Louise Charron

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and offering an indignity to human remains.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge violated his right to be present at his trial under s. 650 of the Criminal Code by holding an in camera meeting with the federal Crown and an investigating officer to determine an informer privilege claim over RCMP records.

The appellant also challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the 'other suspect' defence, Vetrovec warnings for unsavoury witnesses, and the fact-finding process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the in camera meeting was part of a separate proceeding under s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act, not the trial itself, and that the appellant had expressly consented to the procedure.

The Court also found no reversible error in the jury instructions.

The respondent successfully sued the appellants for negligence after a real estate venture failed due to soil contamination.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's decision.

The Court found no duty of care existed, as the appellants never undertook to provide legal advice and advised investors to seek their own.

Furthermore, there was no evidence that the failure to obtain legal advice caused the respondent's loss, and the claim was barred by the six-year limitation period.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of attempting to obstruct justice.

The Crown alleged in the information that the appellant directed witnesses to make a false statement, but at trial argued that knowledge of falsity was irrelevant if coercion was used.

The trial judge convicted based on coercion without finding the statements were false or the appellant knew they were false.

The Court of Appeal held that the Crown was bound by the particulars in the information, which required proving the appellant knew the statements were false.

Since the Crown conceded it could not prove this knowledge, the conviction was quashed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for sexually assaulting his three young granddaughters.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the evidence of the three complainants.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to specifically instruct the jury that a finding of collusion among the complainants would diminish their credibility, and by improperly addressing Crown counsel's remarks regarding the absence of medical evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the total sentence of 8 years' imprisonment given the egregious breach of trust, the severity of the assaults, and the appellant's prior conviction for a similar offence.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action against a corporate officer and director.

The motion judge had dismissed the action on the grounds that the statement of claim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action and that there was no genuine issue for trial regarding negligent misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the statement of claim did plead sufficient facts to support the claim and that there were genuine issues for trial on the evidentiary record.

The appellant, a Convention refugee, was ordered deported after the Minister determined he constituted a danger to the security of Canada due to his involvement in terrorism.

After exhausting domestic remedies, the appellant petitioned the UN Human Rights Committee, which requested Canada stay the deportation.

When Canada refused, the appellant sought an injunction, arguing that his deportation violated section 7 of the Charter and his legitimate expectations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that unincorporated international treaties do not create binding domestic obligations and that the doctrine of legitimate expectations does not grant substantive rights to remain in Canada.

However, the Court granted a 30-day stay to permit the appellant to seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and related offences following a second trial for a home invasion.

He appealed his convictions and his eight-year sentence, arguing that the trial judge provided inadequate jury instructions regarding his alibi defence, failed to give a sufficient Vetrovec warning for an accomplice and a perjured witness, and erred in instructions on identification and prior bad acts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate, fair, and balanced, and that the sentence was fit given the circumstances of the offence and the appellant's record.

The appellant submitted the lowest acceptable bid in response to a Request for Proposals for a computer cabling project.

Due to a budget reduction, the respondent school board negotiated with the three lowest bidders instead of solely with the appellant, ultimately awarding the contract to another bidder.

The appellant sued for breach of the duty of fairness and good faith.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the board was permitted to conduct wider negotiations and that any differing treatment during negotiations did not affect the outcome.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant brought an action for foreclosure on a mortgage given by the respondents as security for a guarantee of their son's company's debts.

The trial judge granted judgment for the mortgage amount but allowed the respondents' counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty based on alleged collateral assurances, awarding a set-off.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that while the trial judge correctly found the guarantee valid and collateral assurances inadmissible to contradict it, he erred in finding those same assurances created a fiduciary relationship.

The counterclaim was dismissed and costs awarded to the appellant.

The parties appealed and cross-appealed a trial judgment arising from the dissolution of their horse business relationship.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in awarding unjust enrichment for foal expenses, dismissing the claim for purse monies, overcompensating for a horse's reduced value, and denying damages from an interlocutory injunction.

The court also awarded the appellant solicitor and client costs based on a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The cross-appeal was allowed in part to grant the respondent pre-judgment interest.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder on the basis that he forcibly confined the deceased while causing his death.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in several aspects of the jury charge, including the definition of forcible confinement and instructions on self-defence, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the jury charge and concluded that there was sufficient circumstantial and expert evidence from which a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer that the deceased had been forcibly confined.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following the release of reasons for judgment allowing the appeals by the Canadian Red Cross Society and Canada, the Court of Appeal received written submissions on the costs of the trial.

The Court ordered that the Canadian Red Cross Society shall have its costs on a party-and-party scale from the plaintiffs, with no costs to or against Canada or Ontario.

The disposition of Bayer's costs ordered by the trial judge was not disturbed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to trafficking in heroin and improper storage of a firearm, receiving an 18-month custodial sentence.

The trial judge emphasized general deterrence and held that a conditional sentence was inappropriate for heroin trafficking.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by applying a presumption against conditional sentences for drug trafficking and failing to adequately consider the appellant's significant rehabilitative progress.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was converted to an 18-month conditional sentence with strict terms.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after shooting his common-law wife.

At trial, the primary issue was whether the appellant had the requisite intent, given his intoxication and mental disorder.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructions regarding his voir dire testimony, evidence of his violent disposition, and the issue of intention, and appealed his sentence of life imprisonment without parole for 14 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge and upholding the sentence as fit.

The appellant, representing the estate of Florence McLaughlin, appealed a trial decision dismissing a claim for approximately $167,878 against the estate of Ernest McLaughlin.

Ernest had been the trustee of Florence's estate and commingled its funds with his own.

Before Ernest's death, his brother Bruce, acting as successor trustee, facilitated a new will for Ernest that established a $50,000 trust for their siblings in satisfaction of the estate's obligations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that Bruce had acquiesced to this arrangement in his capacity as trustee, thereby settling the claim and binding the beneficiaries.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against a young female and sentenced to five years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction on previous disclosure and by admitting alleged oath-helping evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the lack of a limiting instruction benefited the appellant by not diluting his defence of recent fabrication, and the oath-helping evidence was inconsequential.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the term was within the proper range.

The appellant, a Catholic priest, appealed his convictions for gross indecency and indecent assault relating to historical sexual abuse of a male complainant.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's reliance on expert evidence regarding delayed recall and recovered memory to explain discrepancies in the complainant's testimony, including the appellant's arrival date and the absence of a described birthmark.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's use of the expert evidence, his assessment of the complainant's credibility, or his evaluation of the appellant's testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action arising from the birth of a child who suffered severe brain damage due to oxygen deprivation during a breech delivery.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by failing to make an explicit finding on causation, misapprehending expert evidence regarding fetal monitoring, and failing to apply the 'Breech Plus Rule' for the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the failure to explicitly determine causation did not affect the trial judge's conclusion that the obstetrician met the standard of care.

The court found the trial judge's factual findings regarding the obstetrician's decisions and the rejection of an absolute rule for breech deliveries were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellant sought a capacity assessment and visitation rights regarding her mother, who suffered from advanced Parkinson's disease and had consented to permanent gastrostomy tube feeding.

The motions judge dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction under the Substitute Decisions Act and the Health Care Consent Act, and awarded solicitor-and-client costs against the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that a capacity assessment cannot be ordered absent a pending guardianship application or reasonable grounds to doubt capacity.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the costs award and reduced it to a party-and-party scale, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify punitive costs.

Criminal appeal from convictions arising from an armed robbery, where the principal issues were the admissibility of alleged confessions and the adequacy of the challenge-for-cause process.

The court held that the voir dire was infected by legal error and a failure to scrutinize all circumstances surrounding custodial interrogations, including missing arrest records, lack of audio or video recording, allegations of assault, oppressive conditions, and right-to-counsel concerns.

The Crown failed to meet its burden of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, and one impugned statement was also inadmissible as bad character evidence.

The challenge-for-cause instructions were additionally found deficient.

Convictions were quashed and a new trial ordered.