Naomi Greckol-Herlich

The United Steelworkers Local Union 2251, supported by USW Local 2724 and Essar Algoma retirees, brought a motion to qualify a "Subject Bidder" as a Phase II Bidder in a Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) proceeding.

The Subject Bidder had been disqualified by Essar Algoma, its Chief Restructuring Advisor, Financial Advisor, and the Monitor for failing to provide satisfactory evidence of financial capability to consummate a transaction.

The union argued it was not properly consulted in the disqualification decision and that it should have been allowed to meet with the Subject Bidder.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the union's consultation rights under the Sale and Solicitation Process (SISP) did not extend to decisions on a bidder's financial capability, and that the court should not second-guess the business judgment of the CCAA applicants and their professionals.

In the context of CCAA restructuring proceedings, the applicants sought approval of a grievance claims procedure to resolve approximately 3,000 outstanding grievances.

USW Local 2251 opposed the motion, arguing that the CCAA stay did not apply to grievances, that imposing a new procedure impermissibly amended the collective agreement, and that staying the grievance process violated section 2(d) of the Charter.

The court granted the motion, holding that the CCAA permits staying grievance procedures and imposing a claims process, which does not constitute an amendment to the collective agreement.

The court also found no Charter violation and held that under the doctrine of paramountcy, the CCAA stay provisions prevail over the grievance arbitration requirements in the provincial Labour Relations Act.

The moving party regulator brought a motion to strike a lengthy statement of claim alleging various wrongs arising from disciplinary proceedings, settlement agreements, trustee services, and bankruptcy matters.

The court held that many allegations were barred by a prior settlement and release, constituted impermissible collateral attacks on regulatory decisions, were statute-barred, or disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court considered whether the pleadings could support the tort of misfeasance in public office but found that the material facts alleged did not establish deliberate unlawful conduct or knowledge of likely harm.

Even accepting the pleaded facts as true, the claim could not succeed in law and amendment would not cure the defects.

The action against the regulator was therefore dismissed and costs were awarded.