Padraic Ryan

The applicants sought judicial review of the Minister of Natural Resources' decision to apply an Interim Enforcement Policy, which permits Aboriginal people to hunt and fish for food, social, and ceremonial purposes, within the 1923 Williams Treaties boundaries.

The Minister brought a motion to quash the application.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the application of the policy was an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which is immune from judicial review absent an abuse of process.

The court also held that the policy did not violate the applicants' equality rights under section 15 of the Charter, as it constituted an ameliorative program under section 15(2).

The applicant, an 80-year-old suffering from metastasized renal cancer and a broken pelvis, applied for judicial authorization for a physician-assisted death pursuant to the Carter constitutional exemption.

She was in intolerable pain with no hope of recovery and a prognosis of approximately three months to live.

The court found that she was competent, acting voluntarily, and met all the Carter criteria.

The application was granted, including a declaration that the assisting physicians were exempt from Criminal Code provisions and were not required to notify the coroner under the Coroners Act.

The Attorney General for Ontario sought judicial review of an arbitration award between CUPE Local 27 and the Greater Essex County District School Board, arguing the arbitrator erred in interpreting s. 177 of the Education Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for the reasons given in a related Stated Case (2016 ONSC 2361), finding the result was the same regardless of whether the standard of review was correctness or reasonableness.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to CUPE Local 27.

The Minister of Education brought a Stated Case asking the Divisional Court to determine whether the Education Act permits school boards to pay for life insurance and health benefits for retired employees over 65 years of age.

The Minister argued that the Act only permits payments to current employees and that specific statutory authority is required for such expenditures.

The Court held that while ss. 177(3) and 177(4) do not authorize these payments, other sections of the Act, including ss. 58.5(1), 170(1)18, 171(1)3, and 177(1), when read together and in context, provide the necessary authority.

The Court found that school boards have the power to negotiate and pay for post-retirement benefits as part of employee compensation packages.

CD, suffering from stage 4 metastatic breast cancer, applied for judicial authorization of a physician-assisted death under the constitutional exemption established in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General).

She also sought a declaration that the physicians involved would not need to notify the coroner.

The court found that CD met all criteria for physician-assisted death, including grievous, terminal, and irremediable suffering, and that she was a competent adult freely consenting.

The application was granted, and a declaration was issued that coroner notification was unnecessary.

The applicant, a small craft distillery, applied for a declaration that the markup imposed by the LCBO on spirits sold at its on-site retail store was an unconstitutional tax under the Constitution Act, 1867.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the markup was a proprietary charge levied by the LCBO as the owner and commercial supplier of the spirits.

Alternatively, the court held that the markup was a contractual term freely agreed to by the applicant in exchange for the authorization to sell its products.

The applicant brought an urgent application for physician-assisted death and sought confidentiality orders, including a publication ban and sealing order, without giving notice to the media.

The court balanced the open court principle with the applicant's dire medical circumstances and privacy interests.

The court granted an interim publication ban and sealing order, authorized the use of pseudonyms, and directed the applicant to provide notice to the media, giving the media 60 days to bring a motion to challenge the orders.

Two physicians sought judicial review and constitutional relief challenging registration requirements under the Medicine Act and requesting mandamus orders compelling the regulatory body to issue certificates of registration.

They also sought Charter-based relief preventing the regulator from investigating professional conduct.

The court held that the applications were premature because the applicants had alternative statutory remedies through the regulator’s processes, including review by the Health Professions Review Board and appeal to the Divisional Court.

The applicants had also failed to provide sworn evidence or comply with procedural requirements for judicial review.

The court further found the requested mandamus and constitutional relief lacked factual and legal foundation and dismissed the applications.

The appellant, a commercial truck driver, appealed his conviction under the Highway Traffic Act for operating a truck with a speed limiter set above the mandated 105 km/h.

He argued the speed limiter requirement violated his right to security of the person under section 7 of the Charter by preventing him from accelerating to avoid collisions.

The Court of Appeal held that while the legislation infringed section 7 by being overbroad in rare situations where acceleration is necessary to avoid accidents, the infringement was demonstrably justified under section 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit to improve highway safety and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a manager at a provincial jail, filed a human rights complaint after the respondent union president posted sexist comments about her on a union blog during a labour dispute.

The Human Rights Tribunal dismissed the complaint, finding the conduct did not constitute discrimination 'with respect to employment' under s. 5(1) of the Human Rights Code, after balancing the Code's objectives with the respondent's Charter rights to freedom of expression and association.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that administrative tribunals must consider Charter values when interpreting their home statutes, even absent ambiguity, and that the Tribunal's balancing of these rights was reasonable.

The applicant, whose Class M motorcycle licence was revoked due to a visual impairment, alleged discrimination because the regulatory waiver program available for Class G licences is not available for Class M licences.

The respondent sought to dismiss the application for lack of jurisdiction.

The Tribunal found that section 19 of O.Reg. 340/94 explicitly exempts the visual standards and waiver provisions from the Human Rights Code.

Following established precedent, the Tribunal held it lacked jurisdiction to look beyond the constitutionally sound exempting provision to examine the impugned regulation itself.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her application for delay.

The applicant's late husband was denied a liver transplant due to a policy requiring six months of abstinence from alcohol.

The applicant filed her human rights complaint almost two years later, arguing she did not know the policy was discriminatory until then.

The Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding it reasonable to conclude that ignorance of the law does not constitute a good faith explanation for delay under section 34(2) of the Human Rights Code.

The applicant filed a human rights application against the Ministry of Education, alleging discrimination on the basis of creed regarding the distribution of religious materials in public schools and the operation of a Protestant separate school board.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application should be dismissed.

The Tribunal found that the applicant lacked standing to challenge the actions of school boards outside his jurisdiction based merely on his status as a taxpayer.

Furthermore, the challenge to the Protestant separate school board was barred by s. 19(1) of the Human Rights Code and s. 93(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

Finally, the Tribunal held that the Ministry of Education could not be held liable for the alleged discriminatory actions of independent local school boards.

The application was dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicants sought a declaration that Ontario Regulation 27/13 under the Traditional Chinese Medicine Act, 2006 was ultra vires and breached sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

They argued the regulation failed to create a 'doctor' class of practitioners and imposed discriminatory English or French language fluency requirements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the regulation was intra vires, there is no section 7 Charter right to practice a profession unfettered by regulation, and language alone is not a protected ground under section 15.