R. Cary Boswell

This ruling addresses parenting arrangements for two young children, Haylee (step-daughter to the applicant) and Jace (biological son of both parties).

The applicant sought custody of both children and unsupervised access, while the respondent sought custody of both, supervised access for the applicant, and no access for Haylee.

The court found both parties lacked credibility.

It denied the applicant's claim for Haylee, respecting the respondent's parental autonomy as the applicant failed to establish a "settled intention" to treat Haylee as his child or arbitrary imperilment of the relationship.

For Jace, the court awarded temporary custody to the respondent but granted the applicant a gradually increasing schedule of unsupervised access, finding it to be in Jace's best interests.

S.B.S., currently serving a sentence and detained on other serious charges including human trafficking, applied for a second bail review.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to a strengthened supervision plan.

Despite the serious nature of the charges and a reversed onus, the court determined that the revised plan, including 24/7 surety supervision and electronic monitoring, sufficiently attenuated the risk to public safety and maintained confidence in the administration of justice.

The detention order was vacated, and S.B.S. was released on stringent conditions.

The applicant father sought an urgent temporary custody order for his son, Ethan, alleging the respondent mother had substance abuse issues and neglected the child, supported by an initial Children's Aid Society (CAS) letter.

The respondent mother denied the allegations and sought to maintain the existing consent order where she was the primary caregiver.

The court found insufficient evidence to support a complete change in custody or supervised access for the mother.

However, acknowledging the mother's current mental health distress and difficulties, the court issued a temporary order maintaining the mother as the primary resident parent but significantly expanded the father's access, with a plan for review upon Ethan's return to in-person schooling.

No costs were awarded.

The City of Brockville applied for judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner adjudicator's decision ordering the disclosure of redacted legal fee invoices related to collective bargaining.

The city argued the records were entirely excluded from the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act under the labour relations exclusion in s. 52(3)2.

Applying the Vavilov reasonableness standard, the Divisional Court upheld the adjudicator's decision, finding it was reasonable to conclude that the connection between labour relations and accounting documents detailing public expenditures was insufficient to trigger the exclusion.

The applicant, J.B., sought a bail review to be released on a surety bail with house arrest and electronic monitoring, having previously consented to detention.

The Crown opposed her release, citing her extensive criminal record, history of violence including stabbings, and breaches of court orders.

The court found jurisdiction for the review based on a material change in circumstances (the proposed release plan).

However, the court was not satisfied that the proposed plan, involving supervision by her mother recovering from surgery and electronic monitoring, was sufficient to attenuate the substantial likelihood of re-offence (secondary ground) or to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice (tertiary ground).

The application for release was denied, and J.B.'s detention was continued pending trial.

The applicant, S.Q., charged with serious domestic offences, sought to vary his bail conditions due to improved mental health and an impending return to work.

The Crown opposed significant variations, arguing S.Q. continued to pose a risk to the complainant.

The court found a material change in circumstances, triggering its jurisdiction to review the bail conditions.

Applying the Supreme Court's "ladder principle" from *R. v. Antic* and *R. v. Zora*, the court maintained a non-communication order, two sureties, and a residence condition requiring S.Q. to live with a surety (allowing him to reside at his own home with a new tenant surety).

However, the court removed the electronic monitoring and the requirement for constant supervision outside the residence, deeming them disproportionate and not the least onerous conditions necessary to attenuate the identified risk.

Additional conditions prohibiting weapons, alcohol, and non-prescription drugs were imposed.

The defendant, M.W., pleaded guilty to sexual assault of a semi-conscious and vulnerable victim.

The court considered sentencing principles, aggravating factors (victim's vulnerability, non-consensual sexual acts), and mitigating factors (guilty plea).

The judge determined an appropriate sentence of 18 months imprisonment, but applied credits for 181 days of pre-sentence custody (9 months equivalent), an additional 3 months for harsh conditions at Central East Correctional Centre (Duncan credit), and a further 3-month reduction due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic's impact on incarceration conditions.

The net sentence was 3 months, to be served intermittently on weekends, along with 2 years probation and ancillary orders including a weapons prohibition, DNA order, and Sex Offender Information Registration Act compliance.

The appellant, J.G., appealed a 15-year-old verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD), seeking to substitute convictions for the original charges.

J.G. argued the NCRMD finding was unreasonable due to insufficient medical evidence and that the process was procedurally unfair.

The court reviewed the evidentiary record, including psychological and psychiatric assessments, noting the consensual nature of the original NCRMD verdict.

The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the NCRMD finding, particularly given the consensual nature of the proceedings and the medical opinion that J.G. lacked the capacity to appreciate the nature and quality of his acts when agitated.

The court also found no procedural unfairness warranting a new trial, noting J.G.'s representation by counsel and the support of the Children's Aid Society.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, S.B.S., convicted of drug offenses and serving a sentence, sought a bail review of his continued detention on new charges including human trafficking, breach of recognizance, and drug trafficking.

He proposed a stringent release plan with three sureties and electronic monitoring, citing his nearing parole eligibility and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown opposed, arguing an unacceptable risk to public safety.

The court found that the applicant had not met his onus to establish that continued detention was not justified on the secondary ground, citing the egregious nature of the new allegations, his prior flagrant breach of recognizance, and the inadequacy of the proposed surety plan.

The application for bail review was dismissed.

The plaintiff mortgage lender obtained default judgment and lawfully evicted the defendants from the mortgaged premises.

The plaintiff then entered into an agreement to sell the property.

Taking advantage of the COVID-19 suspension of evictions, one of the defendants unlawfully re-entered the premises and sought to stay enforcement proceedings to redeem the mortgage.

The court found the defendant's actions to be an unlawful resort to self-help and granted the plaintiff's motion for a writ of possession, directing police assistance if necessary.

B.S., a 31-year-old inmate with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), applied for a bail review under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code.

He cited his medical condition and the COVID-19 pandemic as new evidence constituting a material change in circumstances since his initial detention order.

The Crown conceded jurisdiction but argued for continued detention on secondary grounds due to public safety risks, B.S.'s criminal record, and prior breaches of recognizance.

The court, acknowledging the reverse onus on B.S., found that while B.S. was not an ideal candidate for release, his proposed surety plan, combined with his motivation to avoid jail due to his vulnerability to COVID-19, sufficiently attenuated the risk of further offences or interference with the administration of justice.

The court emphasized that reducing prison populations where reasonable and safe is in the public health interest during the pandemic.

The detention order was set aside, and B.S. was released on a surety with house arrest conditions.

The accused, B.J., applied for a bail review after being detained on tertiary grounds for serious drug trafficking and criminal organization charges.

The court found that the inclusion of electronic monitoring in the proposed release plan and the public health implications of the COVID-19 pandemic constituted material changes in circumstances, triggering jurisdiction for review.

The court was satisfied that the stringent release plan, including sureties, house arrest, and electronic monitoring, adequately addressed secondary ground concerns.

Considering the potential for lengthy pre-trial custody due to pandemic-related court delays and the accused's heightened health risk, the court concluded that continued detention was not justified on tertiary grounds.

B.J. was released on strict conditions.

C.O., charged with serious offences including sexual assault and breach of probation, applied for a bail review after consenting to detention.

The application was based on new evidence, including a proposed surety and the risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic in correctional facilities.

The Crown opposed release due to C.O.'s lengthy criminal record and public safety concerns.

The court found material changes in circumstances, including the new surety plan and the pandemic's impact on detention conditions and trial delays.

Despite C.O.'s significant criminal history, the court was satisfied that the proposed surety plan, offering 24/7 supervision, sufficiently attenuated public safety risks.

The court also considered the COVID-19 pandemic as a factor tipping the balance in favour of release, vacating the detention order and releasing C.O. on a $10,000 recognizance with specific conditions.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment against the defendants for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale of real estate.

The defendants failed to close the transaction, leading to the plaintiffs reselling their home at a significant loss.

The defendants raised defenses of non est factum and failure to tender, and challenged the appropriateness of partial summary judgment and the calculation of damages.

The court dismissed the defendants' defenses, found partial summary judgment appropriate given the severability of the main action from the third-party claims, and assessed the plaintiffs' damages at $298,847.67.

The court ordered the immediate release of the $30,000 deposit to the plaintiffs and stayed the enforcement of the remaining judgment for six months, pending the resolution of the defendants' third-party claim.

The Crown sought a preliminary ruling to dismiss the defendant's entrapment application, arguing that prior Project Raphael cases had already determined the police investigation was bona fide and not random virtue testing.

The defendant argued that the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Mills provided a new basis to distinguish his case.

The court found that Mills did not alter the entrapment analysis regarding the bona fide nature and precision of the police investigation, and dismissed the first branch of the defendant's entrapment application, but allowed the defendant to proceed with arguments under the second branch of entrapment (inducement).

The accused, charged with violent offences related to a home invasion, appeared for a mandatory 90-day detention review under section 525 of the Criminal Code.

The accused sought release on a surety plan, arguing that the passage of time and the risks associated with the COVID-19 pandemic in correctional facilities justified release.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused's extensive criminal record and history of breaching court orders established a substantial likelihood of re-offence.

The proposed supervision plan was deemed insufficient to mitigate the secondary ground concerns, and the theoretical risk of COVID-19 did not outweigh the risk to public safety.

This case involved urgent motions concerning the sale of land (Huntmar Lands) by Amazon Land Development Corp. to Lioness Developments Inc., which was complicated by a Caution registered by 2718379 Ontario Inc. ("271") based on an earlier "In Principle Agreement" (IPA) with Amazon.

Corfinancial Corp., Amazon's agent, sought orders to facilitate the sale and remove the caution. 271 and 2587410 Ontario Inc. ("258") brought a cross-motion seeking to block the sale, enforce the IPA, and obtain partial summary judgment, arguing Amazon's termination of the IPA was invalid.

The court found that there were too many disputed facts and credibility issues to grant summary judgment on the validity of the IPA's termination.

However, to preserve the deteriorating equity in the property due to accruing mortgage interest and ongoing power of sale proceedings, the court ordered an interim sale of the Huntmar Lands to Lioness under Rule 45.01(2).

The Caution by 271 and a $1 million mortgage registered by 258/271 were vacated, and the net proceeds of sale were ordered to be paid into court, while Corfinancial's proposed mortgage was not registered.

The defendant, Tahir Ali, was charged with multiple drug trafficking offenses and manslaughter related to an opioid overdose death.

The court acquitted the defendant on charges of trafficking and possession for trafficking on April 9, 2017, and manslaughter, due to reasonable doubt regarding the source of drugs and causation of death.

The court also acquitted the defendant on a charge of trafficking on April 28, 2017, as the specific substance trafficked was not proven.

However, the defendant was convicted of possession of heroin and furanyl fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking on April 28, 2017, as the arrest was deemed lawful and the seized evidence admissible.

The defendant, Sheldon Campbell, was convicted of possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a sentence of 6 to 8 months, while the defence argued for time served.

The court considered aggravating factors, such as the insidious nature of crack cocaine and the commercial aspect of the trafficking, and mitigating factors, including the defendant's remorse, rehabilitation efforts, modest drug quantity, and difficult background.

Significant credits were applied for pre-sentence custody, strict bail conditions (2 months), and serious Charter breaches by police (2 months).

The court ultimately imposed a net sentence of 3 months intermittent custody, 2 years probation, a 10-year weapons prohibition, a DNA order, and a forfeiture order.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a FSCO Director's Delegate's decision upholding an arbitrator's award of non-earner benefits to the respondent, who was struck by a bus.

The insurer argued the arbitrator failed to apply the 'continuously prevents' aspect of the test for non-earner benefits.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Director's Delegate reasonably concluded the arbitrator had addressed the test in light of the evidence and the specific arguments raised by the parties at the arbitration.