Peter D. Lauwers

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a 2005 settlement for the sale of shares, arguing he lacked mental capacity to consent and instruct counsel at the time.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant failed to prove lack of capacity, lack of instructions, the respondents' awareness of any incapacity, or that the settlement was unfair.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to award the appellant interest on the $700,000 purchase price, as the respondents had the benefit of the appreciating shares in the intervening years.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter, unlawful confinement, robbery, and use of an imitation firearm after a victim died from suffocation when her face was covered in duct tape during a robbery.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing his Corbett application to exclude his prior robbery convictions.

He also appealed his 18-year sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by finding he knew his actions put the victim at risk of death, and that the sentence was outside the typical range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion on the Corbett application and that the sentence, while outside the normal range, was fit given the extreme gravity of the offence and the offender's high moral culpability.

The appellant sued the Crown for injuries sustained at a provincial park boat launch.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the tort action because the appellant failed to provide the required 10-day notice under section 7(3) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

On appeal, the appellant argued that strict compliance was not required and sought leave to amend the claim to plead breach of contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the legislature did not intend a flexible approach to the notice periods under the Act, and that the proposed contractual claim was time-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant, a successful bidder on a federal dam construction contract in Quebec, sued the federal Crown in Ontario for negligent misstatement and breach of contract.

The motion judge struck the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under s. 21(1) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, finding the contract claim arose in Quebec and the tort claim was extinguished by the contract's general conditions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming the motion judge applied the correct test to determine where the substance of the claim arose and correctly interpreted the contract as providing an exclusive mechanism for resolving claims.

Following a successful appeal, the parties were unable to resolve the costs of the motion below.

The Court of Appeal fixed the costs of the motion below at $4,500 in favour of the appellants, payable out of the proceeds of the sale of the property, noting that much of the time claimed related to necessary housekeeping matters regarding the sale.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing the action against the respondent vehicle owner.

The driver, who was impaired and caused a fatal accident, admitted he did not have the owner's consent to drive the vehicle.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by applying a purely subjective test for implied consent and by not directing a trial of the issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly considered all evidence and credibility, and correctly concluded he could resolve the dispute on summary judgment.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding damages to the respondents for losses arising from unauthorized investment trading, arguing the action was barred by the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the modified objective test for discoverability.

The respondents cross-appealed to recover capital gains taxes incurred due to the unauthorized trading.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, holding that the claim for taxes was not a new cause of action but a claim for additional damages arising from the existing cause of action, and thus not statute-barred.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that a retaining wall encroaching on a right of way did not create a substantial obstruction to their rights under a 1916 grant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge's findings were well-supported by the evidence and owed deference.

The respondents' cross-appeal seeking leave to appeal the denial of costs at the application stage was also dismissed, as there was no error in principle.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after two pounds of the drug were found in her luggage upon returning from Panama.

She appealed her conviction and four-year sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding her credibility and seeking to admit fresh evidence of photographs to corroborate her story.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application, finding it related to a non-essential aspect of her testimony.

The conviction and sentence appeals were also dismissed, as the trial judge made no errors in his credibility assessment and the sentence was within the acceptable range.

The respondent was found not criminally responsible for aggravated assault and other charges.

The Ontario Review Board granted him an absolute discharge, finding he no longer posed a significant risk to public safety.

The hospital appealed, seeking to introduce fresh evidence that the respondent had rapidly decompensated, resumed substance abuse, and become aggressive shortly after his discharge.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it could reasonably have affected the board's decision as it undermined the factual foundation of the absolute discharge.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the board for a rehearing.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding a real estate broker commission on the sale of a property pursuant to a holdover clause in a listing agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the broker's failure to provide written notice of the introduction of the purchaser, as required by the holdover clause, was a bar to the contractual claim for commission.

However, the Court allowed the broker's cross-appeal in part, awarding $20,000 on the basis of quantum meruit for services provided to the vendor after the listing agreement had expired.

The Court also found that the corporate principal was not personally liable for the compensation.

The young person appealed his convictions for possession of a weapon for the purpose of robbery and robbery with a weapon, as well as his sentence of nine months' custody and 12 months' probation.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied credibility principles and relied on corroborating independent evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge adequately considered the principles of the Youth Criminal Justice Act and the sentence was fit for a serious firearm offence.

Following an appeal that upheld a contempt finding against a condominium board but varied the sanction, the Court of Appeal addressed the costs of the underlying contempt motion.

The motion judge had awarded $109,598 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The Court of Appeal found that the board's conduct, while contemptuous, did not warrant elevated costs as it was not motivated by personal gain or vengeance.

The costs award was reduced to $35,000 on a partial indemnity scale, payable jointly and severally by the condominium corporation and the individual board members.

The appellants, members of a Serbian Orthodox Church congregation, appealed a decision dismissing their application for a declaration that the congregation's elected trustees held the congregational properties in trust.

The diocesan administrative board had removed the executive board and replaced it with a temporary trusteeship following a dispute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge did not err in considering internal church documents and correctly concluded that the temporary trusteeship held the properties in trust under the Religious Organizations' Lands Act.

The Court also held that the American 'neutral principles of law' doctrine is not mandatory in Ontario church property disputes.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to compel the City of Ottawa and provincial politicians to disclose information regarding the transit system and the Presto Card.

The motion judge found the court lacked jurisdiction because the appellant had not exhausted his remedies under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the application was premature and quashed the appeal, noting it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal absent leave.

The respondent, a silent investor in a private company, brought an oppression action against the managing directors for awarding themselves excessive compensation and failing to provide financial disclosure.

The trial judge found the directors liable for oppression and awarded damages and substantial indemnity costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the findings of oppression and the scale of costs, but found the trial judge erred by not calculating the excess compensation on a net basis over the entire 22-year period, which would have credited the directors for under-compensation in the company's early years.

The Court reduced the damages award from $250,000 to $187,453.51 and remitted the quantum of costs to the trial judge for reconsideration in light of a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The appellant, previously declared a dangerous offender and a vexatious litigant in Federal Court, appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant in Ontario courts.

He argued he was denied natural justice and that the application judge's conduct raised a reasonable apprehension of bias, specifically regarding the refusal to allow a 55-day adjournment to cross-examine the respondent's affiant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge properly exercised discretion to control the court's process and that the vexatious litigant finding was fully supported by the appellant's history of meritless proceedings.

The appellant and respondent were co-sureties for a corporate debt.

The appellant's principal unilaterally took control of the business, excluded the respondent, and caused the appellant to pay off the corporate debt without any demand from the bank or notice to the respondent.

The appellant then sought equitable contribution from the respondent.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the payment was voluntary and not reasonably necessary for the survival of the business.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that because the appellant failed to establish that default was imminent, its voluntary payment discharged the debt and released the co-surety.

The appellants appealed an order setting aside a commercial lease as fraudulent under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act and directing the sale of a property free of the lease.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in deciding the fraudulent conveyance issue without proper notice or a trial, as the debtor's intent raised a triable issue.

Furthermore, the court held that the term 'encumbrancers' in the standard form order for partition and sale encompasses both existing and subsequent encumbrancers, meaning the property could not be sold free of the subsequently registered lease without the encumbrancer's consent.

The appellants purchased a yacht for over $1 million and later sued for fundamental breach, returning the yacht.

After the close of pleadings, the action languished for over ten years with minimal steps taken.

The motion judge dismissed the action for delay under Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the court's inherent jurisdiction, finding the delay inordinate, inexcusable, and prejudicial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that the court has inherent jurisdiction to dismiss an action for delay as an abuse of process when the delay is of such magnitude.