Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime following a high-risk takedown arrest and the execution of a search warrant at his home.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred by finding the police used reasonable force during his arrest, by engaging in impermissible after-the-fact reasoning regarding a delay in his right to counsel, and by refusing to exclude evidence seized from his home under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the police use of force was justified given the appellant's history, the trial judge's reasons were not improper after-the-fact justifications, and the evidence seized from the home was not obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter because the search was temporally and causally disconnected from the unlawful police interview.

The Crown appealed from a summary conviction appeal court decision that quashed the respondent's conviction for sexual assault and entered an acquittal.

The SCAC judge found the verdict unreasonable and the trial judge's reasons insufficient due to frail identification evidence, which consisted of an in-dock identification over Zoom four years after the incident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the trial judge failed to meaningfully consider the reliability of the identification evidence and that no reasonable jury could convict on the evidence.

The appellant sought an order to prevent police from continuing to examine electronic devices seized under search warrants, pending an appeal of a decision dismissing an application for certiorari to quash the warrants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried, as certiorari is discretionary and exceptional in ongoing investigations.

The court also found no irreparable harm, as remedies remain available on appeal or at trial, and the balance of convenience favoured allowing the investigation to continue.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possessing crystal methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, possessing hydromorphone, and possessing property obtained by crime, as well as his sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence but found no incompetence and no reasonable probability that different tactical choices would have altered the verdict.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued he received insufficient credit for time spent under strict bail conditions.

The Court upheld the sentencing judge's approach of treating the strict bail conditions as a mitigating factor rather than a direct credit against the sentence.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of arson and unlawfully producing cannabis resin after a fire broke out in his mother's basement.

The Crown's expert testified the fire was caused by the ignition of butane vapours from the production of butane honey oil.

The appellant appealed, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer failed to seek legal aid funding to call a competing fire expert who had concluded the fire was caused by a faulty extension cord.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no miscarriage of justice.

The trial judge had considered the competing expert's report and correctly concluded it was flawed and would not have affected the verdict, as it focused only on the ignition source and ignored the fuel source.

The appellant appealed firearm convictions arising from two mass shooting incidents and challenged the dismissal of a s. 11(b) Charter application.

The court held that the trial judge acted within his discretion in permitting a late Leaney application, where the prejudice caused by the Crown’s delay was cured by an adjournment and further disclosure.

Applying Jordan, the court upheld the deduction of periods attributable to defence delay, discrete exceptional circumstances, and pandemic-related delay, leaving the net delay below the presumptive ceiling.

The court also found the trial reasons on identity sufficient, given the combined force of police familiarity evidence, video evidence, and corroborative evidence linking the appellant to the vehicles and participants.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm, driving, and drug trafficking offences, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of a key witness who had a motive to lie.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge did not explicitly address the witness's motive to lie, the reasons demonstrated an awareness of the evidence's frailties.

Furthermore, the witness's testimony was corroborated by significant independent evidence, including the complainant's testimony, video surveillance, and text messages.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention at a mental health centre with conditions, arguing he should have been conditionally discharged.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable given the appellant's lack of insight, medication non-compliance, and intimidation of his treatment team.

The court also rejected the argument that a recent appellate decision setting aside a prior conviction undermined the Board's disposition, as the Board relied on the appellant's own testimony regarding the underlying incident.

The moving party sought leave to appeal his fraud conviction under the Securities Act.

He had been acquitted at trial, but the summary conviction appeal judge entered a conviction, finding the trial judge erred in requiring proof of actual loss caused by detrimental reliance.

The Court of Appeal denied leave on the issue of the standard for causation for fraud, finding the law well-settled.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal on the question of whether the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Hodgson modifies the test for an appellate court to substitute a conviction for an acquittal in the context of a Provincial Offences Act prosecution.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault against two complainants who attended the same special education program.

At trial, the judge dismissed a similar fact evidence application due to concerns about inadvertent tainting between the complainants and another witness.

However, the trial judge subsequently convicted the appellant without explaining why those same tainting concerns did not affect his assessment of the complainants' credibility and reliability on the trial proper.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the failure to address the potential tainting in the credibility assessment was a reversible error, particularly given the witnesses' intellectual disabilities and memory issues.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and forcible confinement, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility.

Specifically, the appellant contended the trial judge impermissibly relied on the complainant's religious beliefs to reject the defence theory that she had a motive to fabricate the allegations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that evidence of religious motives was admissible to explain the timing of disclosure and rebut the fabrication theory.

The court found no error in the trial judge's treatment of demeanour evidence or his assessment of investigative gaps.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, and by providing confusing instructions on motive to fabricate and prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the mistaken belief defence because the accounts of the complainant and the appellant's girlfriend were diametrically opposed.

The court also found no errors in the jury instructions regarding motive to fabricate or the limited use of prior consistent statements.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and possession of child pornography, raising three grounds including that the application judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge incorrectly characterized multiple periods of delay as defence delay, applying a bright-line rule later rejected by the Supreme Court in Hanan.

Properly calculated, the net delay exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling by nearly three months, and the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances.

The convictions were quashed and a stay of proceedings entered.

The appellant sought to reduce a global nine-year sentence for armed robbery-related offences by relying on fresh evidence of pre-sentence custody lockdowns and triple bunking.

The court admitted the fresh evidence but held that harsh-custody mitigation required evidence of actual impact, which was not provided.

Applying the governing approach to custody conditions as a mitigating factor within overall fitness analysis, the panel found no error in principle and no demonstrable unfitness.

Given the appellant’s extensive robbery record, parole status at the time of the offences, and the already low-end fit sentence for armed robbery, a reduction would have made the sentence unfit.

The appellant challenged his jury conviction for sexual assault offences and a five-year penitentiary sentence, arguing the jury charge on motive was unbalanced and the sentencing judge improperly treated lack of insight or remorse as aggravating.

The court held the charge, read functionally and as a whole, accurately and sufficiently instructed the jury, including on motive to fabricate and motive to offend, and any imperfections did not create legal error.

On sentence, the court found no error in principle affecting fitness and no improper reliance on lack of remorse.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, leave to appeal sentence was granted, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

Two appellants challenged convictions for possession of fentanyl and crystal methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime after searches of two suspected stash houses.

The court held the trial judge erred in denying standing to advance a s. 8 Charter challenge because the prosecution theory itself alleged use and control of the properties, which had to be weighed in the totality of circumstances.

The court nevertheless rejected the argument that the verdicts were unreasonable, finding the circumstantial evidence was capable of supporting possession findings for each appellant in relation to White Oak.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of sexual assault arising from an incident where initially consensual sexual intercourse escalated to unprotected intercourse without the complainant's consent.

On appeal, the appellant raised three grounds: errors in the W.(D.) jury instructions, improper Crown closing submissions, and that a pre-trial s. 276/278.92 ruling led to trial irregularities amounting to a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in any ground.

The jury instructions properly conveyed each pathway to acquittal, the Crown's closing did not cross the line into oath-helping or rhetorical excess, and the pre-trial ruling did not create any irregularity or unfairness warranting appellate intervention.

The applicant, convicted of sexual interference against a child aged 12 to 14 and sentenced to 4.5 years' imprisonment, sought bail pending appeal.

The applicant advanced three grounds of appeal: an allegedly improper corrective jury instruction regarding the defence theory, inconsistent verdicts on two counts, and error in dismissing a s. 11(b) Charter application for a stay based on delay.

The motion judge found all three grounds to be weak or without merit.

Applying the Oland framework, the court held that the seriousness of the offence and the weakness of the grounds of appeal elevated the enforceability concern over the reviewability concern.

Bail was denied.

The appellant was convicted of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and possession of a loaded restricted or prohibited firearm.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the verdicts were inconsistent with his acquittals on other firearm charges, and appealed his 13-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding it was open to the jury to find constructive possession of the fentanyl and one firearm while having a reasonable doubt about the other.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to apply the principle of restraint for a youthful first-time offender.

The sentence for the drug offence was reduced from 13 years to 10 years.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.