Saul Moshé-Steinberg

This ruling addresses an application by the defendant, Marquis Clark, for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of his section 11(b) right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the information being sworn to the scheduled end of the second trial was 789 days, exceeding the presumptive ceiling set in R. v. Jordan.

The court analyzed the delay, deducting 195 days conceded by the defence and an additional 90 days attributed to the systemic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, as per the estimate in R. v. Korovchenko.

After deductions, the net delay of 504 days fell below the Jordan ceiling.

The court also considered the mistrial, finding it was due to an inadvertent disclosure mistake that was quickly remedied, and subsequent delays were largely due to defence counsel's schedules.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court's decision to stay proceedings against the respondent for "over 80" due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The delay was caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The summary conviction appeal judge (SCAJ) found the Crown had not taken reasonable steps to mitigate delay by accepting consecutive trial dates instead of exploring earlier non-consecutive ones.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the SCAJ erred by failing to defer to the trial judge's assessment of local circumstances and the reasonableness of the Crown's actions in managing the pandemic-induced backlog.

The Court clarified that the heightened urgency for scheduling retrials (as per MacIsaac) does not apply to initial trials delayed by exceptional circumstances like COVID-19.

The stay of proceedings was set aside, and the conviction restored.

The applicants brought a joint omnibus Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence following their arrest during the execution of a search warrant at a condominium unit.

They alleged multiple Charter breaches, including unreasonable search and arbitrary detention due to the police's dynamic entry and use of handcuffs, unlawful strip searches, failure to preserve CCTV evidence, and delays in fulfilling their informational and implementation rights to counsel.

The court found that the dynamic entry, manner of detention, and strip searches were reasonable and justified for officer safety.

The court also dismissed the lost evidence claim.

However, the court found breaches of s. 10(a) and s. 10(b) due to unjustified delays in informing the applicants of the reasons for their arrest and their right to counsel, as well as delays in facilitating access to counsel.

Despite these breaches, the court declined to grant a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) or exclude evidence under s. 24(2), concluding that the breaches were not systemic, had minimal impact on the applicants' trial fairness, and the evidence was not obtained as a result of the breaches.

The Crown applied for an order compelling the accused, who was wearing a blazer, to roll up his sleeves in court so the complainant could see if he had a specific tattoo for identification purposes.

The accused objected, arguing it would violate his rights under s. 8 and s. 11(c) of the Charter.

The trial judge dismissed the application, holding that compelling an accused to disrobe in open court for identification is an improper exercise of judicial authority that conscripts evidence and infringes on the right to silence.

This was a joint application by the defendants for relief under sections 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking a declaration that searches conducted under two warrants breached their rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The application challenged the validity of the warrants and the police conduct in obtaining consent for information.

The court dismissed the application, finding no Charter breach and that the warrants were properly issued based on the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The three co-accused applicants brought a pre-trial motion challenging the validity of a search warrant that led to the seizure of firearms and drugs.

The Crown asserted Confidential Informant privilege over portions of the Information to Obtain (ITO) and provided a redacted version along with a proposed judicial summary.

In this Step 6 Garofoli ruling, the court held that the proposed judicial summary sufficiently alerted the defence to the nature of the redacted information, allowing them to challenge the warrant by argument or evidence.

The Crown was permitted to rely on the unredacted ITO to support the issuance of the warrant.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug-related offences and his sentence.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in finding the Information to Obtain (ITO) for search warrants was sufficient and whether evidence obtained from a warrantless swab of his car door handle should have been excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found that the warrantless swabbing of the car door handles, followed by chemical analysis, constituted an unreasonable search under section 8 of the Charter, requiring prior judicial authorization.

However, the Court upheld the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence under section 24(2), deferring to the trial judge's assessment of the Grant factors, particularly the police's good faith and full disclosure.

The Court also dismissed the appeal against sentence, finding the six-year consecutive sentence (resulting in a total of 16 years) was not demonstrably unfit given the serious nature of the drug trafficking enterprise and the appellant's conduct while on bail.

Walter Creglia appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient and that his Charter rights were violated due to a lack of reasonable grounds for arrest.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge's reasons for both dismissing the Charter motion and convicting on impaired driving were convoluted, difficult to understand, and failed to demonstrate a clear path to conviction by linking the evidence, law, and conclusions.

The court also noted the trial judge's irrelevant discussion of "care and control." Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered, as meaningful appellate review was not possible, and the curative proviso was deemed inapplicable.