the concerns on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds, and granted bail.

The Crown applied for an order of certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the accused on firearm possession charges.

The Crown argued the judge committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the evidence and by drawing an inference favourable to the accused.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that while the preliminary inquiry judge made an error of law regarding the need for 'exclusive possession', it was not a jurisdictional error.

The judge's conclusion on the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence was within his jurisdiction and not reviewable by certiorari.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion seeking a ruling that the recent amendments to the Criminal Code under Bill C-75 eliminating peremptory challenges operated retrospectively.

The accused argued that the right to challenge jurors is a substantive right.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the right to a jury trial is substantive, but the right to peremptorily challenge jurors is procedural.

Following recent jurisprudence, the court held that the elimination of peremptory challenges does not breach the right to a fair trial and applies prospectively to the accused's jury selection.

The accused, alleged to be the getaway driver in a series of nine armed robberies, appeared for a 90-day detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The accused proposed a new surety and argued the Crown's case was weak.

The court found the proposed surety unsuitable and the Crown's case formidable on at least one count.

Applying the secondary and tertiary grounds, the court concluded that the accused's continued detention was necessary to prevent further offences and maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder following a home invasion where an 82-year-old woman was beaten to death.

At the close of the Crown's case, the defence moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on first-degree murder, arguing the jury should only be left with second-degree murder or manslaughter.

The Crown argued first-degree murder could be established through planning and deliberation or constructive murder based on forcible confinement.

The court granted the directed verdict application, finding no evidence to support planning and deliberation, nor evidence of a discrete act of forcible confinement separate from the killing itself.

The jury was directed to return a verdict of acquittal on first-degree murder and subsequently convicted the accused of second-degree murder.

The Crown brought an application to admit a video statement made by the accused to police following his arrest for second-degree murder.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary, alleging his will was overborne by persistent questioning, inducements, and delayed cautions.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary, noting the police did not offer inducements, the questioning was not oppressive, and the accused understood his rights.

The statement was ruled admissible subject to editing out specific prejudicial references.

This is a ruling on a Corbett application to determine the admissibility of the accused's criminal record for cross-examination on credibility during a trial for second-degree murder.

The court balanced the probative value and prejudicial effect of the record, considering the nature, similarity, and remoteness of previous convictions, and the need to prevent an unbalanced picture for the jury.

The judge decided to admit an edited version of the record, excluding drug offences, mischief over $5000, crimes indicating antipathy to the justice system (assault peace officer, escape lawful custody), sexual assaults, and possession of a firearm, while allowing crimes of dishonesty (theft, possession of stolen property) and some assaults and breaches of court orders, with aggravated assault reduced to assault.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and administering a noxious substance, brought an application under s. 276(2) and s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code to introduce photographs and WhatsApp messages depicting prior sexual activity with the complainant.

The accused sought to use this evidence to impeach the complainant's credibility, as she had testified at the preliminary inquiry that they were 'just friends'.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the evidence was relevant, its probative value was low due to ambiguity in the messages, and its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value.

Following his conviction for 12 counts of fraud over $5000 related to a currency trading Ponzi scheme, the accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged abuse of process.

The accused argued there was improper coordination between the Crown, police, and civil counsel representing the defrauded investors.

The court summarily dismissed the application, finding no reasonable prospect of success.

The court held there was no evidence of improper coordination, that the disclosure of the Crown brief to civil litigants followed the proper Wagg screening process, and that there was no evidence Crown counsel co-authored an article with civil counsel.

The accused, convicted of 12 counts of fraud in a multi-million dollar Ponzi scheme, brought a motion alleging the Crown failed to make timely disclosure and failed to preserve evidence, seeking a stay of proceedings.

The court found that while there were some minor oversights in disclosure, they did not impact the accused's ability to make full answer and defence.

The court also found no duty on the police to preserve irrelevant emails and noted a lack of due diligence by the accused in requesting disclosure.

The disclosure application was dismissed.

The offender was convicted of twelve counts of fraud over $5000 for operating a large-scale Ponzi scheme disguised as a currency trading business.

He defrauded investors of approximately $15.6 million by misrepresenting his trading success, diverting funds for personal use, and using new investor money to pay earlier investors.

The court sentenced the offender to 9 years in prison, ordered restitution of $14.4 million, imposed a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $15.6 million, and issued a lifetime prohibition order preventing him from having authority over the money or property of others.

The accused, charged with 13 counts of fraud, brought an application to remove the prosecuting Crown counsel, alleging a conflict of interest and collusion with civil complainants.

The Crown moved to summarily dismiss the application on the basis that it had no reasonable chance of success.

The court reviewed the accused's allegations, including claims of improper disclosure, misrepresentation, and collusion, finding them factually incorrect or devoid of merit.

The court concluded the application was a transparent attempt to delay the trial and summarily dismissed it without an evidentiary hearing.

The defendant, Steven Nowack, facing 13 counts of fraud, brought a directed verdict motion at the close of the Crown's case, arguing insufficient evidence for conviction on four counts.

The Crown alleged Nowack made misrepresentations to investors, diverted funds, and failed to provide an accounting, resulting in approximately $15 million in losses.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could return a guilty verdict on all challenged counts, including those related to Dr. Joseph Greenberg, Minton Trading Limited, Sinomec Finance Limited, and Lee Sui Fun.

The court emphasized that the Crown is not required to prove that misrepresentations were material to the losses, only that they placed the victim's economic interests at risk, and that a direct personal nexus between the fraudster and victim is not necessary.

The accused, charged with drug trafficking, brought a pre-trial application seeking disclosure of confidential informant handler notes and files to prepare for a Garofoli application.

The Crown resisted, arguing the materials were not part of the investigative file and could identify the informants.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the requested materials are not routinely disclosed as part of the investigative file and the accused failed to meet the threshold showing of relevance required to compel their disclosure.

The court reconsidered its costs decision following a damages re-hearing, where both the plaintiff and defendants sought costs.

The plaintiff, Prolink Broker Network Inc., claimed partial indemnity costs, while the defendants, Rakesh (Rick) Jaitley, My Insurance Broker Corp., and My Insurance Broker Canada Corp., argued for no costs to the plaintiff and sought their own costs based on an offer to settle.

The court applied a flexible approach to reconsider its previous endorsement due to a factual error.

Ultimately, the court found that both parties had mixed success and neither achieved their desired outcome in the overall litigation.

Despite the plaintiff's limited success on liability and the defendants' expert evidence being largely accepted on damages, the court declined to award costs to either party, concluding that each should bear its own costs.

Steven Nowack, convicted of 12 counts of fraud over $19 million, applied for bail pending post-conviction motions and sentencing.

His previous bail was cancelled due to breaches and contempt findings.

Nowack argued for bail based on alleged violations of a court order regarding hospital transport and s. 7 Charter rights due to mistreatment by authorities and reckless driving.

The court found no violation of its order, deeming the delay in hospital transport reasonable given staffing issues and an acute medical emergency involving another prisoner.

The court also found no s. 7 Charter violation, dismissing Nowack's claims of abusive treatment and reckless driving as exaggerated and lacking credibility, particularly after reviewing video evidence.

The application for bail was dismissed, and the detention order remained in place, emphasizing the need to maintain confidence in the administration of justice given the serious nature of the crime and Nowack's history of non-compliance with court orders.

A youth, L.L., charged with second-degree murder, applied for bail.

The Crown sought detention on secondary and tertiary grounds under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court found that the Crown did not meet its onus, emphasizing the strong presumption of release for youth and the requirement of exceptional circumstances for tertiary ground detention.

The proposed plan of release with residential and community sureties was deemed adequate, and L.L. was released on house arrest with conditions.