Robert F. Goldstein

The applicant sought to revisit a decision dismissing his application to vary bail, arguing the court relied on a factual error regarding his brother's address.

The court acknowledged the error but declined to revisit the ruling, finding the error was not material to the outcome.

The original decision was based primarily on the applicant's history of bail violations, the distance from his surety, and the risk of further offences.

The application to revisit was dismissed.

The accused applied to sever counts on an indictment charging him and a co-accused with a home invasion and firearms offences.

The accused sought separate trials so he could testify regarding the firearms charges without implicating himself in the home invasion.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the counts were closely connected factually and legally, and that the desire to testify on some counts but not others did not outweigh the policy against a multiplicity of proceedings.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, voyeurism, and child pornography offences against the complainant.

The police seized the accused's cell phones and obtained two search warrants.

The accused applied to exclude the digital evidence obtained from the phones, arguing the police failed to make full and frank disclosure in the Information to Obtain (ITO) by omitting recantation letters and denials from a family member.

The court found the police breached s. 8 of the Charter by conducting warrantless searches of the digital media outside the authorized scope and date ranges.

Applying the Grant test under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court concluded the Charter-infringing state conduct was serious and had a high impact on the accused's privacy interests.

The digital evidence was excluded.

The applicant, facing 22 charges including robbery, dangerous driving, and firearm offences, sought a bail review after being detained by a justice of the peace.

He argued that his recovery from COVID-19 and delays in setting a preliminary inquiry constituted a material change in circumstances, and that the justice of the peace erred in law.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no material change in circumstances and no errors of law.

The court further held that even with a foolproof release plan, the applicant's detention was necessary on the tertiary ground to maintain confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity of the offences and his extensive criminal record.

The accused, charged with major drug trafficking offences, applied to vary his strict bail conditions to change his residential surety and permit him to operate a liquidation business.

The court found that while there was a material change in circumstances regarding the current surety, the proposed replacement surety was not equipped to properly supervise the accused.

The court also found no material change of circumstances justifying the accused's return to work, noting that his proposed liquidation business posed an unacceptable risk of re-offending given his history of bail breaches and the nature of the charges.

The application to vary bail was dismissed.

Sentencing decision following convictions for sexual assault causing bodily harm and threatening death arising from a violent sexual assault by a male roommate against a young woman in her bedroom and kitchen.

The defence advanced cannabis intoxication and major depressive disorder as mitigating factors through social work and psychiatric opinion evidence, but the court rejected those positions because the offender's self-reporting was inconsistent and unreliable.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence in light of the violent invasion of the victim's living space, bodily harm to her wrists, threats to kill her into silence, and lasting psychological harm.

A suspended sentence or conditional sentence was held to be manifestly unfit, and a global penitentiary sentence of three years was imposed with ancillary DNA, firearm prohibition, SOIRA, and no-contact orders.

The applicant, charged with multiple counts of robbery alongside a co-accused, applied for severance on the basis that a joint trial would infringe his right to be tried within a reasonable time.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, jury trials were suspended, causing significant delay.

The applicant was willing to re-elect for a judge-alone trial, while the co-accused was not.

The court granted the severance application, finding that while most factors favoured a joint trial, the potential injustice caused by the delay and mutually inconsistent elections warranted severance.

The accused, charged with numerous offences including drug trafficking for a criminal organization and obstruction of justice, applied for a bail review.

The Crown conceded a material change in circumstances due to a new release plan involving two sureties and an ankle monitor.

The court found that while the proposed sureties were sufficient to meet the secondary ground, the accused failed to meet his onus on the tertiary ground.

Given the strength of the Crown's case, the gravity of the offences, and the accused's alleged attempt to procure a fake surety to subvert the bail process, detention was necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused applied for a bail review after being detained on serious firearms and drug charges.

The police had found handguns, ammunition, and drugs in a secret compartment in a vehicle primarily driven by the accused.

The accused argued the justice of the peace erred in law and that a new release plan and a reduction in the alleged weight of fentanyl constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no error by the justice of the peace and concluding that the new evidence did not materially alter the tertiary ground for detention.

The accused, Matthew Hamilton, brought an application under s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code to admit evidence from the complainant's Instagram account and Instagram messages in a sexual assault trial.

Hamilton argued the evidence was relevant to his defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent and to the complainant's credibility, as it suggested a consensual paid sexual encounter rather than an iPhone sale.

The court found the Instagram account evidence lacked sufficient precision for admissibility at this stage but allowed for further submissions.

The Instagram messages from the date of the alleged offence were deemed admissible as they related to the core subject matter and contradicted the complainant's initial statement, thus being directly relevant to her credibility.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and uttering threats, sought the appointment of the same judge to hear both a pre-trial third-party records application under s. 278.2 of the Criminal Code and the subsequent trial.

The court denied this request, clarifying that a case management judge is empowered to hear such pre-trial applications under s. 551.3 of the Criminal Code.

The decision emphasized that a trial judge can revisit pre-trial rulings made by a different judge if fresh evidence or a material change in circumstances arises, as explicitly permitted by s. 551.1(4) of the Criminal Code and common law principles.

This is a sentencing decision for Gioacchino Jack Ricchio, who was convicted of sexual assault.

The 16-year-old victim was intoxicated and drugged with flubromazolam, rendering her incapable of consent.

The assault involved intimate touching and possibly digital penetration.

Aggravating factors included the victim's vulnerability, the accused's knowledge of her incapacitation, his prior youth criminal record (including a violent offence), and his callous abandonment of the victim while she was incapacitated.

Mitigating factors included the accused's youth (20 years old), intellectual deficits, and family support.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence, finding the assault highly intrusive and harmful despite the absence of proven penile penetration, citing R. v. Friesen.

Considering the principle of parity with a co-accused who received 26 months, the court imposed a sentence of two years less a day imprisonment, followed by two years of probation, along with various ancillary orders.

The applicants brought a motion to exclude wiretap evidence obtained during a police investigation into the manufacturing and trafficking of converted firearms.

They argued that the police failed to demonstrate the existence of a criminal organization, failed to establish investigative necessity, and engaged in a pattern of misrepresentation that subverted the pre-authorization process.

The court found that while there were insufficient grounds to establish a criminal organization and some misrepresentations existed in the affidavits, the investigative necessity requirement was met for the firearms offences.

After excising the misleading information, the court concluded that the authorizing judge could still have granted the authorizations.

The court declined to exercise its residual discretion to exclude the evidence, finding no deliberate attempt to subvert the prior authorization process.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought the appointment of state-funded counsel under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code for his appeals from convictions for assault and assault causing bodily harm.

He argued that the trial judges erred by failing to inquire into potential s. 11(b) Charter breaches due to delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to prove he lacked the means to hire counsel privately and failed to establish arguable grounds of appeal, as he had been represented by counsel for much of the proceedings and provided no evidence regarding the reasons for the delay.

The accused, a restaurant owner, was charged with mischief and obstructing police after opening his business in defiance of COVID-19 lockdown orders.

He was released on bail with conditions restricting his business operations, prohibiting him from attending his restaurant locations, and banning him from all social media.

On a bail review, the Superior Court found the complete social media ban was an error of law that violated freedom of expression.

The court removed the boundary conditions as contrary to the principle of restraint, narrowed the social media ban to prohibit only unlawful use, but upheld the business operations conditions as rationally connected to the offences.

The accused, charged with attempted murder and firearms offences, applied for a bail review following a detention order.

He argued a material change in circumstances due to a COVID-19 outbreak at the Toronto South Detention Centre.

The court found the outbreak constituted a material change, warranting a hearing de novo.

Although the Crown's case was strong and the offences serious, the court concluded the accused met his onus on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The accused was released on strict house arrest with GPS monitoring and three sureties.

The accused applied to revisit a pre-trial ruling that admitted expert police evidence regarding street gangs.

The defence argued that their willingness to make factual admissions about gang membership and the existence of the gang constituted a material change in circumstances, rendering the expert evidence unnecessary and overly prejudicial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed factual admissions lacked the necessary context that the expert evidence was meant to provide to the jury.

Furthermore, the Crown did not agree to the admissions, and the court could not compel such an agreement.

The accused was charged with sexual assault after he and a co-accused provided alcohol and drugs to two underage girls and took them to a hotel.

The complainant was highly intoxicated and incapacitated.

The court rejected the accused's testimony that the complainant was fine and consented.

Applying the test for capacity to consent, the court found the complainant was incapable of consenting due to intoxication.

The court also found no air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent, as the accused took no reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

The accused was found guilty.

The Attorney General of Canada applied for an arrest warrant, specifically a Feeney warrant, under the Extradition Act for a person sought in the United States for fraud.

The court noted that under section 16 of the Extradition Act and section 507(4) of the Criminal Code, the applicant must make out a case for a warrant as opposed to a summons.

Finding no evidence to suggest an arrest warrant was required for the Canadian citizen living in her own home, the court dismissed the application without prejudice.

The Crown brought a motion for directions to determine whether it could introduce evidence of the young complainant's lack of prior sexual activity in a sexual assault trial, and whether the complainant had standing at the resulting voir dire.

The court held that the Crown may introduce such evidence, subject to the common law Seaboyer principles and the factors in section 276 of the Criminal Code.

The court further held that unlike when an accused seeks to introduce such evidence, the complainant does not have automatic standing to participate in a voir dire when the evidence is led by the Crown.