Louise Charron

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, seeking to introduce fresh evidence regarding the credibility of a jailhouse informant and arguing that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions on intoxication, the common sense inference of intent, and reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence would not have affected the verdict and that the jury instructions, read as a whole, did not contain reversible errors.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after returning from Jamaica with drugs hidden in her purse.

Her sole defence was that she was an 'unknowing mule'.

The trial judge instructed the jury that a reasonable doubt could not arise from an absence of evidence, and repeated this error when answering a jury question.

The Court of Appeal held that this misdirection was a reversible error, as the jury likely misapprehended the correct standard of proof regarding the lack of direct evidence of the appellant's knowledge.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of second-degree murder.

He argued that his Charter rights under ss. 8 and 10(b) were violated during police questioning and the taking of bodily samples, that the jury instructions on reasonable doubt were inadequate, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant made an informed choice to cooperate with police, the jury instructions substantially complied with the required standards, and trial counsel's tactical decisions were reasonable and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant insurer sought to add Livent Inc. and several of its directors as defendants by counterclaim in an action brought by outside directors to enforce a Directors and Officers Liability policy.

The insurer also sought to lift a CCAA stay of proceedings against Livent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, adding Livent as a party because the insurer was entitled to seek a declaration regarding the policy's validity against the policyholder.

However, the court refused to add the additional directors, finding it would unnecessarily complicate the discrete legal issue of coverage for the innocent outside directors.

The CCAA stay was lifted to the extent necessary to give effect to the order.

The parties separated in 1992 and the limitation period for an equalization claim expired in December 1998.

The appellant retained counsel in September 1998, and negotiations regarding the respondent's pension continued past the limitation period.

When negotiations failed, the appellant commenced an action and sought an extension of time under s. 2(8) of the Family Law Act.

The motions judge dismissed the motion, finding bad faith and prejudice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motions judge erred by focusing only on the pre-1998 delay and by finding prejudice where the respondent had notice of the claim before the limitation period expired.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion seeking various forms of relief against the Crown, including an injunction to prevent entry onto disputed lands, damages for the destruction of a gate, an order to search Ministry records, and leave to amend his statement of claim to plead conspiracy and punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's decision in its entirety, finding no errors in the refusal of the injunction, the determination that damages could not be granted on such a motion, the finding on disclosure, and the exercise of discretion to refuse the amendments.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants brought a motion for an order directing the trial of certain issues allegedly outstanding from a 1993 judgment based on Minutes of Settlement.

The motions judge directed a trial on only some issues and stayed a subsequent 1999 action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellants failed to meet their evidentiary burden to support the requested order.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Guatemala involving an uninsured driver.

He sought recovery under the uninsured automobile coverage provision of the Insurance Act.

The motions judge found the respondent was entitled to coverage, holding that the territorial limit in the policy was inconsistent with the Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, finding no ambiguity or conflict between the policy limitation and the legislation.

The Court held that the territorial limit in the policy applied to preclude coverage for the accident in Guatemala.

The appellant school bus operator appealed the dismissal of its motion for a declaration that its insurer had a duty to defend it in the main action.

The underlying action alleged the operator failed to ensure a student was safely on board, resulting in severe weather exposure and amputation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding a possible duty to indemnify under the policy, which triggered the duty to defend.

The court dismissed the request for separate representation, finding no sufficient conflict on the pleadings, but awarded the appellant solicitor-and-client costs until the insurer takes over the defence.

The appellant appealed convictions for historical sexual offences involving two complainants and a custodial sentence of three years.

He argued that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof in assessing credibility, misapprehended evidence on key factual conflicts, improperly treated character and conduct evidence, and erred in entering a gross indecency conviction on one count.

The court held that the trial judge correctly applied the criminal standard of proof, adequately addressed the material evidentiary conflicts, and properly treated both the former-student evidence and the Crown’s reply evidence as being of little assistance.

The gross indecency conviction was upheld on the evidence, and the conviction appeal was dismissed.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed because the contingent basis for sentence reduction did not arise.

Appeal from a declaration that a strip of land remained a public highway because a municipality had not complied with statutory requirements when confirming a road closing and later selling the land.

The court held the earlier by-law had effectively stopped up the highway and the later by-law merely corrected the description and confirmed that result, so s. 470(1) did not invalidate the road closing.

Although the municipality failed to comply with s. 487 when selling the stopped-up highway to the predecessor in title, the court had discretion to refuse declaratory relief and should have done so because of extensive delay.

The court further held that subsequent purchasers could rely on defences under the Limitations Act and the Land Titles Act.

The appeal was allowed and the underlying application dismissed.

An Indigenous band appealed from a summary judgment disposition concerning reserve lands sold in the 19th century without a lawful formal surrender.

The Court of Appeal held that there had been no surrender and that the claim was not barred by statutory limitation periods, but concluded that declaratory and possessory relief should nevertheless be refused.

The court applied public law discretion and equitable doctrines, emphasizing the band's historical acquiescence, the extraordinary delay in asserting the land claim, and the reliance of innocent third-party landowners who had held and developed the properties for generations.

The band was left to pursue its damages claims against the Crown.

The Crown appealed an order quashing a conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit following a single-vehicle accident.

The Court of Appeal held that under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code, the officer need only reasonably suspect that a person operating or in care or control of a vehicle has alcohol in the body; the suspicion need not separately extend to operation or care and control.

The court further held that the trial judge was entitled on the evidence to find that the respondent had not relinquished care and control of the vehicle when the roadside screening demand was made.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and the conviction and sentence restored.

In a child protection matter, the appellant father sought to appeal an order concerning interim care and custody after the Superior Court had dismissed his earlier appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that both the original order and the intervening appeal were interlocutory because they dealt only temporarily with custody of the child.

As a result, the proper appeal route was, with leave, to the Divisional Court rather than directly to the Court of Appeal.

The motion to quash was granted and no costs were awarded.

A foreign judgment creditor appealed the dismissal of a petition for a receiving order under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act based on an unpaid Ohio civil judgment arising from a fatal boating collision.

The Court of Appeal held that the bankruptcy judge erred in treating the foreign plaintiffs as a single creditor and in requiring the petitioning creditor to exhaust other civil enforcement routes before invoking the bankruptcy regime.

The court found there were at least three creditors, substantial unpaid liabilities under a final foreign judgment, and evidence of suspicious asset transfers that made bankruptcy remedies appropriate.

The appeal was allowed, the debtor was adjudged bankrupt, and a trustee was appointed.

The appellant appealed convictions for break and enter, breaking out of a house, and failure to comply, as well as a three-year sentence.

The court held that the trial judge did not err in declining to exclude shoe evidence seized in breach of s. 8 of the Charter, emphasizing the deference owed to a trial judge’s s. 24(2) determination.

The court also rejected the unreasonable verdict argument because the eyewitness testimony was supported by footprint evidence and injuries consistent with the intruder’s escape.

The sentence appeal was dismissed after the court found no failure to consider the appellant’s background as an aboriginal offender and held the sentence fit given the criminal record.

The appeal concerned whether weekly no-fault benefits paid under s. 13 of the pre-1994 Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule were deductible from an award of general damages in a motor vehicle personal injury action.

Applying the no-double-recovery approach from prior appellate authority, the court held that deductibility depends on whether the statutory benefit is akin to the same head of loss as the damages award.

The court concluded that s. 13 benefits are more akin to damages for loss of income than to general damages because they are weekly, age-linked, coordinated with income loss benefits, and directed at those prevented from seeking employment or education.

The appeal was allowed, the Divisional Court order was quashed, and the motions judge's order was restored.

The appellant challenged a trial judgment arising from a matrimonial dispute involving custody and access, equalization, support, credibility findings, and costs.

He alleged unfairness, bias, evidentiary errors, and error in failing to interview the children.

The court held the appeal was an impermissible attempt to retry the case, found the allegations against the trial judge groundless, and held there was no basis to interfere with the custody determination or the costs award.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Appeal from an order granting a combined suspended and conditional discharge from bankruptcy.

The court held that the rehabilitative purpose of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act must be balanced against creditor interests and the integrity of the bankruptcy system.

A bankrupt who is dishonest, evasive, untruthful, fails to make full disclosure, or refuses to co-operate with the trustee is not entitled to a discharge on any terms.

The bankrupt's non-cooperation, misleading evidence concerning a family trust, unexplained office arrangements, inaccurate income disclosure, and post-bankruptcy business activity required refusal of discharge.

The appellant appealed convictions for theft and possession of stolen property, arguing that the trial judge failed to address weaknesses in the identification evidence, improperly relied on witness sincerity instead of reliability, and returned an unreasonable verdict.

The court held that, although brief, the trial reasons disclosed no such errors.

It further held that the verdict was supported not only by eyewitness identification but also by circumstantial evidence placing the appellant at the scene at the relevant time.

The appeal was dismissed.