Robert F. Goldstein

The applicants, owners of hookah lounges in Toronto, challenged a City of Toronto by-law prohibiting hookah smoking in licensed establishments.

They argued the City lacked the power to pass the by-law, that it was confiscatory, conflicted with provincial legislation (Occupational Health and Safety Act), and was passed in bad faith.

The court dismissed the application, finding the by-law was validly enacted under the City of Toronto Act's broad health and safety powers, was not confiscatory, did not create an operational conflict with the OHSA, and that there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of City Council.

The court emphasized the broad and purposive interpretation of municipal powers and deference to democratic decisions of municipal councils.

The plaintiff, a 72-year-old security guard, was terminated after 12 years of service.

The employer provided a letter stating employment would end in a few months but gave no firm date, and the plaintiff continued working for seven months before being abruptly fired without statutory entitlements.

The plaintiff mitigated his damages by finding new employment and brought a motion for summary judgment.

The court found the initial notice was insufficient as it lacked a firm date and the employment continued beyond the 13-week regulatory period.

The court awarded damages for breach of contract and additional damages for mental distress due to the employer's unfair conduct.

The defendants, having successfully obtained a stay of action based on an arbitration clause, sought partial and substantial indemnity costs totaling $68,449.55.

The plaintiff conceded entitlement to costs but argued the amount was excessive.

The court applied the principle that costs should be fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party, not merely the actual costs incurred.

While acknowledging the importance of the matter to the defendants and the plaintiff's conduct contributing to increased costs, the court found the claimed hours excessive for a two-hour motion.

Considering an offer to settle, the court awarded costs at the higher end of a reasonable range, fixing them at $40,000.00.

The applicant, facing serious charges including membership in a criminal organization and fraud, applied for a Rowbotham order for state-funded counsel after being denied Legal Aid.

While the court accepted that the case was complex and the applicant had been denied Legal Aid, the application was dismissed because the applicant failed to prove indigence.

The applicant provided insufficient financial documentation and failed to account for the proceeds from the sale of a home.

The Third Parties (Estate of Francesco Cavallo and Rosa Cavallo) sought partial indemnity costs after successfully dismissing the Defendant's motion for validation of service.

The court awarded $7,500 in costs to the Third Parties, finding their initial request of $12,089.03 excessive as it included costs incurred from a prior hearing before a different judge who had made no order as to costs.

The court emphasized that awarding such costs would effectively overrule the prior decision.

The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) and the defendant police officers brought a motion seeking a declaration that Lina and Paul Lochner lacked standing to challenge a court-approved settlement concerning George Lochner, a party under disability.

The court found that Lina and Paul had received courtesy notice of the settlement approval motion but were not legally entitled to notice, nor were they "affected persons" under Rule 37.14(1) as their proprietary or economic rights were not impacted.

The court granted the PGT's motion, declaring Lina and Paul had no standing, and awarded costs against them due to their unmeritorious arguments and disruptive courtroom behaviour.

The court also initiated a process under Rule 2.1.02 to summarily dismiss Lina and Paul's own motion to set aside the settlement judgment as an abuse of process.

The Town of Caledon and Waterstone Properties Corporation (and Wyndcliffe Developments Inc.) brought cross-applications concerning the beneficial ownership of a 2.8-acre parkette.

Waterstone claimed beneficial ownership based on a 1972 subdivision agreement with a re-conveyance clause, arguing its inclusion in a subsequent 1973 agreement was a mistake.

The Town asserted ownership based on the unconditional transfer provision in the 1973 agreement, and alternatively, through adverse possession or dedication and acceptance.

The court found the 1973 agreement superseded the 1972 agreement, that the inclusion of the parkette in the 1973 agreement was not a mistake, and that the Town was the beneficial owner.

The court also found that the Town would have succeeded on adverse possession and dedication and acceptance.

Waterstone's application was dismissed, and the Town's application was granted.

The applicant, a British Virgin Islands shell company, sought to recover assigned assets from the respondent.

Following a prior order by Justice Dunphy for the applicant to post $25,000 security for costs, the respondent moved to dismiss the application due to non-compliance.

The applicant cross-moved to vary the security amount to $8,000, claiming inability to post the original sum.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion to vary, finding insufficient evidence of inability to pay and a lack of due diligence in assessing financial capacity.

The court granted the respondent's motion, dismissing the application, emphasizing that the applicant's litigation risk outweighed the prejudice of dismissal, especially given the corporate nature of the parties and the token amount proposed.

No order as to costs was made.

Mr. Paspalovski appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO) issued by Dr. Agrawal.

The appeal raised three issues: whether the Board erred in applying the test for incapacity, whether it misapprehended the evidence, and whether the CTO was invalid due to the 72-hour rule for Community Treatment Plans (CTPs).

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly applied the test for capacity, did not make a palpable and overriding error in assessing evidence, and that the 72-hour rule in the Mental Health Act does not require all parties to sign the CTP within that timeframe, only that the physician be satisfied the criteria are met and treatment is available.

The applicant, a condominium unit owner, challenged the validity of a by-law passed by the respondent condominium corporation that leased common element parking spaces to unit holders.

The applicant argued the by-law was ultra vires, discriminatory, unreasonable, and oppressive, as it restricted her tenant's (a popular restaurant) access to parking.

The court found the by-law valid under the Condominium Act, not discriminatory, and that the Board's actions were not oppressive, as they were a reasonable response to a parking monopolization issue caused by the applicant's tenant.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant in a motor vehicle accident claim brought a third-party claim against homeowners, alleging their trees obstructed his view of the plaintiff cyclist.

The defendant attempted to serve one of the homeowners, who had moved to Italy, by leaving the claim at a suspected address.

The defendant moved to validate service under Rule 16.08.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the hearsay evidence of the private investigators insufficient to prove the claim had come to the homeowner's attention, especially given the potential prejudice of a claim exceeding her insurance limits.

The Attorney General of Canada moved to dismiss an application by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association and Christopher Parsons, arguing it was moot following *R. v. Spencer* and failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The application challenged sections of the *Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act* (PIPEDA) concerning the collection and disclosure of personal information to government institutions without consent, alleging breaches of sections 7 and 8 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*.

The court dismissed the Attorney General's motion, finding that *Spencer* did not render the application moot as it addressed a narrower issue and did not cover systemic challenges, intelligence gathering, or accountability mechanisms under PIPEDA.

The court also found that the Amended Notice of Application disclosed a reasonable cause of action, particularly regarding the lack of oversight mechanisms and the potential for arbitrary, overbroad, or grossly disproportionate infringements of Charter rights.

The plaintiff brought a motion to exclude a defendant from her examination for discovery, citing intimidation and fear of tailored evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, affirming a litigant's inherent right to be present at discovery unless exceptional circumstances, such as a real and substantial probability of intimidation or evidence tailoring, are proven.

The court found the plaintiff's discomfort and anxiety insufficient for exclusion and noted the defendant's evidence could be impeached by prior statements.

Costs were awarded to the successful defendants on a partial indemnity basis.

This case involved an application and counter-application concerning a commercial sub-lease and an option to purchase real property.

The Landlord (2405416 Ontario Ltd.) sought a declaration that the Tenant (2405490 Ontario Inc.) had defaulted on the sub-lease, terminating it, and obligating the Tenant to sell its business to the Landlord.

The Tenant counter-applied for a declaration compelling the Landlord to sell the premises under the option to purchase, and for damages for rent paid.

The court found that the Tenant was not in default regarding rent payments or renovations, interpreting the lease's rent commencement date as conditional on the closing of an Asset Purchase Agreement and the issuance of a body-rub licence.

The court also found the Landlord's complaints to be a pretext for refusing to comply with its obligations.

The Tenant's counter-application was granted in part, affirming its right to purchase the property, but its claim for damages for rent paid was dismissed.

The Landlord's application was dismissed.

The plaintiffs, stock promoters from Ontario, sued a British Columbia-based stock promoter and a Colorado-based stock transfer agent for breach of contract related to stock promotion services.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that Ontario courts did not have a real and substantial connection to the dispute.

The court found that the contract was formed in British Columbia, not Ontario, and that the defendants did not carry on business in Ontario.

Consequently, Ontario lacked jurisdiction, and the action was dismissed.

Following a successful motion, the plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $17,000.

The defendant argued the amount was excessive and proposed $6,000.

The court found the requested amount fair and reasonable, noting it was almost identical to the partial indemnity costs incurred by the defendant itself.

Costs were fixed at $17,000.

The Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) sought substantial indemnity costs following a successful summary judgment motion against Michael A. Lunardi.

Lunardi had provided a personal guarantee and raised a defence of non est factum, which was rejected in the prior summary judgment.

RBC's guarantee agreement included a clause for legal costs on a "solicitor and own client basis." The court found that RBC was entitled to substantial indemnity costs as per the contractual term, which was freely entered into and not unconscionable.

The court also determined the appropriate amount, rejecting Lunardi's argument that the costs were excessive, noting that the amount sought was only slightly higher than Lunardi's own partial indemnity costs outline.

HSBC Bank Canada moved to dismiss Panther Film Services Inc.'s action for delay, which had been outstanding for 12 years.

Panther brought a cross-motion to restore the action to the trial list.

The court applied the three-part test for dismissal for delay: inordinate, inexcusable, and substantial risk to a fair trial.

While the delay was inordinate and inexcusable (Panther's arguments regarding shared delay and third-party settlement negotiations were rejected), the court found that Panther successfully rebutted the presumption of prejudice by demonstrating that documentary evidence was preserved and key witnesses were available, making it primarily a documents case.

The motion to dismiss was dismissed, and the cross-motion to restore was granted, with an order for further security for costs against Panther.

The appellant appealed a conviction for "over 80" after her vehicle was found in a snowbank.

At trial, the appellant claimed a third party was driving, a claim corroborated by a defence witness.

The trial judge disbelieved the appellant and convicted her.

On appeal, the court found that the trial judge erred by failing to assess the corroborating defence witness's evidence separately from the appellant's, thereby misapplying the principles of R. v. W.(D.).

The trial judge also erred by engaging in speculation regarding witness behaviour and by not making an explicit finding of collusion despite noting the opportunity for it.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

This case involves an appeal from an arbitrator's decision in an insurance priority dispute.

The arbitrator found that an employer (insured by Old Republic) made a vehicle available for an employee's regular use at the time of an accident, requiring Old Republic to pay statutory accident benefits.

The employee, a short-haul truck driver, was injured while driving his mother-in-law's car to work, but had permission to sleep in a company truck the night before a haul.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed Old Republic's appeal, affirming the arbitrator's decision.

The court also clarified that correctness is the appropriate standard of review for such priority decisions where there is no significant factual issue to be decided.