Padraic Ryan

This decision concerns a costs award following the dismissal of the applicant's constitutional challenge to sections of the Insurance Act.

The court had previously found the applicant lacked standing and that the challenge failed on its merits.

The applicant argued for no costs, citing public interest, or a reduced award based on public sector salaries of Crown counsel.

The court rejected both arguments, stating that the litigation was speculative and without merit, and that costs for Crown lawyers are not reduced due to their salaried status.

The court fixed costs at $50,000, payable by the applicant to the Province of Ontario, which represented approximately one-third of a reasonable claim.

The applicant, a personal injury lawyer, challenged the constitutionality of sections 267.5(1) and 280 of the Insurance Act, which limit pre-trial recovery of lost income and grant sole jurisdiction to the Licence Appeal Tribunal for Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule disputes, respectively.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant lacked both private and public interest standing.

On the merits, the court found no breach of sections 15(1) or 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, nor a violation of section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, as the impugned provisions did not create distinctions based on prohibited grounds, deprive individuals of life, liberty, or security of the person, or usurp superior court jurisdiction for a novel area of law.

The applicants brought a motion to set aside an order quashing their application for judicial review of the Minister's decision to apply an Interim Enforcement Policy to certain First Nations regarding hunting and fishing rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, upholding the motions judge's finding that the Minister's decision was an exercise of prosecutorial discretion and therefore not justiciable absent an abuse of process.

The Court also agreed that the applicant's section 15 Charter claim was bound to fail as the policy did not alter his rights or impose a burden based on race.

Furthermore, the Court held it lacked jurisdiction under the Judicial Review Procedure Act because the policy was not an exercise of a statutory power.

The applicants brought a motion to set aside an order of the motions judge, which added the Williams Treaties First Nations as necessary parties or interveners to an application for judicial review and awarded substantial indemnity costs against the applicants.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the motions judge's conclusion that the First Nations would be directly affected by the declarations sought.

The court also upheld the costs award, noting that the applicants persisted with an unnecessary motion despite being on notice that elevated costs would be sought.

The appellant, a small distillery, challenged the LCBO's 139.7% mark-up on spirits sold at its on-site retail store, arguing it was an unconstitutional tax under sections 53 and 90 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The application judge dismissed the challenge, finding the mark-up was a proprietary charge and not a tax, and that the appellant had voluntarily agreed to it by contract.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that the LCBO, as the owner of the spirits under the contract, was exercising its private law rights to determine prices in a commercial context.

The applicant, an almost 90-year-old man suffering from multiple severe, non-terminal medical conditions causing intolerable pain and suffering, sought judicial authorization for a physician-assisted death under the *Carter* constitutional exemption.

The court considered whether a medical condition must be terminal to qualify for such an exemption.

The Attorneys General took no position, while the respondent physicians supported the application.

The court granted the application, clarifying that a terminal illness is not a necessary precondition for a constitutional exemption for physician-assisted death, and that the death would not require coroner notification.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Minister of Natural Resources' decision to apply an Interim Enforcement Policy, which permits Aboriginal people to hunt and fish for food, social, and ceremonial purposes, within the 1923 Williams Treaties boundaries.

The Minister brought a motion to quash the application.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the application of the policy was an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which is immune from judicial review absent an abuse of process.

The court also held that the policy did not violate the applicants' equality rights under section 15 of the Charter, as it constituted an ameliorative program under section 15(2).

The applicant, an 80-year-old suffering from metastasized renal cancer and a broken pelvis, applied for judicial authorization for a physician-assisted death pursuant to the Carter constitutional exemption.

She was in intolerable pain with no hope of recovery and a prognosis of approximately three months to live.

The court found that she was competent, acting voluntarily, and met all the Carter criteria.

The application was granted, including a declaration that the assisting physicians were exempt from Criminal Code provisions and were not required to notify the coroner under the Coroners Act.

The Attorney General for Ontario sought judicial review of an arbitration award between CUPE Local 27 and the Greater Essex County District School Board, arguing the arbitrator erred in interpreting s. 177 of the Education Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for the reasons given in a related Stated Case (2016 ONSC 2361), finding the result was the same regardless of whether the standard of review was correctness or reasonableness.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to CUPE Local 27.

The Minister of Education brought a Stated Case asking the Divisional Court to determine whether the Education Act permits school boards to pay for life insurance and health benefits for retired employees over 65 years of age.

The Minister argued that the Act only permits payments to current employees and that specific statutory authority is required for such expenditures.

The Court held that while ss. 177(3) and 177(4) do not authorize these payments, other sections of the Act, including ss. 58.5(1), 170(1)18, 171(1)3, and 177(1), when read together and in context, provide the necessary authority.

The Court found that school boards have the power to negotiate and pay for post-retirement benefits as part of employee compensation packages.

CD, suffering from stage 4 metastatic breast cancer, applied for judicial authorization of a physician-assisted death under the constitutional exemption established in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General).

She also sought a declaration that the physicians involved would not need to notify the coroner.

The court found that CD met all criteria for physician-assisted death, including grievous, terminal, and irremediable suffering, and that she was a competent adult freely consenting.

The application was granted, and a declaration was issued that coroner notification was unnecessary.

The applicant, a small craft distillery, applied for a declaration that the markup imposed by the LCBO on spirits sold at its on-site retail store was an unconstitutional tax under the Constitution Act, 1867.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the markup was a proprietary charge levied by the LCBO as the owner and commercial supplier of the spirits.

Alternatively, the court held that the markup was a contractual term freely agreed to by the applicant in exchange for the authorization to sell its products.

The applicant brought an urgent application for physician-assisted death and sought confidentiality orders, including a publication ban and sealing order, without giving notice to the media.

The court balanced the open court principle with the applicant's dire medical circumstances and privacy interests.

The court granted an interim publication ban and sealing order, authorized the use of pseudonyms, and directed the applicant to provide notice to the media, giving the media 60 days to bring a motion to challenge the orders.

Two physicians sought judicial review and constitutional relief challenging registration requirements under the Medicine Act and requesting mandamus orders compelling the regulatory body to issue certificates of registration.

They also sought Charter-based relief preventing the regulator from investigating professional conduct.

The court held that the applications were premature because the applicants had alternative statutory remedies through the regulator’s processes, including review by the Health Professions Review Board and appeal to the Divisional Court.

The applicants had also failed to provide sworn evidence or comply with procedural requirements for judicial review.

The court further found the requested mandamus and constitutional relief lacked factual and legal foundation and dismissed the applications.

The appellant, a commercial truck driver, appealed his conviction under the Highway Traffic Act for operating a truck with a speed limiter set above the mandated 105 km/h.

He argued the speed limiter requirement violated his right to security of the person under section 7 of the Charter by preventing him from accelerating to avoid collisions.

The Court of Appeal held that while the legislation infringed section 7 by being overbroad in rare situations where acceleration is necessary to avoid accidents, the infringement was demonstrably justified under section 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit to improve highway safety and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a manager at a provincial jail, filed a human rights complaint after the respondent union president posted sexist comments about her on a union blog during a labour dispute.

The Human Rights Tribunal dismissed the complaint, finding the conduct did not constitute discrimination 'with respect to employment' under s. 5(1) of the Human Rights Code, after balancing the Code's objectives with the respondent's Charter rights to freedom of expression and association.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that administrative tribunals must consider Charter values when interpreting their home statutes, even absent ambiguity, and that the Tribunal's balancing of these rights was reasonable.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her application for delay.

The applicant's late husband was denied a liver transplant due to a policy requiring six months of abstinence from alcohol.

The applicant filed her human rights complaint almost two years later, arguing she did not know the policy was discriminatory until then.

The Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding it reasonable to conclude that ignorance of the law does not constitute a good faith explanation for delay under section 34(2) of the Human Rights Code.

The applicants sought a declaration that Ontario Regulation 27/13 under the Traditional Chinese Medicine Act, 2006 was ultra vires and breached sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

They argued the regulation failed to create a 'doctor' class of practitioners and imposed discriminatory English or French language fluency requirements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the regulation was intra vires, there is no section 7 Charter right to practice a profession unfettered by regulation, and language alone is not a protected ground under section 15.