Mark C. Halfyard

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug possession.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, specifically cheques in the appellant's name found in the bedroom where the drugs were located.

The Court of Appeal held that no reasonable jury could conclude the appellant was in possession of the drugs based on the entirety of the evidence, as the absence of evidence left open other plausible theories inconsistent with guilt.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant, B.P. (YOA), appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's errors regarding the admissibility and reliability of the complainant's hearsay statement, the weight given to the complainant's mother's evidence despite misidentification, the failure to properly analyze the appellant's evidence against the burden of proof, and impermissible speculation about the complainant's knowledge of sexual activity.

The Superior Court of Justice found multiple errors in the trial judge's approach to hearsay reliability, assessment of witness credibility, and application of the burden of proof.

The appeal was granted, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was acquitted of first degree murder but convicted of manslaughter for shooting his brother.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on self-defence and by allowing the jury to consider the lack of bruising on the deceased's wrist without expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the self-defence instructions properly conveyed the requirement of a defensive purpose, and concluding there was no realistic possibility the jury improperly speculated about the bruising evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was based on three grounds: the trial judge's reliance on inadmissible evidence, an error in finding an unequivocal refusal, and an error in finding the incident was not a "single transaction." The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the entire video evidence was admissible as it was tendered without limitation, the trial judge's finding of an unequivocal refusal was supported by evidence and entitled to deference, and the appellant's late inquiry about providing a sample did not constitute an unequivocal offer or part of a "single transaction" to mitigate the initial refusal.

The appellant appealed a conviction for "over 80" after her vehicle was found in a snowbank.

At trial, the appellant claimed a third party was driving, a claim corroborated by a defence witness.

The trial judge disbelieved the appellant and convicted her.

On appeal, the court found that the trial judge erred by failing to assess the corroborating defence witness's evidence separately from the appellant's, thereby misapplying the principles of R. v. W.(D.).

The trial judge also erred by engaging in speculation regarding witness behaviour and by not making an explicit finding of collusion despite noting the opportunity for it.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for importing cocaine, arguing the trial judge erred by admitting an unanticipated statement made to a customs officer without a voir dire, denying a mistrial application, and failing to properly instruct the jury on the officer's failure to note the statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's decisions.

The court held that the voluntariness of pre-arrest statements had been admitted, cross-examination was sufficient to address any prejudice from the unanticipated evidence, and the jury charge was adequate.

The appellant was convicted of fraud-related offences arising from a large-scale internet fraud scheme operated from his home involving stolen and altered corporate cheques.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his prior convictions for similar cheque frauds as similar act evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the similarities between the prior conduct and the alleged offences were sufficient to overcome the objective improbability of coincidence, and noting the Crown's case was formidable even without the similar act evidence.

The appellant called the police to report a car theft.

The responding officer smelled marijuana and saw drug paraphernalia in her apartment.

He told her he could arrest her but wanted to know what was going on, without informing her of her right to counsel.

The appellant subsequently showed the officer drugs belonging to her boyfriend.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant was psychologically detained when the officer threatened arrest, and the failure to provide s. 10(b) rights was a serious breach.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the appeal was allowed, and acquittals were directed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving (care and control) arising from being found asleep in a parked vehicle with the engine running.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to find that the evidence raised a reasonable doubt regarding impairment and failed to adequately explain the rejection of the defence evidence that the behaviour observed by police was caused by fatigue rather than alcohol consumption.

The court held that the trial judge’s credibility findings and factual determinations were supported by the evidence and entitled to significant appellate deference.

The reasons, read as a whole, sufficiently explained the rejection of the defence theory and the application of the W.D. framework.

No error of law, misapprehension of evidence, or miscarriage of justice was established.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and related offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed arguments regarding the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility and the lack of a Vetrovec caution.

However, the Court found the trial judge misapprehended evidence on one count, quashing that conviction and ordering a new trial.

Another conviction was quashed and an acquittal entered because the complainant did not meet the statutory definition of a young person.

The remaining convictions and the total five-year sentence were upheld.

The appellant appealed convictions for three counts of sexual assault arising from incidents involving a workplace employee with a learning disability.

He argued the trial judge erred by permitting the complainant to testify by CCTV while also admitting her videotaped police statement, misapplying the law of consent and mistaken belief in consent, improperly reconsidering a SOIRA registration order after sentencing, and upholding the constitutionality of lifetime registration under s. 490.013(2.1) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the trial judge properly admitted both CCTV testimony and the videotaped statement under ss. 486.2 and 715.2, and that the findings of lack of consent and rejection of mistaken belief in consent were supported by the evidence.

Although the trial judge erred in reconsidering the SOIRA order after sentencing, the corrected lifetime registration remained appropriate.

The constitutional challenge to the SOIRA lifetime registration provision under s. 7 of the Charter was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of impaired operation of a motor vehicle after causing a four-vehicle accident.

He testified that he was not impaired while driving but consumed a large amount of alcohol immediately after the accident (bolus drinking).

The trial judge disbelieved the appellant, relying on toxicological evidence based on a seven-ounce consumption scenario, but ignored evidence based on a ten-ounce scenario that could have supported the appellant's claim.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal, finding the error immaterial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, holding that the failure to consider the ten-ounce toxicology evidence was a material misapprehension of evidence relevant to the appellant's credibility.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving following a parking lot hit‑and‑run collision.

She argued the verdict was unreasonable regarding both identification and impairment and alleged the trial judge relied on improper hearsay evidence of a witness’s prior description of the driver.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held that the combination of eyewitness recognition and circumstantial evidence reasonably supported the identification finding.

It also concluded that the trial judge properly assessed impairment at the time of driving and that the prior description evidence was not improperly used to prove identity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault arising from an incident where he showered with a child after a sand fight at a campground.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge failed to properly apply the analysis from R. v. W.(D.) when assessing conflicting evidence.

The Superior Court found the trial judge improperly equated disbelief of the accused’s testimony with proof of guilt and failed to conduct the full three‑step W.D. analysis regarding the essential elements of the offences, including the sexual purpose of any touching.

The court also found the evidence of a sexual component to the touching was insufficient and that the verdict relied on speculation rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The convictions were therefore set aside and acquittals entered.

The appellant appealed convictions arising from an impaired driving incident involving a multi‑vehicle collision and breath samples taken outside the statutory two‑hour window.

The defence advanced an intervening drinking theory, asserting that alcohol was consumed after the accident but before the breath tests.

The trial judge rejected the defence as incredible and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant alleged misapprehension of toxicological evidence, improper judicial notice of surrender times for intermittent sentences, and improper use of compelled statements.

The court held that any errors were not material to the verdict and that the trial judge’s credibility findings were supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The Crown appealed acquittals entered by the Ontario Court of Justice on charges of obstructing a peace officer and two counts of failing to comply with a recognizance.

The trial judge had excluded certified court documents establishing the recognizance conditions on the basis that the Crown failed to provide adequate notice under s. 28 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Superior Court held that exemplifications of judicial records are admissible at common law without notice and that the trial judge erred by relying on contrary lower‑court authority rather than binding appellate precedent.

The court also held there was some evidence capable of supporting the obstruct police charge and that the directed verdict of acquittal was therefore improper.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial ordered on all charges.

The applicant sought appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code to pursue a summary conviction appeal from convictions for obstructing police and breach of probation.

The trial judge had relied primarily on circumstantial documentary evidence linking the accused to a rented vehicle involved in the incident after assigning limited weight to tainted identification evidence.

The court considered whether the proposed grounds of appeal were arguable and whether the interests of justice required appointed counsel.

The court found the trial judge had properly addressed identification deficiencies and reasonably relied on the rental documentation to infer identity.

Concluding the proposed appeal lacked arguable merit, the court dismissed the application for appointment of counsel.

The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous driving following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The sole ground of appeal argued that the trial judge improperly applied the rule in Browne v. Dunn by diminishing the weight of the defence evidence because the defence version was not put to Crown witnesses during cross-examination.

The appellate court held that trial judges retain discretion in determining how to address a breach of the rule, including considering the failure to cross-examine when assessing credibility.

The court found that defence counsel had the opportunity to seek recall of witnesses after the issue was raised but chose not to do so.

The trial judge’s treatment of the issue was a permissible exercise of discretion and did not amount to reversible error.

The accused was convicted of possession of approximately 45 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at a restaurant and located drugs behind the counter.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of two years while the defence requested a conditional sentence.

The court considered the seriousness of trafficking offences, the quantity of drugs, and the accused’s prior criminal record as aggravating factors, while also weighing mitigating circumstances including family support, stable employment, and prolonged compliance with strict bail conditions.

Applying the principles of denunciation and deterrence alongside rehabilitation under s. 718.2 of the Criminal Code, the court concluded that a strict conditional sentence would adequately address the purposes of sentencing.

The accused was sentenced to two years less a day to be served in the community under strict house arrest followed by probation.

The Crown appealed a suspended sentence imposed following a guilty plea to sexual assault involving brief touching of a 16‑year‑old complainant.

The Crown argued the sentencing judge erred in principle and imposed a demonstrably unfit sentence by failing to adequately weigh aggravating factors and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The appeal court found the sentencing judge had been incorrectly advised that a conditional sentence was legally unavailable, constituting an error in principle regarding the available sentencing range.

Nevertheless, considering the mitigating factors, the offender’s rehabilitation, completion of probation conditions, and the passage of time, the court concluded that imprisonment would not serve the interests of justice.

The Crown appeal was dismissed.