Mark C. Halfyard

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault relating to events on December 25, 2014.

The appellant had been acquitted of a separate assault charge relating to events in summer 2013.

The appellant and complainant were co-parenting their child and maintained a non-intimate relationship at the time of the alleged assault.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge materially misapprehended evidence regarding who invited the complainant to stay overnight, and second, that the trial judge improperly relied on a police officer's opinion regarding the complainant's expectations about police involvement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds and upheld the conviction.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on dangerous driving causing bodily harm under section 249(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued that the trial judge erred in his analysis of the mens rea component by relying on the respondent's lack of deliberate intention to create danger and failed to consider all relevant circumstances.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the established test from Supreme Court jurisprudence, properly considered whether the respondent had deliberate intention to cause danger, and appropriately applied the modified objective test in concluding there was no marked departure from the standard of care of a prudent person.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, challenging the trial judge's credibility analysis of the complainant's evidence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge impermissibly relied on the concept of memory fragmentation caused by alcohol consumption without expert evidence and that counsel was not given an opportunity to address this finding.

The appellant also argued the trial judge erred in failing to address the complainant's refusal to provide her cellphone to police to recover deleted text messages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings were open to him based on the evidence and that there was no unfairness in the proceedings.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, weapons dangerous, and assault, arising from an altercation with his partner's uncle.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's self-defence claim.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made material misapprehensions of evidence, including regarding blood on a swivel chair and the complainant's actions in preparing for the fight.

These misapprehensions were key to the self-defence analysis and undermined the trial judge's credibility findings.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of section 490.013(2.1) of the Criminal Code, which mandates lifetime registration under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) for offenders convicted of more than one designated sexual offence.

The appellant argued the provision violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on grounds of overbreadth and gross disproportionality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the provision was neither overbroad nor grossly disproportionate.

The court held that conviction of multiple sexual offences is a reasonable proxy for enhanced risk of re-offending, and that the modest impact on liberty is proportionate to the important objective of public safety.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' imprisonment for two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The appellant fell asleep at the wheel while driving under the influence of alcohol, cannabis, and cocaine, causing a serious collision that injured two victims.

The Court of Appeal rejected the appellant's arguments that the sentence was unfit, finding that the sentencing judge properly considered the relevant principles, the serious nature of the offence, the appellant's status as a novice driver, and the catastrophic consequences of the accident.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought bail pending appeal after being convicted of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code and possession of a prohibited firearm under s. 92(1).

He was sentenced to 96 months on the first offence and 80 months concurrent on the second, with 44 months credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Crown opposed bail on the basis that detention was necessary in the public interest.

The motion judge found that while the appeal was not frivolous and the appellant would surrender as required, the appellant failed to demonstrate that detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against a 14-year-old paperboy.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding a doorbell and a request for toilet paper, and failed to properly apply W.D. principles to evidence favourable to the defence.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably assessed the evidentiary conflicts and properly applied the burden of proof.

Four appellants appealed their convictions for various offences arising from a large-scale credit card fraud and money laundering scheme operating over several years.

The appellants were convicted of fraud over $5,000, participation in a criminal organization, identity theft, possession of property obtained by crime, and money laundering.

The appellants raised multiple grounds of appeal, including challenges to the single transaction rule, sufficiency of reasons, and the legal test for criminal organization.

The Court of Appeal dismissed most appeals but quashed certain convictions against one appellant that were entered without being charged, and corrected typographical errors in the trial judgment.

The appellant was convicted at trial of being an accessory after the fact to murder, obstructing police, and public mischief.

She appealed only the accessory conviction.

The trial judge found that the Crown had failed to prove that Joshua Barreira, the alleged principal, was guilty of murder.

However, rather than acquitting the appellant, the trial judge convicted her on the basis that she had assisted Chad Davidson (the actual shooter) by serving as a witness to his wedding.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the conviction was based on a theory of liability that fell outside the scope of the indictment, which was limited to the appellant's conduct in relation to Joshua Barreira.

The court entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed for assault against her child and assault of a police officer for the purpose of resisting arrest.

The summary conviction appeal court judge had upheld the sentence on the basis of deference to the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that deference was not owed because the conviction appeal was allowed on the assault charges, which were the sole focus of sentencing submissions, and the trial judge provided no reasons for the assault police charge.

The Court allowed the appeal and substituted a conditional discharge with a three-year probationary period, which had already been served in full.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and aggravated assault following a violent altercation on a restaurant patio.

He appealed on two grounds, claiming the Crown's closing address was improper and that the trial judge's instruction on self-defence was erroneous.

The Crown's closing address did not misstate the legal test for self-defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code, and any inappropriate comments were adequately corrected by the trial judge.

The trial judge's instruction on self-defence was thorough and proper, correctly identifying the three key elements of the defence without improperly adding proportionality as an additional requirement.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault on three grounds.

The first ground challenged the trial judge's finding that the appellant's Charter s. 10(b) rights were properly advised, arguing the police officer failed to inform him of his right to consult counsel in private.

The Court of Appeal rejected this ground, finding the trial judge properly ensured the appellant understood his rights and made an informed decision to speak without counsel.

The second ground challenged a misstatement regarding drug testing of the complainant, but the Court found this immaterial as the trial judge's finding of incapacity to consent was based on overwhelming evidence of intoxication.

The third ground challenged the trial judge's credibility finding regarding the appellant's fabricated evidence about drinking, but the Court found this finding was open to the trial judge and there were other unimpeachable reasons to reject the appellant's evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, which allegedly occurred on a commercial flight while the complainant was sleeping.

The summary conviction appeal court found that the trial judge erred by failing to adequately address the reliability of the complainant's evidence, improperly discounting the appellant's good character evidence, and engaging in impermissible speculation by taking judicial notice of the aircraft's seat configuration without evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault of his step-granddaughter, who was approximately nine years old at the time of the offences.

The trial judge admitted similar fact evidence from two adult nieces of the appellant who testified to similar inappropriate touching when they were children.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: (1) erroneous admission of similar fact evidence due to collusion; (2) failure to properly address material inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony and over-reliance on demeanour; (3) impermissible inference of guilt from rejection of the appellant's testimony; and (4) unsafe and unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault against female massage clients at his massage and yoga studio.

He appealed his convictions on multiple grounds, including that the application judge failed to provide reasons for refusing his severance application, that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and that the trial judge erred in relying on the complainant's immediate report to police.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial solely on the basis that the application judge's failure to provide reasons for refusing severance frustrated meaningful appellate review, particularly given the intertwined issues of severance and similar fact evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of assaulting his former domestic partner.

At trial, the judge restricted the defence's cross-examination of the complainant regarding her prior sexual history and the duration of the alleged assault, citing section 276 of the Criminal Code and the twin myths.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found that section 276 does not apply to common assault prosecutions and that the trial judge's restrictions materially impaired the appellant's right to make full answer and defence.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The respondent was arrested for robbery and released on bail.

While on bail, he committed a second offence (procuring sexual services) and was denied bail for that charge.

He was subsequently convicted of the robbery offences and sentenced with credit for pre-trial custody accumulated after his detention on the second offence.

The Crown appealed, arguing that pre-trial custody incurred following a later, unrelated charge could not be credited against the sentence for the earlier robbery offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that sections 719(3) and (3.1) of the Criminal Code do not limit credit for pre-trial custody only to the offence that directly triggered detention.

Rather, courts must assess whether a sufficient causal link exists between the pre-trial custody and the offence being sentenced, which may encompass custody arising from later charges if those charges contributed to the denial of bail or the offender's decision not to seek bail.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle over the legal limit, arguing the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand, failed to make the demand 'forthwith', and violated his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The summary conviction appeal judge upheld the trial judge's findings that the inexperienced officer's suspicion crystallized after conducting computer checks, justifying the brief delay.

The court found the demand was made forthwith once reasonable suspicion was formed, and thus the suspension of the right to counsel was lawful.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud entered by the Superior Court of Justice.

At trial, the appellant admitted to dishonest acts but contested whether he possessed the necessary mens rea for fraud.

The trial judge found that he did.

On appeal, the appellant raised two main arguments: first, that the trial judge erred in treating evidence about a remuneration scheme as hearsay when led to show the appellant's state of mind; and second, that the trial judge erred in relying on the Crown's suggestion that the appellant should have called other managers as witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both arguments and upheld the conviction.