Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: CR-16-10000088-00AP DATE: 20170223 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Respondent – and – PAUL J. LOCHNER Appellant

Counsel: Martin Sabat, for the Crown, Respondent Self-Represented, Appellant

HEARD: February 16, 2017

R.F. GOLDSTEIN J.

Reasons for Judgment Summary Conviction Appeal

1On September 29, 2015, the Appellant and other members of his family were at Osgoode Hall Courthouse in Toronto. They were dealing with litigation against the Public Guardian and Trustee. That litigation has a long and colourful history. That history has no bearing on this appeal, except to the extent that it is the source of tremendous acrimony by the Appellant and his family against Walter Kim, the lawyer acting for the Public Guardian and Trustee. The Appellant and his family have somehow latched onto a fantasy that Mr. Kim and others are arrayed in a criminal conspiracy against them involving perjury, obstruction of justice, and fraudulent financial gain. There is no evidence whatsoever of such a conspiracy. Usually, this fantasy has caused the Appellant and his family to act out their acrimony verbally. On that day, however, Paul Lochner attacked Mr. Kim. He was charged with assault and intimidating a justice system participant. The Crown only proceeded on the assault charge. The trial took one day. Despite the best efforts of the trial judge, Justice Zuker of the Ontario Court of Justice, the trial became something of a circus. The Appellant was found guilty. He was given a conditional discharge and 18 months probation. He now appeals the conviction and sentence.

2The Appellant argues that the trial judge erred by finding that Mr. Kim’s evidence was credible and trustworthy. He argues that Mr. Kim deliberately lied about events that form part of the litigation between his family and the Public Guardian and Trustee. The trial judge also called the Appellant’s evidence a “complete fabrication.” He takes issue with that finding as well. He has little to say about the actual events that give rise to the charges. He also appeals sentence, although he has little to say about that as well.

3The trial judge’s credibility findings were open to him on the evidence. It is true that the trial judge did not provide any reasons as to why he found Mr. Kim credible and the Appellant incredible. That is because of the chaos that broke out in the courtroom as the trial judge tried to give his verdict. The Appellant might have had more fulsome reasons, but he and his family caused such a disruption that the trial judge could not continue. The Appellant has no right to complain that the reasons were inadequate. He and his family made it impossible for the trial judge to continue due to their own utterly juvenile and outrageous behaviour. The transcript reveals that the Appellant and his family essentially indulged themselves in a collective temper tantrum at the result. Nonetheless, it is still this Court’s duty to review the conviction to determine whether the record supports the trial judge’s findings. In my view, the record does support the trial judge’s findings.

4I heard the appeal on February 16, 2017. At the end of submissions, I dismissed the appeal from the bench without calling on the Crown. These are my reasons for judgment.

Background

Background

5Mr. Lochner was tried at Old City Hall on September 6, 2016. He was convicted at the end of evidence and sentenced the next day.

6Despite the best efforts of the trial judge, the trial deteriorated into a shouting match with unseemly outbursts, profanities, shouting, inflammatory accusations, and groundless attacks on anyone who happened to disagree with the Appellant or a member of his family. In a word: pandemonium. This behaviour is consistent with the observations of several other judges, including me: Lochner v. Callanan, 2016 ONSC 5384; Lochner v. Callanan, 2016 ONSC 4136; Lochner v. Callanan, 2016 ONSC 1705.

7At trial, the Crown called one witness, Mr. Kim. Mr. Kim is a lawyer. He works for the Public Guardian and Trustee. The Appellant is a member of the Lochner family. The Lochner family has been involved in acrimonious litigation with the Public Guardian and Trustee.

8Mr. Kim testified that on September 29, 2016, he was preparing for a matter at the Ontario Court of Appeal with the Appellant and members of the Appellant’s family. They were all in a courtroom preparing for a motion in that Court. He went over to the Appellant to provide him with some documents. The Appellant began yelling at him. This was typical behaviour for the Appellant. At that point, the Appellant charged at him and knocked him to the ground. The violence was not typical. Mr. Kim suffered a lower back injury and his robes were torn.

9The Appellant called a defence. Silvano Lochner is the Appellant’s brother. He testified that he was in the washroom when the incident occurred. As Crown counsel accurately put it in his factum, the remainder of Silvano Lochner’s evidence can be described as “a shouting and yelling match with little relevance to the proceedings.” The tenor of Silvano Lochner’s evidence in chief can best be taken from this passage:

SILVANO LOCHNER: So when he (Mr. Kim) came to court that day in September, he came towards me and says, “Silvano, why do you keep writing emails to people saying I’m a criminal? Don’t you know I’m a Crown Attorney? I could say what I want. I could do what I want. Nobody’s going to listen to your family because even though I know I’m a criminal” - - not a criminal that he’s lying.

10No one with even the most remote acquaintance with the background could possibly believe that Mr. Kim simply walked up to Silvano Lochner and confessed to being a liar and a criminal.

11In his evidence, Silvano Lochner went on to accuse Mr. Kim of all sorts of misconduct including threatening him and submitting perjured evidence. The trial judge attempted to get Silvano Lochner to focus and answer questions. Silvano Lochner simply kept talking over and interrupting the trial judge. Silvano Lochner refused to answer questions put to him by Crown counsel unless he himself determined that they were relevant. He refused to answer questions even after the trial judge directed him to do so. He yelled and talked over Crown counsel as well as the judge. In submissions, Crown counsel, with ample justification, called him a bully. At the end of the day, Silvano Lochner did not see the assault and so his evidence had no impact on the key issues at trial. Any evidence about Mr. Kim was strictly collateral and inadmissible, although the trial judge, likely out of a sense of fairness to the unrepresented Appellant, admitted it.

12Lina Lochner is the Appellant’s mother. She testified that she saw Mr. Kim on the ground. She did not know how he got there. She had no other relevant evidence.

13The Appellant also testified. He stated in chief that Mr. Kim is essentially out to get his family. He testified that Mr. Kim has constantly threatened him and his family members. The trial judge found it extremely difficult to get him to focus on the events of September 29, 2015. The Appellant testified that Mr. Kim approached him. He put out his hands to stop Mr. Kim. Mr. Kim ran into his hands and fell. In cross-examination, Mr. Lochner admitted that he was yelling at Mr. Kim as Mr. Kim walked toward him. He also started yelling and screaming from the witness box while he was being cross-examined, as noted by the trial judge. As is apparent from the transcript, he stood up in the witness box and pointed his finger at Crown counsel in a threatening manner.

The Trial Judge’s Attempt To Give Reasons

The Trial Judge’s Attempt To Give Reasons

14The trial judge began by observing that the Crown bore the burden of proving the case beyond a reasonable doubt. He then summarized the evidence. He first dealt with the troubled history of the litigation between members of the Appellant’s family and the Public Guardian and Trustee.

15When the trial judge began to describe the events of September 29, 2015, Silvano Lochner interrupted him. He very vocally expressed disagreement with the judge. From the transcript, a shouting match seems to have erupted, with Silvano Lochner, the Appellant, and Lina Lochner engaging in outbursts. I excerpt some of the transcript:

SILVANO LOCHNER: … Your Honour, I’m trying to be calm as possible but when he brings up a testimony… THE COURT: Excuse me sir, but if you can’t keep quiet… SILVANO LOCHNER: But it wasn’t supported by facts, Your Honour. You can’t make the decision based on hearsay evidence because there were no documents served to Paul. Any documents that were served to Paul were mailed to him months in advance because he had already received the Notice of Motion, the factum, the book of authorities… MR. FLAHERTY (Crown Counsel): Your honour, this is inappropriate for a witness to shout out in the body of (indecipherable) your judgment. SILVANO LOCHNER: This is perjury. He did not provide Paul… (indecipherable) on behalf of Walter Kim. PAUL LOCHNER: He never served me with any documents after ever – ever. This is what I’m saying. SILVANO LOCHNER: This matter will be appealed and he will be requested to provide those documents because he’s committing perjury. This court has a duty to ask him what documents…

16The trial judge then tried to explain:

THE COURT: I haven’t got to that yet, because you.

17Unfortunately, the trial judge was unable to finish his sentence as Silvano Lochner and the Appellant both interrupted him again. The trial judge then directed Silvano Lochner to wait outside the courtroom. A further exchange ensued:

MR. FLAHERTY: The witness should be removed. Screaming at the judge all (indecipherable). The former witness should be removed. PAUL LOCHNER: I never received… THE COURT: You know what, sir… PAUL LOCHNER: Yeah. THE COURT: I haven’t even finished what I’m saying.

18The trial judge then attempted to continue on with his reasons for judgment. As he did so, there were frequent indecipherable outbursts from Lina Lochner. The trial judge simply concluded as follows:

THE COURT: I do not accept Mr. Lochner’s evidence. His evidence is a complete fabrication of what took place. Mr. Kim was credible and trustworthy. The Crown has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. I take it at this point given the hostility we should come back tomorrow morning…

19The trial judge then attempted to adjourn to the next day for sentencing. The Appellant’s reaction can best be described as an eruption. The Appellant indicated that he would not appear for sentencing. The following then occurred on the record:

PAUL LOCHNER: I’m not – I’m not coming tomorrow morning. MR. FLAHERTY: Mr. Lochner the trial is set for… PAUL LOCHNER: just make your decision now, put me in jail. I don’t care no more. MR. FLAHERTY: Just… PAUL LOCHNER: This is bullshit. MR. FLAHERTY: Okay, so… PAUL LOCHNER: Okay. MR. FLAHERTY: … Your Honour, we’re not going to let this deteriorate…

20Things did, in fact, deteriorate further – which was rather remarkable considering the low state of the proceedings at that point. The Appellant indulged himself in a series of curses worthy of the saltiest drunken sailor. He angrily invited the trial judge, and others in the courtroom, to perform sexual acts on themselves that are, ordinarily, physically impossible. Lina Lochner continued to make indecipherable noises. Eventually, court officers removed them both from the courtroom.

21Judges at Old City Hall are sometimes required to enter and exit courtrooms from the main public areas. Unfortunately, the specter of physical danger to the trial judge reared its head:

MR. FLAHERTY: If I were you, sir, I would not walk out in that hall. THE COURT: Sorry? MR. FLAHERTY: I would not walk out in that hall if I were you. THE COURT: No, I’m going down. Okay, thank you. MR. FLAHERTY: So, you’re going to give His Honour some security? COURT OFFICER: Yes, for sure.

The Motion To Recuse

The Motion To Recuse

22At the outset of the appeal hearing, the Appellant asked that I recuse myself. I have previously heard motions in relation to civil litigation between the Appellant, Lina Lochner, the Toronto Police, and the Public Guardian and Trustee.

23Silvano Lochner attempted to argue, on behalf of his brother, that I should recuse myself because I treated him, his brother, and his mother unfairly on a previous occasion. I told Silvano Lochner that he had no standing to appear on behalf of anyone else in the Superior Court of Justice as he is not a lawyer. He took umbrage at this and stormed out of the courtroom. The Appellant also asked me to recuse myself. After hearing his submissions on this point, I dismissed the application.

24The test for reasonable apprehension of bias is set out in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Committee for Justice & Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369: what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through – conclude. Would he or she think it more likely than not that the judge, whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly? The test’s threshold is high – there is a presumption that judges will carry out their oath of office: R. v. S. (R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, at para. 117.

25In previous appearances, I was required to deal with all of the same outbursts, disruptions, and outrageous behaviour that the trial judge dealt with. I excerpt a passage from one of my previous judgments:

I turn to the events of July 8, 2011. When the hearing commenced I indicated that as a result of previous rulings by other judges I would tolerate no disruptions. All of my attempts to control the process were stymied. I indicated that I would not hesitate to invoke the contempt power of the Court, if necessary, and that a trip to the cells might be salutatory for Silvano and Lina. Lina is a woman in her 80’s and confined to a wheelchair – which does not give her licence to behave any way she wants in a courtroom. (Paul Lochner did not participate in the day’s outrageous behaviour and remained silent for the most part.). The prospect of a finding of contempt in the face of the court apparently had no effect.

At a related proceeding on August 22, 2016, I ordered Silvano Lochner removed from the courtroom for his disruptive behaviour. That did not stop him from repeatedly re-entering the courtroom, shouting, interrupting, and ignoring my direction that he stay out.

At the same hearing I also reluctantly ordered that Lina Lochner leave the courtroom – I was, for obvious reasons, hesitant to have the court officers remove a woman in her 80’s in a wheelchair or find her in contempt in the face of the court. Lina Lochner still refused to stop her disruptions. As I have noted, she appears to believe that she has a license to say anything she wishes at any time she wishes, at a high volume. Eventually Paul Lochner took her out of the courtroom.

See: Lochner v. Callanan, 2016 ONSC 5384, at paras. 45, 47, 48.

26Simply because I had decided against the Appellant in a previous proceeding is no reason to recuse myself: Beard Winter LLP v. Shekhdar, 2016 ONCA 493, at para. 11. In Shekhdar, the appellant had made specious accusations against Doherty J.A. I respectfully adopt his comments at paras. 10, 13:

It is important that justice be administered impartially. A judge must give careful consideration to any claim that he should disqualify himself on account of bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias. In my view, a judge is best advised to remove himself if there is any air of reality to a bias claim. That said, judges do the administration of justice a disservice by simply yielding to entirely unreasonable and unsubstantiated recusal demands. Litigants are not entitled to pick their judge. They are not entitled to effectively eliminate judges randomly assigned to their case by raising specious partiality claims against those judges. To step aside in the face of a specious bias claim is to give credence to a most objectionable tactic.

A reasonable observer, in considering the allegations made by the moving party, would also take into account that this moving party has made similar allegations of serious misconduct against a great many people involved in the judicial process, including many judges. The moving party offers no evidence that any of the many allegations he has made have ever been made out to the satisfaction of anyone other than himself.

27It is true that in my previous judgment, I commented on Mr. Kim and other members of the office the Public Guardian and Trustee:

The Lochners have made serious allegations against counsel who have appeared from time to time for the PFT and the Defendants. For example, the Lochners have repeatedly accused Mr. Kim of lying to the court. They seem to believe that any failure to accept their version of events constitutes an act of perjury and justifies a maximum amount of righteous indignation. All counsel, and particularly Mr. Kim, have born it with admirable restraint and stoicism. None of the material before me discloses any basis to find that the PGT has acted in any way contrary to the best interests of George Lochner. Other judges have repeatedly made the same finding.

See: Lochner v. Callanan, 2016 ONSC 5384, at para. 45.

28My comment in that case was an assessment of evidence necessary to dispose of the motion. It was also an observation made in the context of the atmosphere created in the courtroom by the Appellant and his family. It had nothing to do with anything I was required to decide on the summary conviction appeal.

29The Appellant and his family cannot create conditions that force a judge to take action to maintain order in the courtroom and then complain that the judge is biased. Trial judges have a duty to maintain order and enforce decorum in their courts. The public must have confidence that courts are able to discharge their functions firmly and fairly. Allowing litigants to undermine courts through their own behaviour would seriously undermine that confidence.

30The Appellant also cannot file completely spurious evidence in a previous proceeding and then complain because the judge does not agree. If I were to recuse myself, it would amount to giving unscrupulous litigants carte blanche to pick their judges. That way lies anarchy. No reasonable person who has read the many volumes of evidence filed by the Appellant and his family and observed their behaviour in a courtroom would think that there was any merit in the recusal application.

The Motion For An Adjournment

The Motion For An Adjournment

31After losing his recusal motion, the Appellant asked for an adjournment. He stated that he wished to consult a lawyer. He said that he had consulted multiple lawyers after consulting the Law Society’s Lawyer Referral Service. He also showed the Court a flyer from Pro Bono Law Canada. The Appellant refused to say which lawyers he had consulted. He told the Court that it was confidential. I informed the Appellant that there was no such confidentiality, but he continued to refuse to inform the Court of the lawyers he had consulted. I am satisfied that the Appellant has not consulted any lawyers, although he has had more than enough time to do so.

32The Appellant also complained that he had not received the Crown’s material on the appeal until the Monday before the hearing (which was on a Thursday). He said that he had not had time to review it. Crown counsel provided detailed information on the many attempts that had been made to serve the material. I am satisfied that the Appellant had adequate opportunity to review the Crown’s material. Any issues arising out of his inability to do so were clearly of his own making.

33Moreover, the Appellant did not serve and file a notice of application or an affidavit or any written material. It is true that the adjournment rules only apply to the adjournment of trial proceedings: Rule 26.01 of the Criminal Proceedings Rules. That said, an adjournment should not just simply materialize out of thin air. A court should have something to work with other than an Appellant’s unsupported say-so – especially when the Appellant’s unsupported say-so comes after an unmeritorious recusal motion.

34Granting an adjournment request is within the discretion of the Court: Darville v. The Queen (1956), 116 C.C.C. 113 (S.C.C.). In Szewczyk v. Real Estate Council of Ontario, 2008 ONCA 744, at para. 1, the Court stated:

The appellant sought an adjournment because his "lawyer" was out of the country and not able to attend. He presented no proof that he has retained counsel for this appeal. He has had ample time to do so. We have nothing by way of a letter or otherwise, indicating that counsel has even been approached, let alone retained, for the appeal. Accordingly, the application to adjourn is denied.

35After hearing Mr. Lochner’s submissions, I dismissed the adjournment request. I gave brief oral reasons for doing so. There was no basis upon which to grant the adjournment.

The Hearing of the Appeal

The Hearing of the Appeal

36It was extremely difficult to get Mr. Lochner to focus on the actual issues before the Court. He began his submissions by noting that Justice Zuker made it clear he was retiring. He then mentioned newspaper stories about Justice Zuker. He questioned Justice Zuker’s mental capacity and stability. He also stated that it was a pre-determined decision. Since none of that was either relevant or in evidence (or comprehensible), I stopped him and asked him to actually deal with the issues.

37Eventually, I gave Mr. Lochner 20 minutes to make his submissions. I stated that I would not interrupt him. I further indicated that if Mr. Lochner actually dealt with the issues, I would allow him to continue. If not, I would simply stop him.

38Unfortunately, Mr. Lochner’s oral submissions were incomprehensible. He walked around the courtroom yelling about fabrications and errors. I had no idea what he was talking about, except that he seemed to reference some of the issues surrounding the litigation relating to George Lochner. He did say that the credibility of the people (presumably Mr. Kim) was unfounded. He said that he was truthful. He further tried to argue about the distances in the courtroom where he assaulted Mr. Kim – in other words, he tried to re-litigate the trial before Justice Zuker.

39The one thing he did not deal with were any errors that might have been made by Justice Zuker, although I tried to focus him on multiple occasions.

40As I noted earlier in these reasons, I dismissed the appeal from the bench without calling on the Crown. Notwithstanding Mr. Lochner’s inability to focus on the issues at hand, I will still analyze the merits of the appeal because there are some difficult aspects of the trial judge’s decision.

Problems In The Trial Judge’s Decision

Problems In The Trial Judge’s Decision

41It is difficult to understand the Appellant’s arguments but it seems that he concentrates on three points: first, he appears to argue that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons; second, he appears to argue that the trial judge erred in his credibility analysis; and third, he seems to believe that the trial judge accorded greater credibility to Mr. Kim than to him, thus engaging in a different standard of review of the evidence.

42The Reasons for Judgment are not problem-free. Nonetheless, the Appellant’s arguments have no merit. I will deal with each in turn.

43I agree that there is a problem with the adequacy of the trial judge’s reasons. The key problem is that there is no link between the summary of evidence and the verdict. There is simply a recitation of evidence and then a bare-bones statement that the trial judge accepted the evidence of Walter Kim and found the evidence of the Appellant to be fabricated: see R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26. Under some circumstances, that may be enough for an appeal court to order a new trial. The problem is that we will never know because the trial judge was forced to abort his reasons for judgment in mid-stream. That was not his fault. That was squarely the doing of the Appellant and his family. The Appellant cannot be part of a process that causes pandemonium in the courtroom and forces a judge to cut short a ruling and then hubristically complain that he has not received justice. To give effect to that argument would seriously undermine the rule of law.

44Where a trial judge’s reasoning is not articulated, then the reviewing court must examine the evidence and determine whether the conclusions were available on the record. An appeal court should not re-assess the evidence except to determine whether the conclusions of the trial judge can be supported by the record. I am not to substitute my views for the trial judge’s: R. v. Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24, at para. 32.

45I am satisfied that when read as a whole, the reasons are amply supported by the record: R. v. Vuradin, 2013 SCC 38, at para. 12; R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, at para. 16. It is true that the trial judge did not issue supplementary reasons, as he might have, but on the record before this Court, the Appellant cannot succeed on the basis of inadequacy of reasons. There was an ample basis on the record, when read as a whole and in context, to support the decision.

46I turn now to the trial judge’s credibility analysis.

47This case clearly turned on credibility. The trial judge found Mr. Kim to be credible and trustworthy. He found the Appellant’s evidence to be fabricated. Those findings were well within the purview of the judge. Trial judges are entitled to great deference in their assessment of credibility: R. v. Myerscough, [2001] O.J. No. 2867.

48The Appellant, in submissions, was unable to point to any palpable and overriding error in the trial judge’s reasons. He was also unable to point to any credibility issues that would undermine Mr. Kim’s evidence, other than a general attack on Mr. Kim’s character, reputation, and credibility. This is the same attack that has been made on Mr. Kim throughout the litigation involving the Public Guardian and Trustee. The trial judge, by implication, rejected that attack. He was right to do so, as it amounted to an ad hominem attack on the character of a witness based, in essence, on furious disagreement with a legal position taken by the Public Guardian and Trustee. I note that it is the same attack that has been made in virtually every other proceeding involving the Appellant and his family and has been rejected as groundless – although that is not a basis for upholding the trial judge in these circumstances. Given the paucity of actual evidence, I see no basis at all to interfere with that finding.

49The trial judge did not conduct a deep analysis of the Appellant’s evidence. That said, I am satisfied that the trial judge, who is presumed to know the law, was aware that he was required to determine whether he believed the Appellant or the Appellant’s evidence left him in a state of reasonable doubt: R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742. That is evident from his comment that the Appellant’s evidence was “a complete fabrication.” Although the trial judge did not articulate that he understood that a trial is not a simple credibility contest, he was within his rights to reject the evidence of the Appellant based on a considered acceptance of the evidence of the complainant: R. v. (D.)J.J.R. (2006), 215 C.C.C. (3d) 252 (Ont. C.A.).

50I turn now to the argument that the trial judge accorded more weight to Mr. Kim’s evidence because he is an officer of the Court and Crown counsel. In oral argument, the Appellant mentioned Mr. Kim’s status as a Crown Attorney. At trial, both he and Silvano Lochner also mentioned Mr. Kim’s status as a Crown Attorney.

51This argument has no merit, for two reasons. First, Mr. Kim is a lawyer and an employee of the office of the Public Guardian and Trustee, but he is not a Crown Attorney. Crown Attorneys and Assistant Crown Attorneys are appointed pursuant to the Crown Attorney’s Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.49. Their duties are specified in ss. 10 and 11 of that Act as well as by the common law. The basic function of a Crown Attorney or Assistant Crown Attorney is to act as agent for the Attorney General for the purposes of the Criminal Code. The Crown Attorneys Act also assigns other functions related to the administration of criminal law to Crown Attorneys and Assistant Crown Attorneys.

52Crown Attorneys have very different duties from lawyers employed by the Public Guardian and Trustee. Those duties are set out in the Public Guardian And Trustee Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.51. Thus, the Appellant is simply factually wrong about Mr. Kim’s employment status.

53Second, there is simply no evidence whatsoever that the trial judge accorded greater weight to Mr. Kim’s evidence because he is a lawyer or employed in any capacity by the government. The Ontario Court of Appeal very recently affirmed the long-standing principle that an appellant must point to something clear in the reasons that shows different scrutiny was applied in order to displace the deference to a trial judge’s credibility assessment: R. v. Gravesande, 2015 ONCA 774. The Appellant has not done so.

54Accordingly, there is no merit to any of the arguments advanced by the Appellant.

Sentencing

Sentencing

55An appeal court should only interfere with a sentence if the sentencing judge has made an error in principle, failed to consider a relevant factor, or imposed a sentence that is demonstrably unfit: R. v. C.A.M., [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500; R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227.

56In this case, the Appellant received a conditional discharge and 18 months probation. He has pointed to no error in principle, other than a generalized complaint about the entire process. As a result of the conditional discharge, he will be able to maintain that he has not had a criminal conviction. He received an exceedingly lenient sentence for someone who, unprovoked, attacked a lawyer in a courtroom simply because the lawyer represented the opposing side in litigation. There is no basis to interfere with the sentence.

Disposition

Disposition

57The trial judge in this case treated the Appellant and his family with great fairness and care. He was extraordinarily patient in the face of repeated provocations. As reviewed above, there is no basis to interfere with the conviction or sentence. The appeal is dismissed.

R.F. Goldstein J.