Court of Appeal

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing her motion for net arrears of child and spousal support and section 7 expenses, and granting the respondent's cross-motion to terminate all support.

The Court of Appeal emphasized the high degree of deference owed to family support decisions.

Finding no material error, serious misapprehension of evidence, or error of law in the motion judge's detailed analysis, the court dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, Shelly Legault, brought a motion within her appeal against TD General Insurance Company.

The motion sought relief from filing all trial transcripts for the appeal record and leave to amend her notice of appeal to include a mid-trial ruling and a costs decision.

The court dismissed the request to be relieved from filing all transcripts, agreeing with the respondent that the full record was necessary given the appellant sought a new trial.

However, the court granted leave to amend the notice of appeal to specify grounds regarding the payment of non-expert witnesses and to appeal the costs award.

Following an appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement.

The appellants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, fixed at $27,689.52 inclusive of HST on a partial indemnity scale.

The appellants appealed an order striking out their statement of defence and crossclaim and granting judgment against them for $49,628.11.

They argued the motion judge failed to give reasons for the decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the record clearly disclosed the basis for the order: the appellants failed to answer undertakings despite multiple opportunities and court orders, and failed to respond to the motion to strike.

The evidentiary record supported the judgment amount.

Bradley MacGarvie and Thomas Nagy appealed their convictions for first- and second-degree murder, respectively.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on after-the-fact conduct evidence, failing to adequately explain its relevance and possible inferences.

For Nagy, the trial judge also incorrectly defined the mental element for party liability for murder under a common unlawful purpose and failed to provide a decision tree, leading to jury confusion.

While the provocation defence was correctly rejected for MacGarvie, and the admission of Nagy's criminal record and lay opinion evidence was upheld, the errors in jury instructions were deemed sufficiently serious to warrant a new trial for both appellants.

The moving party law firm sought an order under Rule 15.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to be removed as the lawyer of record for the appellant in a receivership proceeding.

The firm had filed a notice of appeal on behalf of the appellant to prevent the sale of two condominium units, despite intending to have no further involvement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the firm had launched a 'zombie appeal' that jeopardized the receivership proceedings and abused its status as an officer of the court.

The firm was ordered to remain on the record until the final disposition of the receiver's motion to quash the appeal, prioritizing the administration of justice over the firm's interests.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault causing bodily harm and forcible confinement against his spouse, as well as his sentence of 7 months' incarceration.

The trial judge had accepted the complainant's evidence over the appellant's, finding the appellant not credible.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the trial judge's credibility assessments or treatment of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors for a serious domestic assault.

This is a Crown appeal from the respondent's acquittals on charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of various controlled substances, as well as possession of property obtained by crime.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, and the appeal grounds related to the trial judge's assessment of this evidence.

The appellant argued the trial judge considered the circumstantial evidence in a piecemeal fashion rather than cumulatively.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge correctly instructed herself on the law regarding circumstantial evidence and applied it properly, considering the evidence as a whole and identifying limitations without assessing individual pieces in isolation against the reasonable doubt standard.

The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that no legal error was committed by the trial judge.

The court also clarified that misapprehension of evidence is a question of mixed fact and law, not appealable by the Crown on a question of law alone, and affirmed the trial judge's correct application of law regarding constructive and joint possession.

The appellant sought a panel review of a motion judge's decision refusing to stay a trial judge's order requiring her to vacate a property pending appeal.

The trial judge had ordered the property sold and found no unjust enrichment or joint family venture.

The motion judge denied the stay, finding no serious issue, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for review, holding that the appellant failed to articulate any errors of fact or law warranting intervention.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court decision regarding a mortgagee's attempt to take possession of a commercial property after default.

The appellants, mortgagees, attempted self-help possession by changing locks, which was met with resistance from the respondent, mortgagor.

The application judge dismissed the mortgagees' request for an order restraining the mortgagor and declaring them in possession, finding they did not act peaceably.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's factual findings and her application of the legal principles of peaceable possession, as clarified in Hume v. 11534599 Canada Corp., 2022 ONCA 575.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the lower court's conclusion that the mortgagees failed to take peaceable possession.

The moving party, who had defaulted on a mortgage, sought a stay of execution of a writ of possession pending the disposition of his appeal.

The court found that the automatic stay provision under Rule 63.01 does not apply to writs of possession.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court concluded that the moving party failed to establish a serious issue to be tried or irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the responding parties.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellants brought a motion to set aside, amend, or vary the Court of Appeal's previous order regarding trial costs, arguing procedural unfairness, inconsistency with costs principles, and insufficient reasons.

The motion was brought under rules 59.06(1) and (2)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the relief sought was not available under rule 59.06, as it was an attempt to reargue issues already adjudicated.

The court clarified that challenges to discretionary orders, procedural fairness, or adequacy of reasons are typically grounds for seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The court also addressed and dismissed belated arguments regarding the order settlement procedure under rule 59.04 and the inapplicability of rule 37.14.

This appeal addressed the Ontario court's jurisdiction over an action that overlapped with earlier proceedings in Nova Scotia involving the same parties.

The appellant sought to stay the Ontario action, arguing lack of jurisdiction simpliciter and that Nova Scotia was the more convenient forum.

The Court of Appeal, conducting a fresh analysis due to incomplete lower court reasons, affirmed Ontario's jurisdiction simpliciter but found Nova Scotia to be clearly the more appropriate forum.

This decision was based on the significant overlap of issues and the high risk of inconsistent findings between the two actions.

The Ontario action was stayed on an interim basis.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault with a weapon, brought a motion for state-funded counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code after being denied Legal Aid.

The applicant argued the trial judge erred by relying on myths and stereotypes and misapplying the W.(D.) principles in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the proposed grounds of appeal lacked sufficient merit and the applicant was capable of advancing the arguments without appointed counsel.

The applicant sought a stay of an enforcement order requiring the sale of the matrimonial home pending his application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed appeal raised no issues of public or national importance and was merely an attempt to relitigate factual findings.

The applicant also failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay, given his failure to pay spousal support or costs.

The appellant was convicted of child luring following an online sting operation.

He appealed, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and seeking to raise the issue of entrapment for the first time on appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the ineffective assistance claim, finding no reasonable probability of a different trial outcome.

However, the court allowed the entrapment issue to be pursued at a new trial, citing the Supreme Court's recent decision in R. v. Ramelson, which provided clearer guidelines for internet sting operations.

The court found that the record did not definitively show compliance with these new guidelines and that the Crown would not suffer procedural prejudice by allowing the issue to be heard.

The conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered solely on the issue of entrapment.

This case involves an appeal and cross-appeal from trial orders concerning the equalization of net family property between former spouses.

Both parties, self-represented, challenged the trial judge's factual findings on asset valuation, debts, and trust account funds.

The Court of Appeal reiterated the significant deference owed to trial judges in family law financial disputes, particularly given the complex and inconsistent evidence presented at trial.

Finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's determinations, the court dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, upholding the original equalization payment order.

The applicant mother appealed an order directing the return of her infant son to New York under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and sought an urgent stay of that order pending appeal.

The motion judge refused the requested stay, finding that the mother did not meet the onus to demonstrate irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience did not favour her.

The court emphasized the Hague Convention's mandate for prompt return and that delays frustrate its purpose.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that required them to pay a real estate commission.

The primary issue at trial was whether Sandeep Jhutty had initialed an acknowledgement on a Buyer Representation Agreement, which the trial judge found he had.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred by reversing the onus of proof and by finding the individual appellants jointly and severally liable without providing reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the standard of proof applies to the final evaluation of liability, not piecemeal, and that the joint and several liability was consistent with a prior consent order.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their application for a declaration that their current use of lands was a legal non-conforming use under the Planning Act.

The application judge found that the use had changed significantly from the prior legal non-conforming use and that the appellants had abandoned the prior use.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's factual findings and her conclusion that the appellants failed to establish a continuing legal non-conforming use.

The court also confirmed the admissibility of property complaints as factual matters from records kept in the ordinary course of business.