Louise Charron

Following the release of the main judgment dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal issued an addendum to clarify the costs award.

The court upheld the motions judge's decision to award the individual defendants their costs against both plaintiffs, as the individual defendants had been improperly joined in the action.

Following the release of the main decision, the Court of Appeal for Ontario received further submissions on costs.

The Court ordered that the costs of the application for leave, the motion for leave to appeal, and the appeal be awarded to the appellant in the cause.

The deceased transferred his residence to his sons in trust to be used for his and his wife's maintenance if required, with the remainder to his five children.

The trustees later sold the residence and mistakenly transferred the proceeds of $205,342.63 to the deceased.

After the deceased's death, his widow (the appellant) argued the funds belonged to his estate.

The motions judge held that the transfer was a breach of trust made under a mistake of law, and that the trust was entitled to recover the funds secured by an equitable lien.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the widow's appeal, finding that the deceased knew or should have known of the breach of trust, and that his estate would be unjustly enriched if permitted to retain the funds.

The seven appellants were convicted of trafficking in heroin following an undercover police operation.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, primarily arguing that the 44.5-month delay between their charges and trial violated their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal agreed with respect to six of the appellants, finding the delay was largely systemic and caused prejudice, and ordered a stay of proceedings for those six.

The appeal of the seventh appellant, who was arrested much later, was dismissed on all grounds, including arguments regarding the destruction of police notes, jury instructions, and sentence fitness.

The appellant appealed a judgment in a matrimonial action, seeking a new trial on the basis that his trial counsel was incompetent for failing to marshal relevant evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence to determine whether the lack of evidence was attributable to counsel or the appellant's own failure to divulge information.

The respondent's cross-appeal regarding deductions for notional costs and tax liability was also dismissed, as the trial judge's consideration of probable tax liability was reasonable given the record.

The Director of the Family Responsibility Office appealed a motions judge's order lifting the suspension of a defaulting payor's driver's licence, issuing a refraining order, and directing the withdrawal of any federal licence denial application.

The Court of Appeal held that the motions judge lacked jurisdiction to make a refraining order outside the 30-day statutory period.

However, because the Director failed to prove service of the First Notice regarding the driver's licence suspension, the suspension could not stand.

The Court further held that the motions judge erred in ordering the withdrawal of the federal licence denial application, as the payor had been properly served with notice and failed to take the required statutory steps to prevent it.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The respondent was in default of a child support order and his driver's licence was suspended after the Director sent a First Notice to his address on record.

The respondent brought a motion to reinstate his licence, claiming he did not receive the notice.

The motions judge ordered the reinstatement of the licence for 90 days to allow the respondent to bring a motion to vary support.

The Director appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Director proved proper service of the First Notice in accordance with the legislation.

The motions judge had no jurisdiction to order reinstatement or to make a refraining order outside the statutory 30-day period.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and settled her claim for statutory accident benefits with her insurer for a lump sum.

She later sued for further benefits, and the insurer relied on the signed release.

The appellant argued the release was invalid because the insurer's written notice did not comply with s. 9.1(2) of Regulation 664 under the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the notice failed to provide an estimate of the commuted value of the benefits and failed to state the maximum benefits available.

The appeal was allowed and the summary judgment dismissing the action was set aside.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding an equalization payment.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to follow the steps provided in the Family Law Act and made unclear findings of fact regarding a constructive trust, pension valuation, and a property gift.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment was set aside, and a new trial was directed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment and costs order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial and confirming the motions judge's jurisdiction to hear the summary judgment motion despite the appellant's motion to discontinue under Rule 23.

The Court also upheld the solicitor and client costs award.

However, the Court set aside one paragraph of the judgment regarding the costs of a prior motion, as the motions judge lacked jurisdiction to alter an existing order.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $24,882.30, representing the return of a deposit paid for a baling system machine.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in finding the partnership, rather than the corporation, was a party to the contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions regarding the parties to the contract, the breach of contract, and the dismissal of the counterclaim based on credibility findings.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The young person appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, use of a firearm, unlawful confinement, possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and possession of stolen firearms.

He argued the verdicts were unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions for the robbery and firearms offences, finding the circumstantial and direct evidence supported the trial judge's conclusions.

However, the court quashed the conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle, as there was no evidence the appellant had control over the vehicle.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the 22-month delay was not unreasonable given the complexities of the case.

The young person appellant appealed his conviction for manslaughter arising from a deliberately set fire in a store during business hours.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in allowing the Crown to cross-examine its own witness on a prior statement, failed to appreciate the mens rea test, and failed to adequately explain how inconsistencies in the evidence were reconciled.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion regarding the cross-examination, concluding the evidence amply supported the mens rea finding, and holding that the trial judge's reasons sufficiently identified the evidence relied upon to support the verdict.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, seeking to introduce fresh evidence that he was in custody on a date the complainant claimed to have seen him prior to the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to introduce fresh evidence and the appeal, finding that the specific date was of no particular significance in the context of the trial and the fresh evidence could not reasonably be expected to have affected the trial judge's acceptance of the identification evidence.

The appellant general contractor appealed the trial judge's assessment of damages for construction deficiencies and delays in building a commercial office building.

The trial judge awarded $1.7 million for diminution in value due to floor slab deficiencies and $770,000 for lost rental income from prospective tenants due to a five-month construction delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the $1.7 million award, finding the owner did not fail to mitigate its damages.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the delay damages for prospective tenants, finding the $770,000 assessment was not supported by the evidence, and reduced that portion of the award to $65,000.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that set aside his acquittal for impaired driving and ordered a new trial.

The trial judge had excluded evidence under section 9 of the Charter, finding the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and demand a breath sample.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the summary conviction appeal judge that the officer's subjective opinion was supported by objective facts, including the appellant's physical condition, apparent evasion of a RIDE program, and the discarding of open beer bottles by a passenger.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, and forcible confinement, as well as his sentence of nine years plus time served.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding sufficient evidence to support the verdict and no basis for the ineffective assistance claim.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was justified by the serious nature of the offences and the appellant's extensive criminal record.

The insured claimed for the theft of a vehicle under his automobile insurance policy.

The vehicle was later found submerged in water, and the insured's mechanic retrieved and completely dismantled it before the insurer could inspect it.

The insurer denied the claim for breach of statutory conditions.

At trial, a jury awarded the insured compensatory and punitive damages, finding the insurer wrongfully refused to pay and acted reprehensibly.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, setting aside the punitive damages and costs, holding that the jury's verdict was unreasonable as the evidence clearly showed the insurer was denied a reasonable opportunity to inspect the vehicle and there was no evidence of malicious or high-handed conduct by the insurer.

The appellant was convicted of five counts of possessing machines and materials adapted and intended to be used to commit forgery under s. 369(b) of the Criminal Code, relating to the manufacture of forged credit cards.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that 'adapted' meant 'suitable for' rather than 'altered so as to be suitable for'.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the term 'adapted' in s. 369(b) is ambiguous and must be interpreted in favour of the accused to mean 'altered so as to be suitable for'.

As there was no evidence that the materials in four of the counts were altered, acquittals were entered for those counts, and a new trial was ordered for the remaining count where some materials had been altered.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing most of their claims against magazine publishers and a distributor for conspiracy to injure, conspiracy to unduly lessen competition, wrongful interference with economic relations, inducing breach of contract, and breach of contract.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that there was some evidence of a common design or agreement among the corporate defendants to injure the appellants or unduly lessen competition, requiring a trial for the conspiracy and wrongful interference claims.

The appeal regarding the breach of contract and inducing breach of contract claims was dismissed, as the contract was terminated in accordance with its unambiguous terms.