Robert F. Goldstein

The accused, Corey Cunningham, was charged with attempted murder and armed robbery.

The Crown alleged he stabbed Christina Elgin and robbed her.

The court found Mr. Cunningham's testimony not credible due to contradictions with surveillance, medical, and text message evidence.

The court found Mr. Cunningham guilty of attempted murder, rejecting his self-defence claim.

He was found not guilty of robbery but guilty of the lesser included offence of theft of the phone, with reasonable doubt regarding the cash.

The applicant, F.N., sought bail after being charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder following the poisoning of two young children with sodium nitrite, resulting in one fatality.

The court considered the three grounds for detention under the Criminal Code, with particular focus on the tertiary ground, which assesses whether detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

Despite the applicant presenting strong sureties and a reasonable release plan, the court found the Crown's circumstantial case to be formidable, given the applicant's access to the chemical and familiarity with the victims' household.

The gravity of the offence, involving the deliberate poisoning of defenceless children, was deemed extremely high.

The application for bail was dismissed, as the court concluded that a reasonable, informed member of the public would lose confidence in the administration of justice if the applicant were released under these circumstances.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that he should have a new trial due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.

The appellant alleged that trial counsel failed to properly perfect a section 11(b) Charter application and failed to inform him of his right to testify on the Charter application.

The Superior Court of Justice found that while trial counsel's failure to file transcripts for the section 11(b) application fell below the standard of reasonable professional assistance, it did not result in a miscarriage of justice as the trial judge ultimately allowed the application to proceed.

The court also found that the appellant failed to establish that he was not informed of his right to testify, and even if he had been, it would not have changed the outcome given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's refusal to order a Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) assessment and the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit for an offender convicted of possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace.

The offender, a homeless man with schizophrenia, was involved in an altercation with a taxi driver and a homeless couple.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary decision to refuse the assessment based on the evidence, including video surveillance.

The court also upheld the trial judge's allocation of pre-sentence custody credit across multiple charges, applying the principles from Barnett.

The accused was charged with willfully promoting hatred against gay men under s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code after distributing anti-gay flyers at the 2016 Toronto Pride Parade.

The flyers contained graphic images and medical claims about the dangers of the 'homosexual lifestyle', alongside religious messaging.

The court found that while the flyers were offensive and contained exaggerations, they fell into the 'grey zone' between legitimate expression and hate speech, lacking the hallmarks of extreme vilification.

The court also found a reasonable doubt regarding the accused's specific intent to promote hatred, resulting in an acquittal.

The Crown brought an ex parte application on behalf of 721 respondents to vary the time to pay the victim fine surcharge (VFS) by 99 years.

The VFS had previously been struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Boudreault, leaving thousands of offenders subject to an unconstitutional penalty.

The Superior Court of Justice found it had jurisdiction under section 734.3 of the Criminal Code to grant the extension and that it was in the interests of justice to do so, effectively ensuring no enforcement measures would be taken against these offenders in their lifetimes.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death after driving her vehicle through a red light and striking a pedestrian in a crosswalk.

The accused argued she was in a momentary 'dreamlike state' due to grief over a friend's recent death, which she claimed negated the necessary fault element.

The court rejected this explanation, finding that the accused experienced a prolonged period of inattention that constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable driver.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused, charged with attempted murder and other offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 42 months and six days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court analyzed the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the scheduling of the bifurcated trial.

The court found that the entire period from the originally scheduled trial date to the anticipated end of the rescheduled trial was attributable to the exceptional circumstance of the pandemic.

After deducting this period, the net delay was 23 months, which fell within the presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The offender pleaded guilty to abducting his 21-month-old son in 1987 in violation of a custody order and fleeing to the United States, where they lived under false identities for 31 years.

The mother had no knowledge of her son's whereabouts or well-being during this time.

The court accepted a joint submission for a sentence equivalent to three years in custody (time served) but rejected the proposed two-year probation term, imposing three years of probation instead to ensure the offender receives necessary counselling.

The accused was tried on two counts of sexual interference involving an 11-year-old complainant: one count for sexual touching and one count arising from two kissing incidents.

The court granted the Crown's cross-count similar fact application, holding the evidence on each count was probative of the other and provided context for the complainant's conduct.

Applying the W.(D.) framework and relying heavily on the complainant's immediate disclosure to her mother as a spontaneous utterance, the court rejected the accused's denial and found that inconsistencies in peripheral details did not undermine the core allegations.

The court also rejected the defence theory of fabrication based on family conflict and motive.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The accused, a young Black man, sought release from custody through a combined 90-day detention review and a bail review.

He was facing charges including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and breaching a previous release order by deliberately evading GPS monitoring.

The court found that while the justice of the peace erred in law by failing to explicitly consider the accused's status as a member of a vulnerable population under s. 493.2 of the Criminal Code, the error did not affect the outcome given the egregious nature of the breach and the inadequacy of the proposed release plan.

The court also rejected the accused's argument for release based on fear of COVID-19, noting his refusal to be vaccinated.

The application for release was dismissed and continued detention was found justified.

The offender was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.

He acted as upper management in a commercial cocaine trafficking conspiracy that purchased cocaine at the kilogram level and sold it at the quarter-kilogram level and below.

The Crown sought 4-5 years imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court found that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the scale of the operation and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The offender was sentenced to 3 years in the penitentiary for conspiracy and 2.5 years concurrent for trafficking.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder for allegedly shooting an innocent bystander during a drive-by shooting, applied for bail.

The court found the Crown's case to be extremely strong and noted the accused's extensive criminal record, including numerous bail breaches and violent offences.

The court dismissed the application, concluding the accused failed to meet his onus on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds, as he posed a significant risk to public safety and his release would undermine confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, applied for bail.

The Crown's case relied on strong circumstantial evidence, including cell phone records and surveillance video, suggesting the accused lured the victim to a meeting where he was shot by a co-accused.

The court found the accused met the onus on the primary ground but failed on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The accused had a lengthy criminal record, and the proposed sureties, including his mother in whose home loaded handguns were found, were deemed incapable of supervising him.

The court also held that releasing the accused would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The bail application was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for sentencing after the self-represented defendant was found in civil contempt for repeatedly breaching a permanent injunction prohibiting him from publishing defamatory statements about her.

The underlying dispute originated from a minor disagreement over a fence, which escalated into a relentless online harassment campaign by the defendant.

The court found that the defendant's apology was insincere, as he continued to violate the order and failed to pay previously awarded damages.

Emphasizing the need for specific and general deterrence, the court sentenced the defendant to 21 days in custody.

The Crown applied to qualify an expert witness to testify on the history and tropes of anti-gay discrimination in the trial of the accused for willful promotion of hatred.

The accused had distributed flyers at the Toronto Pride Parade.

The court applied the Mohan criteria and found that while the expert was qualified and capable of giving unbiased evidence despite his advocacy background, the evidence was not necessary.

The court held that a properly instructed jury could determine whether the flyer constituted hate speech without expert assistance.

Furthermore, the court found that the cost-benefit analysis favoured exclusion due to the high risk of distracting the jury with debates over religious beliefs and political values.

The application was dismissed.

In a first-degree murder prosecution, the Crown and defence brought pretrial applications regarding the admissibility of evidence.

The Crown sought to admit recognition evidence from the accused's probation officer identifying him in surveillance videos.

The defence sought to admit evidence of the deceased's prior violent acts and threats to support a claim of self-defence.

The court admitted the recognition evidence, finding it met the threshold for reliability.

The court also permitted the defence to introduce evidence of prior altercations involving the deceased, but excluded hearsay evidence regarding the deceased allegedly stating he was going to get a gun.

Finally, the court ruled that introducing evidence of the deceased's violent nature opened the door for the Crown to introduce evidence of the accused's propensity for violence.

The accused was charged with conspiracy to traffic fentanyl and cocaine, and multiple counts of possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking and firearms offences.

The charges arose from a police investigation into two other individuals, during which the accused was observed associating with them and visiting a storage locker and driving a vehicle where drugs and guns were found in secret traps.

At the close of the Crown's case, the defence brought an application for a directed verdict.

The court granted the application and discharged the accused on all counts, finding there was no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find the accused had knowledge and control of the drugs and guns, or that he was part of a conspiracy.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial arising from an encounter arranged through Instagram, the court acquitted the accused on all eleven counts, including personating a peace officer, multiple firearms offences, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault by threat of weapon, and robbery.

Applying the W.D. framework, the court held that the complainant’s evidence was not credible or reliable on material points, particularly her false account that the meeting concerned the sale of a cell phone rather than paid sexual services.

The accused’s police statement, while problematic in some respects, was accepted in part and otherwise raised a reasonable doubt.

The court also found the Crown had not proved that the accused took the complainant’s phone or intentionally pointed or used the pellet gun in the manner alleged.

The accused was charged with trafficking cocaine and conspiracy to traffic cocaine.

The Crown's case relied on intercepted communications, police surveillance, two cocaine seizures, and expert evidence on drug terminology.

The court found that the intercepted communications, which heavily featured drug slang, established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was part of an ongoing buy-sell conspiracy to traffic cocaine from the Greater Toronto Area to Sudbury.

The accused was convicted on both counts.