Peter D. Lauwers

The appellant, Thirumal Kanthasamy, sought leave to appeal his sentence for tractor trailer thefts and robberies, after his co-accused had their sentences reduced.

He argued for a reduction based on the principle of parity and changes in his personal circumstances, including new health issues (coronary artery disease, COVID-19 susceptibility) and increased family responsibilities due to his daughter's cerebral palsy and common-law partner's medical disability.

The Crown consented to a reduction from 8.5 years to 6.5 years based on parity but opposed further reduction based on the fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal accepted the fresh evidence but found that a sentence below 6.5 years would not be proportionate to the gravity of the offences, which involved the use of firearms.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to six and one-half years.

The appellants, David Brown and Daimian Johnson, appealed their sentences for drug trafficking offences, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient credit for various mitigating factors, including multiple arrests, restrictive bail conditions, and cooperation with authorities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the sentencing judge had properly identified and considered the mitigating factors and that the sentences imposed were reasonable and reflected the circumstances.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The appellant, Beth Ann Markowski, was ordered to pay the respondents, Dwayne David Verhey and Kathleen Anne Verhey, costs fixed at $15,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements, following an appeal from a Superior Court of Justice order.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a motion brought on consent.

The motion was dismissed, with costs reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The accused appealed his conviction for attempted murder, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting improper opinion evidence from a 911 dispatcher and a homicide detective, and in admitting hearsay evidence from the complainant to EMS personnel.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in allowing opinion evidence on the accused's credibility and demeanour, and in admitting the complainant's out-of-court statements as hearsay that did not meet necessity and reliability requirements.

The court rejected applying the curative proviso, finding the errors were not trivial and the Crown's case, while strong, was not overwhelming.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Alexander Sangster, appealed convictions for multiple firearm and assault offences, and a global sentence of seven years and seven months.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings regarding the reasonable expectation of privacy for a guest and the validity of consent to search, and finding no material misapprehension of evidence.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal based on fresh evidence demonstrating the appellant's significant rehabilitative progress while in custody and on bail, substituting the sentence to time served.

The appellant, Stonehouse Group Inc., appealed a motion judge's decision denying enhanced refund interest on an overpayment of provincial tax.

The overpayment resulted from a disallowed loss carry back under the Corporations Tax Act, which was later reversed.

The motion judge interpreted s. 79(7) of the Act as precluding enhanced interest for loss carry back refunds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge's interpretation incorrect.

The Court held that such an interpretation would unfairly deny any refund interest, contrary to the legislative intent of the interest payment provisions, which aimed to balance the rights of government and taxpayers and provide enhanced interest for compelled overpayments arising from disputes.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a home invasion and robbery where a co-perpetrator shot and killed the victim.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on post-offence conduct, circumstantial evidence, and by failing to answer a withdrawn jury question regarding the mens rea for murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions and concluding the trial judge appropriately accepted the jury's decision to withdraw their question after they resolved it themselves.

The appellant, Boris Rajkovic, appealed a global sentence of 13 years for six offences, including kidnapping, bank robbery, and discharging a firearm at police.

He challenged the fitness of the sentence, the imposition of a consecutive sentence for discharging a firearm, and the sufficiency of credit for pre-trial custody conditions, including alleged poor medical care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the global sentence fit given the gravity and number of offences, upholding the consecutive sentence due to the distinct nature of the firearm discharge, and affirming the sentencing judge's decision on pre-trial credit as the medical records did not support the appellant's claims.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following its decision to allow an appeal, finding the original trial unfair to the self-represented, non-English speaking appellant.

The court awarded the appellant trial and appeal disbursements, and a modest fee allowance for her and her husband's time as self-represented litigants, emphasizing that costs should dissuade misconduct.

The court also reserved pre-trial costs to the re-trial judge, with a directive that the respondent should not recover costs related to their criticized trial conduct.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario concerning an appeal brought by K. Matthew Hoang against Mann Engineering Ltd. et al.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs of the appeal to the respondents in the amount of $15,000, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by excluding a co-accused's out-of-court hearsay statements, admitting the co-accused's guilty plea and agreed statement of facts, and improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, correctly admitted the edited guilty plea to preserve trial fairness, and provided a clear and error-free jury instruction regarding post-offence conduct.

The appellant appealed his conviction by a jury for aggravated assault arising from a group altercation.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable due to flaws in the eyewitness identification evidence and alternatively sought a new trial on the basis that the trial judge misdirected the jury regarding the identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was ample circumstantial and descriptive evidence to support the conviction, including bloodstain evidence matching the victim on the appellant's shirt.

The Court also held that the trial judge's charge clearly distinguished between descriptive evidence and in-court identification, and would not have misled the jury.

The respondent applied to the University of Waterloo as a transfer student but did not meet the academic standards due to prior grades affected by undiagnosed disabilities.

The University's Admissions Committee rejected his application based solely on those unaccommodated grades.

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario dismissed his discrimination complaint, finding the University met its duty to accommodate.

The Divisional Court set aside the HRTO decision as unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's finding that the HRTO decision was unreasonable, as the University could not rely solely on unaccommodated grades to demonstrate reasonable accommodation, but varied the remedy to remit the matter back to the HRTO rather than the Admissions Committee.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and simple assault against his stepson and son, respectively.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in her assessment of the complainants' motive to fabricate and the potential tainting of their evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's explanation of the motive issue was problematic, it did not amount to a palpable and overriding error, and there was no evidence of collusion or tainting between the complainants.

The appellant sued the respondents in negligence, alleging that the respondents improperly obtained an enforcement order during garnishment proceedings which caused the appellant's employer to terminate his employment.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding no duty of care was owed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, holding that a judgment creditor seeking to realize on a judgment through garnishment proceedings does not owe a duty of care to the debtor to avoid causing harm to the debtor's ongoing employment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to firearms offences and was sentenced to four years in custody.

At sentencing, he sought additional credit for pre-sentence custody due to harsh conditions at the detention centre, specifically that his leg injuries prevented him from accessing the yard.

The sentencing judge granted standard 1.5:1 credit but refused additional credit, disbelieving the appellant's claims.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence of complaints made to the Ombudsman.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence did not meet the Palmer test and the sentencing judge made no error in principle in exercising her discretion.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference involving a child.

At trial, the evidence of the complainant and the appellant was diametrically opposed.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, stating that the two versions could not both be true and rejecting the appellant's evidence based on her acceptance of the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred by treating the case as a credibility contest rather than assessing whether the evidence as a whole raised a reasonable doubt, and by misapplying the principles for rejecting an accused's evidence.

The appellant, a general contractor, appealed the dismissal of its application for a declaration that the City of Toronto pay a construction holdback of $174,381.14.

The parties had previously entered into a global settlement of five lawsuits for $1,287,500, signing a release for all outstanding claims.

The appellant argued the holdback funds were impressed with a trust under the Construction Lien Act and separate from the settlement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the unambiguous terms of the settlement and release covered all claims, including the holdbacks, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) test.

The appellant had grabbed the complainant from behind, claiming he mistakenly believed she was his girlfriend.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence and convicted him.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge failed to properly apply the second step of the W.(D.) test by not considering whether the exculpatory evidence of the appellant's girlfriend raised a reasonable doubt.