Richard Litkowski

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge held the complainant's evidence to a different standard and misapprehended the evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly considered the reliability of the appellant's evidence, addressed the frailties in the complainant's version of events, and did not misapprehend the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, two young persons charged with manslaughter and robbery, appealed orders transferring their proceedings to ordinary court.

The youth court had concluded that the first appellant could not be rehabilitated within the three-year maximum youth disposition, and that while the second appellant could be rehabilitated, the gravity of the offence required transfer.

The Court of Appeal allowed both appeals, finding that the youth court placed undue emphasis on speculative psychological evidence for the first appellant and misapplied the statutory test for the second appellant by relying on general deterrence.

The Court ordered both youths to be tried in youth court.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that the common law rule of jury secrecy and section 649 of the Criminal Code infringed their Charter rights by preventing them from adducing evidence of jury deliberations to impeach their verdicts.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the common law rule of jury secrecy, which prohibits the admission of evidence concerning the intrinsic deliberation process but allows evidence of extrinsic influences, is consistent with the principles of fundamental justice.

The Court also found that section 649 of the Criminal Code is constitutional and that the trial judge in the appellant Pan's case did not err in declaring a mistrial.

The Court of Appeal released an addendum to address the appellant Johnson's sentence appeal, which was inadvertently omitted from the original endorsement.

As no oral or written submissions were advanced in support of the appeal, the court found it had no merit and dismissed it.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and assault with a weapon, arguing the trial judge erred in handling jury selection and failing to hold a fitness hearing.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge improperly denied the appellant's right to challenge jurors for cause regarding pre-trial publicity by instead asking a general question to the panel.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred by not directing a fitness hearing when the self-represented appellant exhibited clear signs of mental illness and an inability to understand the proceedings.

The convictions were set aside, and the appellant was declared unfit to stand trial.

The appellants appealed their convictions for robbery, arguing the evidence did not establish their identity as the perpetrators.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the circumstantial evidence—including the appellants' presence in the vehicle used during the robbery, matching physical descriptions, and possession of the victim's stolen property and firearms—permitted a reasonable inference of guilt.

The court also noted the appellants' failure to testify could be considered in assessing the reasonableness of the verdict.

The sentence appeal by Black was also dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions for first degree murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on eyewitness identification, including testimony from unsavoury witnesses.

The appellants argued that the verdict against one of them was unreasonable, and that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding the assessment of a witness's credibility, the application of the 'might reasonably be true' test, and the definition of reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal found that the verdict was not unreasonable given the confirmatory evidence available.

The Court also held that the trial judge's jury instructions, while not perfect in light of subsequent jurisprudence, did not constitute reversible error.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant challenged convictions entered following a nighttime search of his apartment under a warrant obtained on the basis of a confidential informant's tip about stolen property.

The court held that the information to obtain the warrant misleadingly described the informant as reliable, included another person's more serious criminal record, failed to address the informant's own criminal record properly, and did not justify nighttime execution.

Applying the totality of the circumstances analysis for informer-based warrants and the s. 24(2) exclusion framework, the court found the warrant invalid and the search unconstitutional under s. 8 of the Charter.

Given the flagrantly careless police conduct and the seriousness of an unjustified nighttime home intrusion, the seized drugs, weapons, and ring were excluded.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant challenged historic convictions for gross indecency, indecent assault, and common assault arising from repeated sexual abuse of his younger sisters over a lengthy period.

The court held the trial judge's characterization of the appellant as violent and vindictive was reasonably grounded in the evidence and was admissible as narrative context explaining delayed disclosure, not as propensity proof.

The court further held that the convictions rested on a proper credibility assessment, including rejection of the fabrication theory, and that improper Crown cross-examination caused only minimal prejudice.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the 44-month concurrent custodial sentence was upheld as fit given the prolonged abuse, force, threats, and enduring harm.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction and sought leave to appeal sentence.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended evidence concerning hand holding and that reply evidence was improperly admitted.

The court rejected both grounds, finding evidentiary support for the trial judge’s findings and concluding the reply evidence was not strictly collateral and was inconsequential in any event.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence of two years less a day was held to be within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The trial judge had erred by relying on the contents of the complainant's diary as corroboration of her testimony, even though the diary was not introduced into evidence.

The Court of Appeal applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code to uphold the convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's application of the proviso.

The appellants appealed their convictions for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to put the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent to the jury and misdirected the jury on the issue of consent.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that even if the defence should have been put to the jury, the jury's conviction negatived that defence based on how the issue of knowledge of absence of consent was framed.

The Court agreed with the Ontario Court of Appeal that there was no misdirection on the issue of consent.