Court of Appeal

The appellant, Jamie Dunlop, appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and the indeterminate sentence imposed after being declared a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The conviction appeal argued the trial judge erred in assessing witness credibility regarding the extent of the appellant's participation in the assault.

The sentence appeal contended the sentencing judge erred by not acknowledging an accomplice's role and by focusing on general future harm rather than specific serious personal injury offences.

The Court found the trial judge's findings on the appellant's role were supported by evidence and that the sentencing judge correctly applied the dangerous offender test, despite not explicitly mentioning the accomplice.

The appellant, convicted of importing methamphetamine, appealed his conviction and 12-year sentence.

His grounds of appeal included alleged Charter violations (detention, search, voluntariness of statements) due to a particularized drug lookout at the border, and a flawed jury selection process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in its entirety, affirming that routine border inspections, even with a specific lookout, do not trigger Charter detention until a highly intrusive search or communicated subjective intent to detain occurs.

The court also found the appellant's statements voluntary and the jury selection process valid.

The 12-year sentence for importing 25 kg of methamphetamine was deemed fit and within the appropriate range for large-scale drug couriers.

The court-appointed receiver, KSV Restructuring Inc., moved to quash an appeal by the debtor, 30 Roe Investments Corp., from orders approving the sale of two condominium units. 30 Roe argued the units should be sold en bloc, not individually, and that the sales diminished the "Enterprise" value.

The Court of Appeal found no appeal as of right under BIA s. 193(a)-(c) as the appeal did not involve future rights, did not directly involve property value loss (as the sales were at market price and the en bloc argument was a collateral attack on prior unappealed orders), and was not likely to affect other similar cases.

The court also denied leave to appeal under BIA s. 193(e), finding the issue not of general importance, not prima facie meritorious, and unduly hindering the receivership.

The appeal was quashed, and leave to appeal denied.

The appellant, Khaophone Sychantha, appealed an extradition order to the United States on drug-related charges.

He argued that the extradition hearing was unfair due to his unrepresented status and that the identification evidence was flawed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material unfairness in the hearing despite the appellant's self-representation, noting that he had discharged multiple lawyers.

The court also reiterated that an extradition judge's role is not to evaluate the strength, credibility, or reliability of evidence unless it is "so defective" or "so unreliable" and that challenges to identification quality are matters for trial.

This is a motion to quash an appeal from a trial judge's costs order.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario quashed the appeal, finding that leave to appeal was required for an appeal solely from a costs order under s. 133(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, and the appellant had not sought leave.

The court also directed the distribution of security for costs previously posted by the appellant, awarding a portion to the respondent for prior appeal costs and the current motion costs, with the remainder returned to the appellant.

The appellant law firm appealed the dismissal of its application seeking to set a market rate for lease renewal and compensation for renovations, and also sought leave to appeal a costs order from a prior cross-motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the respondent landlord did not breach its duty to act in good faith during lease negotiations, that the expert evidence was properly considered, and that compensation for renovations was not warranted.

The court also refused leave to appeal the costs order from the cross-motion, finding no strong grounds to interfere with the motion judge's discretion.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his sentence for four offences related to an attempted convenience store robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but granted leave to appeal the sentence.

The sentence was adjusted to mitigate unforeseen collateral immigration consequences for the appellant, a permanent resident, by re-allocating pre-sentence credit and treating restrictive bail conditions as a mitigating factor rather than a direct reduction in sentence, ensuring the effective sentence per count did not exceed 179 days.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a motion regarding an appeal that arose under the Construction Lien Act.

The moving parties (respondents) argued that the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.

The court agreed, finding that jurisdiction for such matters lay with the Divisional Court, and that the question of whether the underlying order was final or interlocutory was for the Divisional Court to decide.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal quashed the appeal and declined to exercise its discretion to transfer the appeal to the Divisional Court.

Costs were awarded to the successful moving parties.

The appellant, Dorothy Groves, appealed her conviction for second-degree murder and her sentence of life imprisonment with 13 years parole ineligibility.

She argued the trial judge erred in admitting a statement she made to a special constable, claiming it was not voluntary, and in failing to properly instruct the jury on the two forms of accident.

She also sought a reduction in her parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the trial judge correctly assessed the voluntariness of her statement and adequately instructed the jury on the defence of accident as it related to intent.

The court also found the sentence imposed was fit, considering both aggravating factors (criminal record, violent offences) and mitigating factors (intellectual disability).

The appellants hired the respondents for a backyard renovation project with milestone payments.

After disputes and delays, the appellants terminated the contract and sued for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

The trial judge dismissed the appellants' claims, finding no fundamental breach, but awarded damages to the respondents for the balance of the contract despite the lack of a valid counterclaim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, noting the contract provided a juristic reason for the payments made.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the damages awarded to the respondents, as the proper party had not filed a counterclaim.

The moving party (respondent in the appeal) sought security for costs of the appeal and trial.

The court granted security for costs of the appeal ($20,000) due to the appellant's unpaid costs from a previous motion, significant unpaid child support arrears, and questionable financial conduct, despite the appeal concerning the best interests of a child.

The court refused security for trial costs, finding legitimate issues were litigated.

Costs of the motion were awarded to the moving party.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the Dryden Police Services Board and Anishinaabe Abinoojii Family Services and their employees.

The action stemmed from a warrantless entry into their home by a child protection worker and police officers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of claims against the Society defendants due to the expiry of the limitation period.

However, it set aside the summary judgment dismissing claims against the Dryden Police related to the lawfulness of the entry, including negligence, false arrest, false imprisonment, assault and battery, trespass, invasion of privacy, and Charter breaches (ss. 7 and 9), finding the motion judge erred in concluding the entry was lawful under the CFSA without sufficient evidence of statutory preconditions.

The Court also reinstated Mr. Land's claims for negligent investigation and malicious prosecution, while dismissing Ms. Henry's similar claims due to her participation in a diversion program.

The appellant, who suffered from schizophrenia and represented himself at trial, appealed his first-degree murder conviction.

He argued he was unfit to stand trial and urged the Court of Appeal to overturn or modify the 'limited cognitive capacity' test from R. v. Taylor to require that an accused be capable of making rational decisions in their best interests.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Taylor test, clarifying that while an accused must have a reality-based understanding of their legal predicament and the ability to make decisions, they need not possess 'analytic capacity' to make decisions in their own best interests.

The Court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the voluntariness of statements made to a Crown psychiatrist and refused to admit fresh psychiatric evidence to substitute a verdict of not criminally responsible.

The appellant pleaded guilty to impaired driving, drug trafficking, and firearms offences, and was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment just before the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown.

On appeal, he sought a sentence reduction based on the totality principle and the harsh conditions of incarceration caused by the pandemic.

The Crown and the appellant agreed to an 18-month sentence reduction.

The Court of Appeal accepted the joint proposal, finding that the pandemic resulted in significantly harsher conditions than anticipated at sentencing, and reduced the sentence by 18 months.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether a general revocation clause in a will was effective under s. 52(1) of the Succession Law Reform Act to revoke existing beneficiary designations by instrument for Registered Retirement Income Fund (RRIF) and Tax-Free Savings Account (TFSA) plans.

The court affirmed the application judge's finding that the clause, which revoked "all Wills and Testamentary dispositions," did not "expressly relate to the designation" as required by the Act.

Consequently, the prior beneficiary designations remained valid.

The court also confirmed that a conflicting Superior Court decision (Ashton Estate) on this point was "plainly wrong." The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal concerned a dispute over a shared boundary between lakefront cottage properties and the location of a dock.

The trial judge found the boundary to be ambulatory, extending to the water's edge, and that the land under the dock was adversely possessed, but the dock could not impede riparian rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the main appeal, which challenged the boundary determination and the application of accretion/avulsion principles, and the cross-appeal, which challenged the adverse possession finding.

The court found no reversible error in the trial judge's determination of the boundary based on grantor's intent and upheld the adverse possession finding, noting it was supported by evidence.

The appellant, Julie Menard, appealed her conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's thorough reasons regarding witness credibility and reliability.

The appeal against sentence was also dismissed, with the exception of a consensual reduction of the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order from lifetime to 20 years, in light of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Ndhlovu.

The applicant brought an application under s. 680 of the Criminal Code to set aside a detention order.

Because a non-publication order under s. 517 of the Criminal Code was imposed at the bail hearing, and the decision contains information covered by that order, the Court of Appeal withheld the publication of its reasons until the ban ceases to be in effect.

The appellant appealed a conviction for invitation to sexual touching involving a young child, arguing that the trial judge made improper credibility findings, shifted the burden of proof, and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The Crown's case relied largely on a video-recorded statement given by the complainant as a child, which was admitted under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code and adopted at trial.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence, including discrepancies and defence testimony, and repeatedly reminded himself of the Crown’s burden of proof.

Although some factual inconsistencies were not expressly resolved, the trial judge considered them within the reasonable doubt analysis.

The appellate court concluded that the verdict was reasonably supported by the evidence and disclosed no reversible error.

The appellant was convicted of accessing child pornography following the execution of a search warrant at his residence where police obtained passwords for electronic devices and seized digital evidence.

The trial judge found multiple Charter breaches but admitted most of the seized evidence, excluding only material obtained from a cellphone.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge erred by characterizing the s. 8 breach as minimal despite findings that officers routinely sought passwords without valid consent, reflecting systemic misconduct.

Applying the Grant framework anew, the court excluded the contents of a computer but admitted evidence from a USB thumb drive and photographs taken during the search.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.