Robert F. Goldstein

The accused, Eric Brazau, brought an application to strike his guilty pleas to one count of causing a disturbance, one count of breach of probation, and one count of breach of recognizance.

Brazau argued that the Crown over-charged him, that new evidence undermined the hate crime allegations (which were not part of the plea but were aggravating factors), and that the facts did not make out the offence of causing a disturbance.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the plea was voluntary and unequivocal, the Crown did not engage in undue oppression, and the facts supported the mens rea for causing a disturbance, distinguishing between motive and intention.

The court also affirmed the Crown's ability to rely on Brazau's comments as aggravating factors under s. 718.2(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown applied for two orders regarding witness D.H. in a criminal trial: to permit D.H. to testify via closed-circuit television (CCTV) under s. 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code, and to admit D.H.'s video statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The court granted both applications, finding that CCTV testimony was necessary due to an attempt by gang members to intimidate D.H. in the courtroom, which interfered with the proper administration of justice.

The court also found that admitting D.H.'s video statement was appropriate given D.H.'s age at the time of the offence and the short timeframe between the incident and the statement.

This criminal trial concerned allegations of sexual assault and voyeurism against two accused, M.S. and R.S., involving a child complainant, A.R. The court meticulously assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant and key Crown witnesses, Q.W. and P.K., noting inconsistencies, exaggerations, and troubling explanations for delayed reporting.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework for reasonable doubt, concluding that the Crown's evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

All charges were dismissed.

The accused, D.K., was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant, C.V., alleged D.K. sexually assaulted her after a dorm party, while D.K. claimed consensual participation.

The court heard conflicting testimonies from both parties.

Applying the principles from R. v. W.(D.), the court found D.K.'s evidence plausible and identified inconsistencies and reliability concerns in the complainant's testimony, particularly regarding her memory of subsequent interactions and the circumstances of clothing removal.

Ultimately, the court was left with a reasonable doubt as to D.K.'s guilt and dismissed the charge.

The accused, Jason Angeles, was charged with multiple counts of possession of firearms and prohibited weapons.

The Crown argued for constructive possession based on circumstantial evidence, including video surveillance of Angeles entering an apartment where weapons were later found, and his subsequent return to the apartment after a staged break-in, where he commented, "The boss man is going to be pissed." The court found that while Angeles's actions were highly suspicious and he was likely involved in criminal activity, the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had specific knowledge of the firearms.

The court distinguished the case from other constructive possession precedents, emphasizing the lack of evidence that Angeles handled the weapons or was in close proximity to them, and the possibility that he was aware of other contraband rather than specifically firearms.

Consequently, all charges were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for impaired care and control and refusing to provide a breath sample.

He argued the trial judge misdirected herself on care and control, improperly used his right to silence against him, erred in finding his refusal was unequivocal, and that his trial counsel was ineffective.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made no reversible errors and that trial counsel's strategic decisions were reasonable and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired care and control of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The appeal raised four issues: whether the trial judge misdirected herself on care and control, whether the trial judge improperly used the appellant's right to silence against him, whether the trial judge erred in finding the breath sample refusal clear and unequivocal, and whether trial counsel was ineffective.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no misdirection on care and control, that the trial judge properly used prior inconsistent statements to assess credibility without infringing the right to silence, that the breath demand was clear, and that trial counsel's performance was not ineffective, nor did it cause a miscarriage of justice given the overwhelming evidence.

The appellant, Nishan Minhas, appealed his convictions for impaired driving and "over 80" stemming from a RIDE checkpoint stop.

He alleged multiple Charter violations by the police officer, including errors in credibility assessment, acceptance of impairment evidence, handling of mouth alcohol, and the timing of the approved screening device demand relative to the right to counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings.

The court found no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments, the reliability of the impairment indicia, or the handling of the mouth alcohol issue.

Crucially, the court held that the brief delay in providing the right to counsel during the roadside investigation, including the approved screening device test, was a reasonable and demonstrably justified limit under section 1 of the Charter.

The applicant, Akeem Bailey, sought to quash his committal for trial on five counts of attempted murder following a preliminary inquiry.

The application for certiorari argued that the preliminary inquiry judge erred in finding sufficient evidence to establish the specific intent to kill required for attempted murder, particularly concerning the applicant's role as a getaway driver and the probative value of post-offence conduct.

The court reviewed the preliminary inquiry judge's assessment of circumstantial evidence, including the applicant's vehicle positioning for a quick getaway and his awareness of the shooting.

The court concluded that there was evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict the applicant of attempted murder, and therefore, the preliminary inquiry judge did not commit a jurisdictional error.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant, Paul J. Lochner, appealed his conviction for assault and the conditional discharge and 18 months probation sentence.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty after a trial marked by significant disruptions from the appellant and his family.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in credibility findings and by failing to provide adequate reasons.

The appeal judge dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings were supported by the record, and that the appellant could not complain about inadequate reasons given his and his family's disruptive behavior that forced the trial judge to cut short his ruling.

The court also rejected the appellant's motion for recusal and adjournment.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of impaired driving.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent, finding that his medication, Effexor, could explain some signs of impairment.

The appellate court found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding Effexor, as there was no expert evidence to support its effects on impairment-like symptoms, and speculated on its impact.

The trial judge also erred in applying the test for impaired driving by not considering alcohol as a contributing factor.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for sexual assault and possession of a weapon.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility and by failing to provide an interpreter for a Crown witness whose first language was not English.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were entitled to deference and that she properly exercised her discretion in allowing the witness to testify in English without an interpreter.

The appellant pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg.

He appealed his conviction, arguing his plea was not free and voluntary because he was under immense psychological pressure to obtain a mental health assessment.

The summary conviction appeal court found that the appellant's desperation to access psychiatric care robbed him of the conscious ability to make a voluntary decision.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace, arguing that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons and improperly applied the self-defence provisions of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons, though brief, were sufficient when read in the overall context of the case and submissions, allowing for meaningful appellate review.

The court affirmed the trial judge's conclusion that while the appellant may have subjectively believed his mother was threatened, there were no objective grounds to support that belief, thereby negating the self-defence claim.

The appellant, Arafat Bakshi, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons and misapplied the principles from R. v. W.D. The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge provided detailed and careful reasons, correctly instructed herself on the reasonable doubt standard, and properly applied the W.D. principles by assessing the complainant's credibility and finding the appellant's evidence implausible.

The court emphasized the deference owed to trial judges in credibility assessments.

The accused, charged with aggravated assault, brought a Corbett application to prohibit the Crown from cross-examining him on his criminal record.

The record consisted of youth and adult convictions that were over a decade old, including a suspended sentence for assault.

The court granted the application, finding that the probative value of the remote convictions was low and outweighed by the risk of the jury engaging in prohibited propensity reasoning, especially given the limited nature of the defence's attack on the Crown witnesses' credibility.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for allegedly breaching a software license agreement by using proprietary source code to develop a competing product.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 32.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for an order to inspect the defendants' computer systems.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it premature as traditional documentary discovery had not yet occurred, and noting that the proposed inspection was wide-ranging and highly intrusive.

The dismissal was without prejudice to the plaintiffs' right to bring a new motion after discovery.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded restricted firearm, breach of recognizance, and breach of a weapons prohibition.

The Crown sought a 4-year sentence, while the defence sought a 3-year sentence with enhanced credit for harsh pre-trial custody conditions due to frequent lockdowns.

The court imposed a global sentence of 3 years, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation while acknowledging the accused's youth, guilty plea, and remorse.

The court granted additional credit for the harsh lockdown conditions, resulting in a remaining sentence of 11 months in custody.

Following a successful application regarding the ownership of a parkette, the successful municipality sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondent developers argued that no costs should be awarded as the matter involved public interest and was litigated in good faith.

The court rejected the public interest argument, finding the developers were seeking a private windfall.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01, including the complexity of the case and the developers' vexatious conduct during discovery, the court awarded the municipality $210,000 in costs.

The accused brought a Charter motion to exclude evidence seized during a drug trafficking investigation.

Police initially entered the accused's hotel room without a warrant following noise complaints, discovering drugs in plain view.

This led to the seizure of cell phones and subsequent surveillance of an apartment building, resulting in further drug seizures.

The court found the initial hotel room entry violated section 8 of the Charter as police did not comply with the Trespass to Property Act.

However, the court found no section 8 violation regarding surveillance in the apartment building's common areas.

Applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2), finding the police acted in good faith and the societal interest in adjudicating the serious charges on their merits outweighed the impact of the breach.