Date: 2021-10-25

Appeal under section 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019

Between:

Thomas Pryde, Adrienne Spottiswood & Georgeina Pierce

Appellants

and

Chief Animal Welfare Inspector

Respondent

REASONS FOR DECISION & ORDER Appellant’s Motion for Disclosure

Adjudicator: Jennifer Friedland

Appearances:

For the Appellant: Eric Gillespie, Counsel John May, Counsel Yasmeen Peer, Counsel Kristian Ferreira, Student-at-Law

For the Respondent: Jason Kirsh, Counsel Deanna Exner, Counsel Padraic Ryan, Counsel Waleed Malik, Counsel

Heard by videoconference: October 19, 2021

Overview

1This is a motion for disclosure brought by the appellants in relation to four appeals proceeding together before the Animal Care Review Board (the “Board”).

2The appellants run a dog sledding and horse riding business at two locations in Ontario: one in Oro-Medonte (“Moonstone”) and one in the Township of Severn (“Severn”). The appellants, Thomas Pryde and Adrienne Spottiswood, live with their children on the Severn property. The appellant, Georgina Pryde, is Thomas’ mother. She lives on the Moonstone property with her family.

3On September 23, 2021 the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (the respondent) removed all of the appellants’ dogs from both properties pursuant to s. 31(1) of the Act. This provision allows an inspector to remove an animal in certain circumstances for the purpose of providing it with necessaries to relieve its distress. 111 dogs of various breeds, age, sex and colour and seven puppies of approximately 8 weeks were removed from Moonstone. 115 dogs (including puppies, according to the appellants) were removed from Severn. The appellants have appealed the respondent’s decision to remove the animals pursuant to s. 38 of the Act.

4The respondent subsequently made a decision to keep all of the animals in the care of the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector pursuant to s. 31(6) of the Act. This decision has also been appealed.

5The respondent has provided disclosure of what it intends to rely on at the hearing, which is disclosure relating to the inspection that led to the respondent’s decision to remove the animals from the appellants’ properties.

6By Notice of Motion dated October 13, 2021, the appellants seek an Order requiring the respondent to produce the following further disclosure, which the respondent refuses to provide:

a) All documentation (written and visual) of all Inspectors involved in the removal on September 23, 2021;

b) All documentation (written and visual) of all other persons involved in the removal on September 23, 2021;

c) All documentation (written and visual) of the Ontario Provincial Police (“OPP”) Officers involved in the attendance at the Appellants two properties on September 23, 2021;

d) All documentation (written and visual) related to the housing and care of the dogs since their removal on September 23, 2021;

e) The Informations to Obtain (“ITOs”) used to obtain the search warrants executed on September 23, 2021.

7The hearing of the motion proceeded before me September 19, 2021 by video. I have also been the case management adjudicator for the appeals. My hearing of this motion was on consent of the parties.

Issue and Result

8Much of the argument on this motion centred on whether the principles set out in R v. Stinchcombe¹ apply in the context of an ACRB hearing. I find this to be a red herring. The appellants’ request can be considered on the basis of relevance and on the basis that the disclosure requested is necessary for a full and satisfactory understanding of the issues in the proceeding. It can also be decided on principles of procedural fairness. I need not decide whether there is a broader requirement for Stinchcombe type disclosure in the ACRB context. In this case there has been a request for particular disclosure that the respondent is refusing to provide. The Rules of the Board allow the Board to order disclosure that it considers relevant to the issues in dispute or necessary for a full and satisfactory understanding of the issues in the proceeding. I consider this to be the case here.

9Therefore, for the reasons that follow, I am ordering the requested disclosure be provided as further described in in my Order below provided the disclosure is in the respondent’s possession.

10The parties were orally informed of my decision to order the requested disclosure prior to the start of another motion that proceeded before me on October 22, 2021.²

Background

11The respondent purportedly removed the 200+ animals from the appellants’ properties pursuant to s. 31(1) of the Act. This provision states:

31 (1) An animal welfare inspector may remove an animal from the place where it is and take possession of the animal for the purpose of providing it with necessaries to relieve its distress if,

(c) an order respecting the animal has been made under section 30 and the order has not been complied with.

12The order that was allegedly not complied with by the appellants is an order of this Board released June 23, 2021, upholding compliance orders issued by the respondent pursuant to its authority under s. 30 of the Act in February 2021 following an inspection.³

13The s. 30 compliance orders that were confirmed by the Board related to the length of the tethers used to tie up the dogs outside and to the conditions of the dogs’ houses.

14To put the compliance orders that were confirmed by the Board in perspective: the member acknowledged with respect to the tether issue that the system and length of tether used by the appellants for their sled dogs was the length recommended “under sled dog codes of care around the world, including those in Canada” and that the “appellants’ evidence that their tethering system was safe and humane was strongly supported by their expert witness.⁴ “Unfortunately for the appellants” however, as the member concluded, there was no getting around the fact that the current tether length used by the appellants for their dogs met the definition of distress under the Act given that distress is defined in s. 1 to include being “in need of proper care”, and the regulation sets a standard of care for outdoor dogs requiring a longer tether.⁵

15With respect to the dog houses, the member found that “overall, most of the dog houses were in a good state of repair. However, some were not and some were too small.” Additionally, the member found that most of the dog houses lacked sufficient insulation and bedding. Here too, the member found that the regulations required a minimum standard of care and because the dog houses fell below that standard of care, the animals met the definition of distress set out in the Act.⁶

16The Order of the Board varied the original date for compliance to September 1, 2021.

17Both parties sought reconsideration of that decision. The Board dismissed both parties’ requests for reconsideration by Order dated September 4, 2021. ⁷

18According to the appellants’ affidavit evidence before me, following the release of the reconsideration order, the appellants’ counsel wrote to the respondent on September 15, 2021 to advise it had filed a Notice of Constitutional Question and would be seeking a stay or injunction in Superior Court to prevent further inspections and/or removal of the dogs pending judicial review.

19The same day that the appellants’ request was made to the respondent to hold off on further inspections pending their application in Superior Court, the respondent obtained a warrant before a justice of the peace in order to carry out an inspection.

20The information relied on by the respondent to obtain the warrants is unknown to the Board and unknown to the appellants at present as this is one of the items the respondent refuses to produce.

21On September 23, 2021 the respondent executed the warrants. Multiple inspectors attended the appellants’ properties and carried out an inspection. The inspections confirmed that the appellants were not yet in compliance with the s. 30 orders confirmed by the Board on September 4, 2021. The respondent proceeded to remove all dogs from both properties, including puppies living in a pen with an insulated doghouse.

22The appellants allege that the removal of the animals breached their rights under s. 7 and 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter).

23They further allege that the manner of the removal caused distress to the dogs and was itself a breach of the standards of care set out in the regulations. The appellants assert that the respondent was not prepared to cause 200+ animals to be removed in a manner that would not cause greater distress than that purportedly being caused by non-compliance with the s.30 orders upheld by the Board.

24As well, the appellants allege that the current circumstances of where and how the dogs are being kept and the conditions in which they are kept are also potentially causing distress to the dogs.

25The appellants’ veterinarian attests to the dogs having been in good general health prior to the removal.

26In the Board’s decision upholding the compliance orders, the member also found that the animals were generally in good health.⁸

27By the date of this motion, two dogs had died in the respondent’s care.⁹

28The respondent takes the position that there is no relevance to any of its actions as of the moment it decided to remove all of the dogs.

29On that basis it refuses to provide disclosure relating to the removal of the dogs.

30It also refuses to provide any disclosure relating to their subsequent care or housing.

31As already mentioned, it also refuses to produce the information relied on to obtain the warrants it executed on the day it entered the appellants’ properties and removed all the dogs. This, too, in the respondent’s submission, is irrelevant.

Law

32Issues of disclosure before the Board are governed by the Licence Appeal Tribunal, Animal Care Review Board, and Fire Safety Commission Common Rules of Practice and Procedure¹⁰ and the Statutory Powers and Procedure Act.¹¹

33The default disclosure obligations of a party are set out in Rule 9.2, which requires a party to disclose to the other parties … “(a) the existence of every document and anything else the party intends to present as evidence at the hearing.”

34The basis of the appellants’ request does not relate to the above rule. The appellants seek disclosure beyond what the respondent intends to rely on at the hearing.

35The Board’s authority to order disclosure beyond what a party is obliged to produce under s. 9.2 is found in Rules 9.1 and 9.3 of the Board’s Rules, and s. 5.4 of the SPPA.

36Rule 9.1 of the Board’s Rules states:

The Tribunal may at any stage in a proceeding, including prior to a case conference, order any party to provide such further particulars or disclosure as the Tribunal considers necessary for a full and satisfactory understanding of the issues in the proceeding.

37Rule 9.3 allows a party to seek an order from the Tribunal at any stage of the proceeding ordering a party to:

… e) Disclose any document or thing the Tribunal considers relevant to the issues in dispute.

38Rule 1.2 of the Rules states that “if there is a conflict between these Rules and any statue or regulation, the provisions of the statute or regulation prevail.”

39There is nothing in the PAWS Act that speaks to disclosure as it relates to proceedings before the Board.

40Section 5.4 (1) of the SPPA provides that “if the tribunal’s rules made under s. 25.1 deal with disclosure” (as is the case with the Board’s Rules),

…the tribunal may, at any stage of the proceeding before all hearings are complete, make orders for,

a) The exchange of documents;

b) The oral or written examination of a party;

c) The exchange of witness statement and reports of expert witnesses;

d) The provision of particulars;

e) Any other form of disclosure.

41Subsection (1.2) of the SPPA provides that, “the tribunal’s power to make orders for disclosure is subject to any other Act or regulation that applies to the proceeding.”

42Subsection (2) of the SPPA states that “(1) does not authorize the making of an order requiring disclosure of privileged information.”

43The parties provided various cases in which disclosure was or was not required to be produced in the administrative context, including cases where the Stinchcombe obligations were applied.

44I have considered but need not review these cases. Irrespective of whether there is or is not a Stinchcombe duty to disclose, this Board has the authority to order disclosure of any document or thing that it considers relevant to the issues in dispute. It is further authorized to order disclosure which the Board considers necessary for a full and satisfactory understanding of the issues in the proceeding.

Analysis

45The respondent submits that it has provided disclosure as required under the Rules. It disputes that any of the further disclosure requested is relevant to the issues on appeal.

Disclosure relating to the care and housing provided to the animals after removal

46The respondent submits that in relation to the appellants’ appeal of the decision to remove the animals, the “sole issue is whether the decision to remove the dogs was authorized by s. 31 of the Act, and if not, whether the dogs should be returned.”

47With respect to the respondent’s decision to keep the animals in care, it submits that the “sole issue is whether the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector had reasonable grounds to believe that the animal may be placed in distress if returned to the owner.”

48The respondent summarizes its position as follows in its written submissions:

15. Put differently, the sole issues to be determined by the Board are whether there was non-compliance with an Order and therefore whether the dogs should be returned to the owner or custodian.

16. The question of distress (i.e., whether there was compliance with the orders) only arises in relation to the living conditions of the dogs at the Appellants’ properties at the time the inspectors made the decisions to remove them.

17. The circumstances of the removal of the dogs, the housing and care the dogs have received since their removal, their current condition or what is contained in the ITOs are not relevant to whether there was non-compliance with the Distress orders (i.e., whether the dogs were in distress).

49With respect, I disagree. Non-compliance with the s. 30 orders is not the sole issue to be determined before the Board.

50There is no provision in the Act that allows an inspector to remove an animal simply for non-compliance.¹²

51Rather, the respondent’s purported authority to have removed all of the animals from the appellants’ care and custody was pursuant to s. 31(1) of the Act. This provision has a qualifying phrase at its start. It states that an inspector may (not must) remove an animal from the place where it is and take possession of the animal for the purpose of providing it with necessaries to relieve its distress in certain circumstances, including, as set out at clause (c), if there has been non-compliance with a s. 30 Order.

52At the hearing of the appeal, the onus will be on the respondent to show that the removal of each animal was lawful. This will include showing that each animal’s removal “was for the purpose of providing it with necessaries to relieve its distress.” Despite this, the respondent refuses to provide any information to the appellants describing the necessaries that have been provided, nor how such necessaries were to relieve distress, nor even what the nature of the distress was that required immediate relief in the manner pursued.

53On that basis alone, the respondent must surely make disclosure about the care and housing it has provided to the animals since its decision to remove them from the appellants’ care. It can hardly assert that it took the animals for the purpose of providing necessaries while refusing to provide any information about what necessaries were provided and how that relieved the animals’ distress.

54This is to say nothing of the potential relevance of the disclosure from the appellants’ perspective, which it believes will show that the dogs’ current circumstances may be causing the animals to suffer greater distress than that caused by not having a 3m tether or insulated dog houses; and even critical distress, as has already been the case with respect to at least two of the dogs by the hearing of this motion.

Disclosure in relation to the removal of the dogs

55In my view, the respondent must also provide disclosure about the removal itself.

56Despite being on the appellants’ properties with the full powers of the government, including a police presence, having executed a warrant, and carrying out its decision to remove over 200+ dogs, including puppies, owned by the appellants or in their care and custody, and ostensibly pursuant to its authority under s. 31(1) of the Act, the respondent refuses to produce disclosure relating to the removal.

57In my view, from the perspective of procedural fairness alone, the disclosure should be provided.

58The respondent submits that its manner of carrying out the removal is irrelevant to the issues in dispute.

59Further, it has brought a motion to strike any allegation from the appellants’ grounds of appeal that the removal caused distress to the dogs or was itself a breach of the standards of care set out in O. Reg. 444/19. It has also brought a motion to strike the appellants’ Charter claim before it is heard.

60The respondent submits that it would be procedurally unfair for me to make a decision about relevance in the context of a disclosure request until the above motions are determined.

61I disagree. The respondent’s disclosure of the circumstances of the removal may well be relevant to those motions.

62Moreover, I find that the circumstances of the removal may also be relevant to whether the respondent is able to discharge its onus of proving the lawfulness of the removal. It therefore needs to be disclosed.

63The respondent submits that even if its inspectors breached their duties under the Act (which it denies), the appellants’ recourse would be to make a complaint as provided for under the Act. It submits that the conduct of the inspectors in carrying out the decision to remove cannot be relevant to any determination of the lawfulness of the Order. Here too, I disagree.

64Section 7 (1) of the Act requires every animal welfare inspector, including the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector and every deputy Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, to comply with the prescribed code of conduct.

65The code of conduct is set out in O. Reg. 445/19. As provided in s. 1 of that regulation, it is a code of conduct with which every animal welfare inspector must comply.

66At s. 4, the code of conduct provides that

4. An animal welfare inspector shall comply with the Act and the regulations made under the Act.

67Section 11 of the code of conduct prohibits an animal welfare inspector from causing or permitting an animal to be in distress. It states:

11. (1) An animal welfare inspector shall not cause or permit an animal in the inspector’s care to be in distress in the course of performing the functions of an inspector.

(2) An animal welfare inspector shall not cause an animal in the inspector’s care to be exposed to an undue risk of distress in the course of performing the functions of an inspector.

68In my view, the respondent is wrong to say that any non-compliance with the inspectors’ duties under the Act would be relevant to a complaint process only and not potentially to issues on appeal before this Board.

69The requirements for an inspector (including the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector) to comply with the code of conduct is not conditional upon a person complaining if that inspector fails to do so.

70Rather, an inspector’s duty to comply with the code of conduct is a requirement of the Act. It applies in all circumstances to all animal welfare inspectors. It is not a duty that is triggered only if someone complains about the inspector’s conduct. Where that duty is breached, it may well be relevant to the lawfulness of the respondent’s actions.

71In this case, the appellants allege that various conduct occurred during the removal, which would constitute a violation of s. 7(1) of the Act.

72For example, the appellants believe that the animals were not provided water once loaded onto the truck during the approximately seven hours that the trucks were on the appellants’ properties.

73Because they have not been provided with disclosure, the appellants also do not know how long the animals continued to be on the trucks without water after the removal was completed.

74The appellants further allege that the animals were subjected to fumes from the diesel engines of the trucks that ran throughout the period of the removal.

75They also suspect that the inspectors were not equipped or trained to handle sled dogs. They believe that an inspector may have led a dog through the circle of another dog, resulting in injuries.

76One of the appellants observed dogs being removed using choke collars. Ms. Spottiswood, in one of her affidavits, claims she could hear the sounds of the dogs’ respiration being cut off and choking sounds. She believes this is a “very clear indication of mishandling, as sled dogs are large and powerful animals specially bred and trained to pull, and handlers need to be trained to move with the dog not against the dog to avoid injury to the dog.”

77There are further allegations made by the appellants about the manner of the removal, such as the crates being loose on the trucks and one of the inspectors hitting a dog.

78As well, the appellants claim that the animals were removed without any inspector making inquiries about whether the animals were on medication or required special monitoring or had special needs. Nor was any information requested regarding the dogs’ diets.

79The respondent disputes the affidavit evidence submitted by the appellants but did not seek to cross-examine on any of it in relation to this motion.¹³

80I agree that the evidence is un-tested and that it is in dispute. For that reason, I make no findings of fact on this motion. Nonetheless, these are the allegations made by the appellants and, if true, the respondent’s lack of preparedness for the removal and its inability to carry out the removal in a manner that did not breach the inspectors’ duties under s. 7 of the Act may well be relevant to the lawfulness of the removal itself.

81The respondent is in possession of the footage and notes of the inspectors involved in the removal.

82I consider this disclosure to be relevant to the issues in dispute and conclude that it must be disclosed.

83As I set out in my order below, the respondents must provide all of their own notes, and recordings, subject to privilege (which has not so far been claimed), including any footage recorded on their personal phones.

84With respect to the appellants’ request for third party disclosure from the OPP who were in attendance, and anyone else (for example, the people driving the trucks), the respondent must provide the names of every person in attendance and any contact information in their possession. If the names of the truck drivers are not known, the name of the company or companies that provided the trucks should be disclosed. Any other documents or notes from these parties that is in the respondent’s possession must also be disclosed.

85With respect to disclosure from the OPP, the respondent must provide the name and badge number of every officer in attendance as well as any notes or footage that is in the respondent’s possession.

Disclosure of ITOs

86The respondent refuses to provide copies of the information sworn or affirmed before a justice of the Ontario court to obtain the search warrant ultimately executed on the day the respondent removed all of the appellants’ dogs from their properties.

87The respondent takes the position that although it obtained a warrant and executed it, the warrant was not in fact necessary because the respondent has the power under s. 24 of the Act to carry out an inspection without a warrant for the purpose of determining compliance with an order. It submits that because the warrant was not necessary, the ITO made under oath in support of the warrant need not be disclosed.

88First, I note that the respondent is not necessarily correct about whether a warrant was required. Section 24 (3) of the Act sates that a warrantless entry under s. 24 shall be made only between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. during a business day, or at any other time whether the place is open to the public. The warrant was authorized for attendance between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. The evidence of Ms. Spottiswood is that the respondent arrived at 8:15 a.m. Unless the appellant’s premises were open to the public, a warrant would have been required.

89Apart from whether the warrant was required, I find that the information relied on to obtain the warrant must be disclosed.

90The respondent provided evidence under oath to a justice of the Ontario court in order to obtain the warrant. The warrant could be issued pursuant to s. 24(4) only if the justice was satisfied by information provided by the respondent under oath or affirmation that there were reasonable grounds to believe that an inspection under section 24 was required. The respondent acknowledges that the inspection is relevant to this appeal yet asks the Board to conclude that ITOs are irrelevant and should not be produced.

91I cannot agree with that submission. It hardly lies in the respondent’s mouth to claim that information it provided under oath to the Court as being relevant to its request for a warrant is now irrelevant for the purpose of these proceedings. At the very least, it is potentially relevant and must be disclosed.

Conclusion

92For the above noted reasons, I am ordering the respondent to produce the requested disclosure.

93I make this order pursuant to Rule 9.3 (e) which allows a party to seek an order from the Board ordering a party to disclose any document or thing the Board considers relevant to the issues in dispute; and pursuant to Rule 9.1 which allows me to order a party to provide disclosure that the Board considers necessary for a full an satisfactory understanding of the issues in the proceeding.

94I do not find that the appellants are embarking on a fishing expedition in making this request.

95I find that disclosure relating to the removal may be relevant to the respondent discharging its onus to prove that the removal was lawful. In my view, if the removal was carried out in contravention of the Act, then it may not be considered lawful, regardless of its purpose.

96I find that disclosure relating to the care and housing provided to the animals since removal is also potentially relevant to whether the removal will be considered lawful. I come to this conclusion because nowhere on the face of the Act is an inspector authorized to remove an animal solely because of non-compliance with a s.30 Order. Rather, the removal must be for the specific purpose of providing the animal with necessaries to relieve its distress. The respondent can hardly claim that was its purpose while refusing to produce any disclosure about what it in fact did with the animals once they were removed.

97Finally, I find the ITO by its nature is a relevant document and must be disclosed.

98With respect to the respondent’s claim that it is procedurally unfair for me to make orders pertaining to relevance of disclosure pending the outcome of its motion to exclude the appellants’ Charter claims and its other motion to exclude evidence of whether the removal and subsequent actions of the respondent caused distress, the respondent is still free to bring those motions. Relevance at the disclosure stage need not parallel ultimate admissibility. Moreover, the respondent had the opportunity to make submissions on those issues at this disclosure motion. I am satisfied that this order for disclosure is necessary, regardless of the outcome of those motions.

ORDER:

99Pursuant to the Board’s authority under Rules 9.1 and 9.3 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal, Animal Care Review Board, and Fire Safety Commission Common Rules of Practice and Procedure and s. 5.4 of the Statutory Powers and Procedure Act, the respondent shall provide the following disclosure forthwith to the appellants, through their counsel:

a) All documentation (written and visual) of all Inspectors involved in the removal on September 23, 2021.

i. This shall include the names of all animal welfare inspectors in attendance;

ii. The names of any people otherwise employed by the respondent in attendance; and

iii. All notes, logs, video, audio and/or photographic evidence taken by any animal welfare inspectors or people otherwise employed by the respondent attending the appellants’ properties on September 23, 2021 that has not already provided. This includes any recordings made on a person’s personal cell phone or camera;

b) All documentation (written and visual) of all other persons involved in the removal on September 23, 2021 that is in the respondent’s possession;

i. This shall include the names of any people or companies arranged by the respondent to attend the appellants’ properties on September 23, 2021, including the trucking companies and drivers;

ii. Where it is not obvious from the names provided, the respondent shall identify the role the person played on September 23, 2021;

iii. All notes, logs, video, audio and/or photographic evidence taken by such people that is in the possession of the respondent;

b) All documentation (written and visual) of the Ontario Provincial Police (“OPP”) Officers involved in or attending the appellants’ properties on September 23, 2021 that is in the respondent’s possession.

i. This shall include the names and badge numbers of all officers; and

ii. All notes, logs, video, audio and/or photographic evidence taken by such people that is in the possession of the respondent;

c) All documentation (written and visual) related to the housing and care of the dogs since their removal on September 23, 2021;

i. This shall include – at a minimum – all documentation relating to any care any animal has received by a veterinarian or other specialist from September 23, 2021 and ongoing; and

ii. An outline of where the dogs are residing, including whether they are living indoors or outdoors, whether they are with any of the dogs with whom they were previously living; whether in a kennel situation or in a residential home and any other relevant details about the necessaries being provided;

iii. The respondent is not required to provide specific addresses of where the dogs are being held if the dogs are being fostered in a residential setting;

d) The Informations to Obtain (“ITOs”) used to obtain the search warrants executed on September 23, 2021.

e) If the respondent claims privilege over a document or other thing, it shall describe the item and articulate its basis for claiming privilege.

Footnotes

1. 11991 CanLII 45 (SCC), [1991] 3 SCR 326 (“Stinchombe”)
2. 2As my reasons for this decision had not yet been released, I wanted the parties to know the result in order to avoid any appearance that my decision on this disclosure motion had in fact been decided prior to my hearing the appellant’s motion for an inspection.
3. 3See Pryde, Spottiswood and Pierce v Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2021 ONACRB 12
4. 4Para 41
5. 5Paras 38-41
6. 6Paras 79-86, and 58-72
7. 7See Thomas Pryde, Adrienne Spottiswood & Georgina Pierce v Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, Reconsideration decision, 2021 ONACRB 18
8. 8Para 36.
9. 9I was advised on October 22, 2021, that a third dog had now also died in the respondent’s care.
10. 10Version I (October 2, 2017), amended February 8, 2019 (“Rules”)
11. 11R.S.O. 1990, Chapter s.22 (“SPPA”)
12. 12Non-compliance in and of itself may be addressed by way of the offence provisions of the Act. See for example, s. 49(1) (a) (ix), which provides that a person is guilty of an offence who contravenes s. 30(4) – requiring compliance with a s. 30 order. See also s. 49 (2) of the Act which provides that a person is guilty of an offence for failing to comply with an order of the Board. Under s. 49(3), the penalty upon conviction for such offences is a fine of up to $75,000, six months in jail or both for a first offence; and $100,000, a year in jail or both for any subsequent offence.
13. 13By email dated, October 15, 2021, the respondent alerted the appellants that it reserved the right “to cross examine Adrienne Spottiswood and all other witnesses you propose to rely on at the actual hearing of these appeals and/or on any other motion that you have filed or may bring in these matters.” It made not such request with respect to this motion.