Padraic Ryan

The applicant sought costs of $15,000 previously fixed by Kimmel J. relating to an injunction granted against the respondents for breaching COVID-19 public health orders.

The respondents argued they should be excused from paying costs as public interest litigants.

The court rejected this argument, finding that by choosing to disobey the law rather than challenge it directly, the respondents engaged in conduct harmful to the public interest.

The respondents were ordered to pay $15,000 in costs.

The appellants appealed the removal of over 200 dogs from their dog sledding business properties by Animal Welfare Services.

The dogs were removed following non-compliance with previous orders regarding tether lengths and dog house conditions.

The Board found that while some puppies were not in distress and must be returned immediately, the majority of the dogs were in distress due to inadequate tether lengths, lack of insulation, and poor state of repair of their shelters.

The Board ordered the return of the remaining dogs subject to the appellants achieving compliance with specific standards of care, including three-metre tethers and insulated dog houses.

The appellants run a dog sledding business from which over 200 dogs were removed by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector.

The appellants brought a motion seeking the return of the dogs or a stay, based on the respondent's redaction of boarding facility and veterinarian information from disclosure on the grounds of public interest litigation privilege.

The Board found the redacted information was not protected by privilege, noting it had been disclosed in previous cases.

The Board ordered the respondent to provide the unredacted information to the appellants' counsel, subject to an undertaking not to release it to anyone else, including the appellants.

The Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (CAWI) brought motions to strike certain grounds of appeal raised by the appellants regarding the removal of over 200 dogs.

The CAWI sought to strike grounds relating to the conduct of inspectors during the removal and alleged Charter violations, arguing the Animal Care Review Board lacks jurisdiction over these matters.

The Board granted the motion to strike the grounds relating to inspector conduct, finding it has no jurisdiction to oversee inspector conduct under the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act.

The Board also determined it is not a court of competent jurisdiction under s. 24(1) of the Charter and struck the appellants' Charter arguments.

However, the Board dismissed the CAWI's request to preclude the appellants from calling evidence on issues from previous proceedings, finding that res judicata and issue estoppel did not apply because the issues in dispute were not identical.

The appellants, operators of a dog sledding and horse-riding business, appealed the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector's removal of over 200 dogs from their properties.

The appellants brought a motion seeking the return of the dogs and dismissal of the proceedings, or alternatively an interim stay, alleging untimely and incomplete disclosure by the respondent.

The Animal Care Review Board dismissed the motion, finding insufficient evidence of outstanding disclosure and concluding that the appellants failed to demonstrate actual prejudice to their ability to make full answer and defence.

The appellants, operators of a dog sledding business, brought a motion seeking the return of over 200 dogs removed by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector or a stay of the removal orders.

They argued the search warrants leading to the removal were based on misleading Information to Obtain (ITOs).

The Animal Care Review Board dismissed the motion, finding it constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the Ontario Court of Justice, which issued the warrants.

The appellants, who run a dog sledding business, had over 200 dogs removed by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector.

They brought a motion seeking the return of the dogs or a stay of the removal orders, arguing that a reasonable apprehension of bias existed because the Animal Care Review Board filed a factum in a related judicial review proceeding before the Divisional Court.

The adjudicator dismissed the motion, finding that the Board's factum did not demonstrate aggressive partisanship and that the test for a reasonable apprehension of bias applies to the individual decision-maker, not the entire tribunal.

The appellants, who run a dog sledding business, had over 200 dogs removed by the respondent Chief Animal Welfare Inspector due to alleged non-compliance with previous orders.

The appellants brought a motion seeking to inspect the dogs, arguing they needed to take their own measurements and expressing concern over the dogs' welfare after three dogs died in the respondent's care.

The Animal Care Review Board found it had jurisdiction to order an inspection under Rule 9.3(d) because the respondent intended to rely on measurements taken during the removal.

However, the Board declined to order the inspection, finding it would not be proportionate or efficient to inspect over 200 dogs for measurements, and noting that the appellants' welfare concerns would be addressed by a separate disclosure order.

The respondent Chief Animal Welfare Inspector brought two motions to strike grounds of appeal, including Charter claims, related to the removal of over 200 dogs from the appellants' dog sledding business.

The appellants requested an adjournment of the motions because a recent disclosure order required the respondent to produce extensive materials regarding the removal and care of the animals.

The Animal Care Review Board granted the adjournment, finding that the pending disclosure would facilitate a more open process and informed participation by providing factual context relevant to the motions.

The appellants, who run a dog sledding business, appealed the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector's decision to remove over 200 dogs from their properties.

The appellants brought a motion for further disclosure, including documentation of the removal, the subsequent care of the dogs, and the Informations to Obtain (ITOs) used for the search warrants.

The respondent refused, arguing the information was irrelevant.

The Animal Care Review Board granted the motion, finding the requested disclosure was relevant to whether the removal was lawful and necessary for a full understanding of the issues.

The appellants, owners of a dog sledding business, appealed the removal of over 200 dogs by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector.

They brought a preliminary motion seeking the interim return of the dogs pending the full hearing, arguing that a multiplicity of proceedings between the parties offended natural justice.

The Animal Care Review Board dismissed the motion, finding that the other proceedings did not address the same issues and were mostly initiated by the appellants themselves.

Furthermore, under the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, the Board only has the authority to order the return of animals after a full hearing on the merits, unless both parties consent, which did not occur here.

The applicant, an advocacy group for strippers, brought a judicial review application challenging COVID-19 regulations that temporarily closed strip clubs in Stage 2 and Stage 3 areas.

Before the application was heard, the impugned regulations were revoked and replaced, allowing strip clubs to operate with safety requirements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for mootness, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case on the merits as the live controversy had ended and there was no cogent reason to depart from the general rule against hearing moot cases.

Following the dismissal of the respondents' motion for Charter damages due to procedural errors, the applicant sought costs for the hearing and for a prior hearing.

The respondents argued they were public interest litigants and no costs should be awarded.

The court rejected this argument, finding that public interest litigants are not entitled to cause wasted costs through basic procedural errors.

The court awarded the applicant $15,000 in partial indemnity costs for the recent hearing and deferred the prior costs pending a determination on the merits.

The respondents brought an interim motion seeking Charter damages and a declaration of invalidity regarding COVID-19 public health regulations that restricted their restaurant operations.

The court dismissed the motion on threshold jurisdictional grounds, finding that the respondents failed to commence an originating process claiming such relief and that their Notice of Motion was procedurally defective.

The court held it had no jurisdiction to grant final Charter damages on an interlocutory motion.

Following the dismissal of the moving party's motion to strike, the successful responding parties sought partial indemnity costs of $36,269.19.

The moving party argued for a maximum of $15,000.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01, noting the public interest nature of the litigation, the complexity of the constitutional issues, and the reasonable delegation of work among counsel.

The court found the requested amount fair and reasonable and awarded costs of $36,269.19 to the responding parties.

The applicant sought judicial review and broad declaratory relief against Ontario, arguing that the province failed to ensure the equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines to vulnerable populations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction under the Judicial Review Procedure Act because the requested declarations did not relate to the exercise, refusal to exercise, or proposed exercise of a specific statutory power.

The court noted that while the applicant raised important issues regarding vaccine equity, the broad, abstract relief sought was not properly before the court.

The respondent (moving party) brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the applicants (responding parties) in the agreed amount of $5,000.

The plaintiffs, a group of affiliated wine manufacturers and retailers, brought an action against the LCBO, the AGCO, and the Crown challenging the 'Made Policy', which regulates where wineries can sell their products.

The parties brought six competing motions, including motions to strike pleadings, motions for summary judgment, and a motion regarding the late disclosure of a tolling agreement between the defendants.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion to strike the defendants' pleadings over the tolling agreement, finding it did not alter the expected adversarial landscape.

The court struck significant portions of the plaintiffs' statement of claim against the LCBO and AGCO, particularly allegations relating to pre-2001 conduct that had been settled in prior litigation, and claims for intentional interference with economic relations.

The Crown's motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against it.

The AGCO's and the plaintiffs' respective motions for summary judgment were dismissed, as the complex factual matrix and allegations of bad faith required a trial.

The applicants, seven youths residing in Ontario, brought an application challenging Ontario's cancellation of the Climate Change Act and its newly-enacted greenhouse gas reduction target under the Cap and Trade Cancellation Act, 2018.

They alleged that the target violates their rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

Ontario brought a motion to strike the application under Rule 21, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action, was not justiciable, was based on unprovable speculations, depended on positive obligations, and that the applicants lacked standing for future generations.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding that the target and plan are reviewable by the courts, the claims are capable of scientific proof, the matter is justiciable as it challenges specific government conduct, the issue of positive obligations should be decided on a full evidentiary record, and the applicants meet the test for public interest standing at this preliminary stage.

The applicants sought a declaration that a liver transplant waiting list rule adopted by Trillium Gift of Life Network, which requires a six-month wait for patients whose liver failure is caused by alcohol consumption, is unconstitutional.

The Province moved to dismiss the application against it, arguing that the application challenges the rule of the delegate, not the delegating legislation or any act of the Minister.

The court agreed, holding that under civil procedure rules, a challenge to the constitutionality of delegated legislation must be brought against the rule-making authority, not Her Majesty the Queen.

The application was dismissed against the Province without costs.