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Appeared as counsel in 20 cases (2005–2017)
The court granted an interlocutory injunction restraining former key employees from competing and misusing confidential software code.
The plaintiff, Arc Compute, sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendants—two former senior employees and their new company—from retaining or disclosing confidential information, competing with the plaintiff, and interfering with its client and employee relationships.
The court found that the defendants, as fiduciaries, breached both contractual and common law duties by retaining confidential information and soliciting clients and employees for their competing business.
The court granted a modified injunction, requiring the return of all confidential information, the shutdown of the competing company, and a six-month worldwide non-competition order.
The court struck the plaintiff's $275 million claim as an abuse of process and time-barred.
The court granted the defendants' motion to strike the Amended Statement of Claim in its entirety, with leave to amend, on the grounds that it amounted to an abuse of process and was time-barred by the 15-year ultimate limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.
The claim, brought by G. Scott Paterson against the Royal Bank of Canada and others, alleged a campaign of defamation and economic interference culminating in regulatory proceedings by the Ontario Securities Commission.
The court found that the claim sought to re-litigate issues already settled by the OSC and that Paterson was aware of the essential facts giving rise to his claim well before the expiry of the limitation period.
Owners cannot withhold condominium common expenses because they have claims against the corporation.
The defendant condominium corporation moved for partial summary judgment dismissing claims seeking declarations that unpaid common expenses and a registered lien were satisfied because the plaintiff owner alleged overcharged water expenses and unreimbursed repair costs.
The court held that s. 84(3)(b) of the Condominium Act, 1998 unambiguously prohibits an owner from withholding common expenses even when making a claim against the corporation.
Applying the summary judgment framework, the court found the issue was a discrete question of law with no genuine issue requiring a trial and that the concerns associated with partial summary judgment did not arise.
The motion was granted, the impugned claims were dismissed, leave was granted for additional counsel to appear, and costs were awarded to the moving party.
The court dismissed the appeal, confirming that a second clinical opinion is not required to corroborate a finding of incapacity.
The appellant, SI, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision upholding Dr. Jeanetta Viljoen’s finding that SI was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic drugs.
The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly identified and applied the statutory test for capacity under the Health Care Consent Act.
The court held that corroborative evidence, as required by the Evidence Act, was present, including the notes and observations of Dr. Banks and other medical history.
The court confirmed that a second clinical opinion is not required for corroboration and that the Board’s findings were supported by the evidence.
Summary judgment was granted for a $700,000 loan repayment and the corporate veil was pierced due to fraud.
The plaintiff, Carrie Wei, moved for summary judgment against the defendants (except Zhi Qiang Wang) for $700,000 plus 30% interest, and for dismissal of the counterclaim.
The court found that the loan agreement was clear, that the defendants failed to provide any credible defence or evidence, and that the corporate veil should be pierced due to fraudulent conduct.
The counterclaim for defamation was dismissed for lack of evidence.
Judgment was granted for the plaintiff, including costs.
Conflicted municipal council members were permitted to participate in decision-making subject to judicial oversight.
The Township of Georgian Bay applied, without notice, for an order under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act permitting its Council members to participate in decision-making on certain matters despite declared conflicts.
The court granted the order, subject to judicial oversight for settlement approvals and indemnification issues, due to the impossibility of forming a quorum.
The decision discusses the statutory remedy of necessity and the appropriate controls to address conflicts in small municipalities.
The court dismissed a motion to strike a defamation claim, finding that absolute privilege for statements about non-parties requires contextual analysis.
The court dismissed motions by the defendants to strike out the plaintiff’s statement of claim on the basis of absolute privilege.
The case concerns whether statements made in an affidavit in another proceeding, about a non-party, are protected by absolute privilege.
The court held that absolute privilege is subject to exceptions and applies only to statements made “with reference to the inquiry.” Without the full context of the affidavit and related documents, the court could not determine that the claim was bound to fail.
The court also addressed the application of absolute privilege to counsel and found no basis to treat counsel differently in this context.
Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.
Application dismissed decision
The applicant, HomeLife/Cimerman Real Estate Ltd., sought a declaration that the respondent, Liberty Market Tower Inc., was obliged to pay it a commission in relation to the sale of a condominium unit.
The dispute centered on confusion over which real estate agent represented the purchaser, Mehdi Ajorlou.
The court found that Liberty had a binding agreement with Ajorlou to change the agent of record from Nejad to Ahmadipour, and a binding agreement with HomeLife to register Ahmadipour as the agent of record.
The court ordered Liberty to pay the commission to HomeLife and awarded costs.
The court dismissed the defendants' motion to strike and largely allowed the plaintiff's motion to amend its claim regarding the alleged misappropriation of a pension plan design.
The court considered motions by the plaintiff to amend its statement of claim and by the defendants to strike the statement of claim.
The court found that, except for the claim of unlawful interference with contractual relations, the plaintiff’s amended claim disclosed the material elements of the causes of action pleaded, including breach of confidence, fraudulent misrepresentation, conspiracy, inducing breach of contract, and piercing the corporate veil.
The court dismissed the defendants’ motion to strike, allowed the plaintiff’s motion to amend (except for the unlawful interference claim), and awarded costs to the plaintiff.
Default judgment, punitive damages, and full indemnity costs were granted against a fraudulent mortgage broker.
The plaintiffs moved for default judgment after the defendant, Maria Surovova, was noted in default for failing to attend examinations for discovery.
The court found that Surovova had fraudulently misrepresented herself as a mortgage broker, induced the plaintiffs to transfer $85,221.00 to her under false pretenses, and retained the funds.
The court granted default judgment, awarded punitive damages, and ordered that the judgment survive bankruptcy under s. 178(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.
Full indemnity costs and prejudgment interest were also awarded.
The court granted partial summary judgment dismissing historical coal tar contamination claims as an abuse of process but allowed newer benzene contamination claims to proceed.
The court granted summary judgment dismissing Canadian National Railway Company's claims relating to coal tar contamination as an abuse of process, since those claims had already been dismissed in 2014 due to inordinate delay and failure to preserve evidence.
The court found that the same fairness concerns that prevented a fair trial in 2014 persisted.
However, the court allowed CN's claims regarding benzene contamination to proceed, finding that these claims did not crystallize until 2014 and were not part of the earlier action.
The decision clarifies the application of res judicata and abuse of process in the context of environmental contamination and continuing torts.
Negligence Action dismissed
The plaintiffs sought to enforce a guarantee, promissory note, and mortgage against Ashok and Usha Badhwar, parents of a primary debtor, for a debt of over $1.3 million.
The defendants raised defences of non est factum, undue influence (for Usha), and failure to demand payment on the guarantee.
The court found that the plaintiffs knew or ought to have known of the parents' lack of sophistication and English language skills, and Usha's susceptibility to undue influence.
The certificate of independent legal advice obtained by the plaintiffs was deemed fatally flawed and insufficient to protect them from these equitable defences.
Additionally, the court found the guarantee to be a demand guarantee, and the plaintiffs failed to make a formal demand before commencing the action.
Consequently, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' action, set aside the guarantee, promissory note, and mortgage, and ordered the mortgage removed from the parents' property title.
Statement of claim challenging COVID-19 vaccine mandates struck for lack of jurisdiction, abuse of process, and failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.
The plaintiffs, comprising 473 individuals, brought an action against the Ontario government and 54 non-governmental healthcare entities, challenging COVID-19 vaccination policies and public health measures.
The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim.
The court granted the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction over unionized employees and physicians whose claims were subject to exclusive statutory regimes.
The court also found the action to be an abuse of process due to its prejudicial scope and frivolous pleadings.
Furthermore, the court held that the statement of claim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action for conspiracy, intimidation, intentional infliction of mental anguish, and Charter breaches.
The claim was struck in its entirety, with leave to amend.
Interim injunction restraining obstructive picketing at Purolator premises extended for 30 days.
The plaintiff sought to extend an ex parte interim injunction restraining the respondents from picketing at its premises in a manner that blocked vehicles.
The respondent union requested amendments to the order, specifically to remove a provision precluding the inducing of breach of contract and to narrow the scope of the order to the specific premises rather than province-wide.
The court dismissed the union's requests, finding that the tort of inducing breach of contract does not capture legitimate free speech or boycotts, and that a province-wide order was a preferable use of judicial resources.
The injunction was extended for a further 30 days.
The court dismissed a $14.2 million misrepresentation counterclaim and upheld the termination of a consulting agreement for lack of transparency.
The plaintiffs claimed damages for wrongful termination of a Consulting Agreement, and the defendant counterclaimed for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations.
The court dismissed the defendant's counterclaim, finding no misrepresentation or reliance.
The court also dismissed the balance of the plaintiffs' claim, finding the defendant was entitled to terminate the Consulting Agreement due to the plaintiffs' wilful conduct harming business relationships through lack of forthrightness.
However, the plaintiffs were granted judgment for unreimbursed expenses.
Charter Injunction granted
Purolator Inc. sought and was granted an injunction against unknown persons, including members of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW), who were obstructing access to and egress from its Scarborough facility.
The court determined that the special rules for labour injunctions under section 102 of the Courts of Justice Act did not apply, as Purolator was a third party to the Canada Post-CUPW labour dispute and not an alter ego of Canada Post.
Applying the conventional test for an interim injunction, the court found a strong prima facie case of nuisance due to prolonged obstruction, irreparable harm to Purolator's critical delivery services, and that the balance of convenience favored granting the injunction.
The court also addressed the lack of prior notice to CUPW for the initial ex parte order, noting it was problematic but did not warrant refusing the injunction given the strength of Purolator's case.
Ex parte interim injunction granted to restrain secondary picketing that blockaded a delivery facility.
The plaintiff sought an ex parte interim injunction to restrain secondary picketing at its facility by individuals associated with a union engaged in a strike against the plaintiff's majority shareholder.
The picketers blockaded the facility, significantly delaying the departure of delivery vehicles, including those carrying critical medical supplies.
The court found that the statutory rules for labour injunctions did not apply because there was no labour dispute between the plaintiff and the picketers.
Applying the test for a conventional interim injunction, the court granted the injunction, finding a serious issue to be tried regarding unlawful obstruction, irreparable harm to the plaintiff and its customers, and a balance of convenience favouring the plaintiff.
The court ordered a conditional independent medical examination of a wrongfully dismissed employee claiming prolonged inability to mitigate due to mental health.
The defendant brought a motion for an independent medical examination (IME) of the plaintiff in a wrongful dismissal action.
The plaintiff alleged an inability to mitigate damages due to a mental health condition, claiming this would prevent mitigation for up to 26 months.
The court, acknowledging the unusual nature of an IME in wrongful dismissal cases, found it appropriate given the plaintiff's prolonged assertion of inability to mitigate.
The motion was granted, conditional on the plaintiff's inability to mitigate extending beyond 12 months from the date of termination, balancing the employer's right to test such assertions against potential abuse.
The court dismissed a motion for leave to proceed with a malicious prosecution claim against the Crown due to a lack of evidence of malice.
The plaintiff, A.C., sought leave under section 17(2) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act to continue a civil action for malicious prosecution against the Attorney General of Ontario.
This claim arose after criminal charges against A.C. for sexual misconduct, which had resulted in a mistrial, were subsequently withdrawn by the Crown due to no reasonable prospect of conviction.
The court dismissed the motion for leave, finding that A.C. failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of success, specifically by not providing sufficient evidence of malice on the part of the Crown.
The court emphasized that mere inconsistencies in evidence, lack of forensic evidence, or late disclosure (without proof of deliberate intent to subvert justice) do not meet the high threshold for proving malice required for malicious prosecution claims against the Attorney General.
Interlocutory injunction granted to dismantle university protest encampment based on trespass and property rights.
The University of Toronto brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to dismantle a protest encampment set up by students and others on Front Campus.
The protesters argued the encampment was a protected exercise of their rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly.
The court granted the injunction, finding that the University established a strong prima facie case of trespass and ejectment.
The court held that the protesters' appropriation of University property to the exclusion of others constituted irreparable harm.
The balance of convenience favoured the University, as the injunction only prohibited camping and erecting structures, while allowing the protesters to continue demonstrating elsewhere on campus.
In an alternative analysis, the court found that the Charter does not apply to the University's management of its property, and even if it did, the trespass notice was a justified limit under section 1.