Padraic Ryan

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) challenged the constitutionality of Ontario's Federal Carbon Tax Transparency Act (FCTTA) and its accompanying regulation, O. Reg. 275/19, which mandated gasoline retailers to display a specific sticker on gas pumps.

The CCLA argued this requirement constituted compelled speech, violating freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court granted the CCLA public interest standing, finding that the legislation's true purpose was partisan advocacy rather than neutral information sharing.

Consequently, the court held that the FCTTA and O. Reg. 275/19 infringed section 2(b) of the Charter and could not be justified under section 1, declaring them to be of no force or effect.

The appellant was successful on appeal and sought costs for both the appeal and the underlying summary judgment motions.

The parties agreed to fix the appeal costs at $75,000.

For the motions, the appellant sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $212,500.

The respondents argued this amount was excessive and not within their reasonable contemplation, suggesting a cap of $125,000.

The Court of Appeal found that while there was some overlap in the respondents' work, it was not considerable, and fixed the motion costs at $175,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The appellant, a heavy electricity user, challenged the constitutionality of the Global Adjustment component of Ontario's electricity pricing formula, which funds the Feed-in Tariff (FIT) program.

The appellant argued that the FIT program component was a colourable attempt to disguise a tax as a regulatory charge, designed to provide economic stimulus and subsidies to preferred communities (aboriginal peoples, co-operatives, and municipalities) rather than to regulate electricity generation.

The motion judge struck the applications, finding the Global Adjustment was a valid regulatory charge within a closed system.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the appellant's colourability challenge was sufficiently plausible that the applications should not have been dismissed on a pleadings motion and should proceed to a full hearing on the merits.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a reference question regarding the constitutionality of the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, Part 5 of the Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No. 1.

The Act establishes a federal carbon pricing scheme applicable to provinces that have not adopted sufficiently stringent carbon pricing mechanisms.

The majority held that the Act is constitutional under the national concern branch of the Peace, Order, and Good Government power, as establishing minimum national standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is a matter of national concern.

The fuel charge and excess emissions charge were found to be valid regulatory charges, not taxes.

Justice Huscroft dissented, arguing that the Act improperly expands federal jurisdiction over greenhouse gas emissions, which are generated by virtually all provincial activities.

The appellants, Dairy Farmers of Ontario and Dairy Farmers of Canada, appealed a Master's order dismissing their motion to intervene as added parties in an application challenging the constitutionality of mandatory milk pasteurization laws.

The Master had dismissed the motion based on the Supreme Court's decision in Northwestern, finding that allowing the appellants to intervene would violate their impartiality as administrative bodies.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Master erred in applying Northwestern, as the underlying application was a constitutional challenge to a statute, not a judicial review of the appellants' own decisions.

The Court found the appellants met the criteria under Rule 13.01 and could make a useful contribution given their specialized expertise.

The applicant, an icewine producer, challenged the validity of rules, by-laws, and regulations under the Vintners Quality Alliance Act, 1999, after its membership in the VQAO was terminated and approvals for its wines were revoked.

The applicant argued that the VQAO's taste test requirement and membership rules were ultra vires, and that the provincial scheme conflicted with its rights under the federal Trade-marks Act and Canada Agricultural Products Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the VQAO's rules and by-laws were reasonable and properly enacted, the new regulation was intra vires, and there was no operational conflict or frustration of purpose invoking the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

A lawyer appealed the dismissal of an application for a declaration that sections 267.5(1) and 280 of the Insurance Act violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The application judge found the appellant lacked both private and public interest standing to bring the application.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the impugned provisions affected him personally and directly, and that his scholarly contributions and representation of affected clients did not establish a genuine interest in the outcome or demonstrate that the application was a reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the courts.

The court issued a costs endorsement following successful motions by the Attorney General of Ontario, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, and the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) to strike two constitutional challenge applications.

The applications, brought by National Steel Car Limited, challenged aspects of Ontario's Global Adjustment electricity regime.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the Attorney General and Her Majesty in the amount of $50,000, and to the IESO in the amount of $75,000.

The decision considered the general principles of costs under Rule 57.01, the principle of indemnity, and the reasonable expectations of the parties.

It addressed the applicant's argument of being a public interest litigant and confirmed that a party fully participating in and supporting a successful motion, even without formally bringing it, can be awarded costs, subject to adjustment.

The respondents brought a motion to strike out two applications challenging the constitutionality of the Global Adjustment under the Electricity Act, 1998.

The responding party argued that the Global Adjustment was an unconstitutional tax that violated s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The court applied the Lawson and Westbank tests, concluding that the Global Adjustment is a regulatory charge tied to a complex regulatory scheme, not a tax.

The court found it plain and obvious that the applications could not succeed and granted the motion to strike.

The self-represented applicant, a paramedic, brought an application seeking a declaration that the Ambulance Services Collective Bargaining Act, 2001 unjustifiably violates section 2(d) of the Charter by requiring ambulance workers to provide essential services during a strike.

The applicant argued that the legislation's purpose was unconstitutional on its face and therefore no evidentiary record of its effects was required.

The court dismissed the application, holding that a factual foundation demonstrating the legislation's deleterious effects on collective bargaining is essential, and its absence was fatal to the Charter challenge.

The applicant alleged that the respondents discriminated against him on the basis of disability by refusing to pay out the commuted value of his pension while his employment status remained in dispute due to an outstanding human rights application.

The respondents requested that the application be dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success and for delay.

The Tribunal declined to dismiss the application, finding that the issues of adverse effect discrimination were more appropriately determined on a full evidentiary record, and that the application was filed within the one-year limitation period.

The appellant, a tobacco manufacturer on the Six Nations reserve, appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing its application for judicial review of the Minister of Finance's demand for security under section 12(2)(f.1) of the Tobacco Tax Act.

The appellant manufactured tobacco for export and for sale on First Nations reserves, neither of which were subject to Ontario's tobacco tax.

The appellant argued the Minister's interpretation of the security requirement was unreasonable and that the provision was unconstitutional as an indirect tax on exported goods.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's decision, finding the Minister's interpretation reasonable and the provision constitutionally valid as incidental to a valid direct taxation scheme.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming her involuntary psychiatric admission.

She sought a declaration that a forced injection of anti-psychotic medication violated her Charter rights and requested rescission of her detention certificate as a remedy.

The central issue was whether the Board has jurisdiction to grant remedies under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal held that the Board does not have s. 24(1) Charter jurisdiction, despite having authority to decide questions of law.

The court found that the legislature clearly intended to exclude Charter remedies from the Board's jurisdiction based on the removal of s. 52(1) jurisdiction, strict statutory timelines, limited remedial powers, composition of the Board, and the availability of Superior Court appeals.

The applicant filed a human rights application on behalf of the claimant, an ODSP recipient, alleging that the respondent's policies regarding Extended Health Benefits and Transitional Health Benefits are discriminatory.

The claimant is currently financially eligible for ODSP but anticipates losing eligibility in the future when she begins receiving a survivor's pension.

The Tribunal held a preliminary hearing to determine if the application was premature.

The Tribunal found that it lacks jurisdiction to hear claims based on anticipated future infringements of the Human Rights Code, as section 34(1) only addresses incidents of discrimination that have already occurred.

The application was dismissed as premature.

This decision concerns a costs award following the dismissal of the applicant's constitutional challenge to sections of the Insurance Act.

The court had previously found the applicant lacked standing and that the challenge failed on its merits.

The applicant argued for no costs, citing public interest, or a reduced award based on public sector salaries of Crown counsel.

The court rejected both arguments, stating that the litigation was speculative and without merit, and that costs for Crown lawyers are not reduced due to their salaried status.

The court fixed costs at $50,000, payable by the applicant to the Province of Ontario, which represented approximately one-third of a reasonable claim.

The applicant, a personal injury lawyer, challenged the constitutionality of sections 267.5(1) and 280 of the Insurance Act, which limit pre-trial recovery of lost income and grant sole jurisdiction to the Licence Appeal Tribunal for Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule disputes, respectively.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant lacked both private and public interest standing.

On the merits, the court found no breach of sections 15(1) or 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, nor a violation of section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, as the impugned provisions did not create distinctions based on prohibited grounds, deprive individuals of life, liberty, or security of the person, or usurp superior court jurisdiction for a novel area of law.

The applicants brought a motion to set aside an order quashing their application for judicial review of the Minister's decision to apply an Interim Enforcement Policy to certain First Nations regarding hunting and fishing rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, upholding the motions judge's finding that the Minister's decision was an exercise of prosecutorial discretion and therefore not justiciable absent an abuse of process.

The Court also agreed that the applicant's section 15 Charter claim was bound to fail as the policy did not alter his rights or impose a burden based on race.

Furthermore, the Court held it lacked jurisdiction under the Judicial Review Procedure Act because the policy was not an exercise of a statutory power.

The applicants brought a motion to set aside an order of the motions judge, which added the Williams Treaties First Nations as necessary parties or interveners to an application for judicial review and awarded substantial indemnity costs against the applicants.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the motions judge's conclusion that the First Nations would be directly affected by the declarations sought.

The court also upheld the costs award, noting that the applicants persisted with an unnecessary motion despite being on notice that elevated costs would be sought.

The appellant, a small distillery, challenged the LCBO's 139.7% mark-up on spirits sold at its on-site retail store, arguing it was an unconstitutional tax under sections 53 and 90 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The application judge dismissed the challenge, finding the mark-up was a proprietary charge and not a tax, and that the appellant had voluntarily agreed to it by contract.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that the LCBO, as the owner of the spirits under the contract, was exercising its private law rights to determine prices in a commercial context.

The applicant, an almost 90-year-old man suffering from multiple severe, non-terminal medical conditions causing intolerable pain and suffering, sought judicial authorization for a physician-assisted death under the *Carter* constitutional exemption.

The court considered whether a medical condition must be terminal to qualify for such an exemption.

The Attorneys General took no position, while the respondent physicians supported the application.

The court granted the application, clarifying that a terminal illness is not a necessary precondition for a constitutional exemption for physician-assisted death, and that the death would not require coroner notification.