Louise Charron

The appellant appealed his youth court convictions for offences including forced sexual intercourse, forcible confinement, and assault with a weapon against his ex-girlfriend.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made several fatal errors in assessing the evidence, including improperly excluding the appellant's spouse's testimony as hearsay, admitting highly prejudicial hearsay evidence from a police officer, and applying a double standard in assessing the credibility of the complainant versus the appellant.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed for sexual assault following a jury trial.

The Court of Appeal held the sentence was manifestly unfit given the gravity of the offence, the offender's abuse of authority, the complainant's unconsciousness, and his failure to stop when she objected.

A custodial sentence was clearly required, and the court stated that a penitentiary term would have been appropriate.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the sentence was varied to 18 months' incarceration.

The appellant's statement of defence was struck and he was subsequently noted in default.

He appealed to the Court of Appeal, seeking to set aside both the order striking his statement of defence and the noting of default.

The respondents raised a preliminary issue regarding jurisdiction, arguing the appellant must first move to set aside the noting of default under rule 19.03.

The Court of Appeal agreed and quashed the appeal, holding that a defendant must exhaust remedies in the court of first instance before an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal.

The appellant challenged convictions for multiple sexual offences against nine child complainants spanning three periods over three decades, arguing that evidence from earlier family-based abuse should not have been admitted as similar fact evidence on later allegations involving unrelated children.

The court held that similar fact evidence need not show striking similarity where identity is not in issue and credibility is central.

In the context of a multi-count indictment, the trial judge was entitled to find a sufficient pattern of opportunistic sexual predation and distinctive sexual conduct to give the evidence significant probative value outweighing prejudice.

The limiting instruction properly guarded against prohibited bad character reasoning.

The conviction appeal and the related dangerous offender appeal were dismissed.

The father appealed a trial judgment regarding child support arrears and custody, while the mother cross-appealed a condition requiring her to relocate to Ottawa to retain custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the father's appeal, upholding the reduction in support arrears and the award of custody to the mother.

The Court allowed the mother's cross-appeal, striking down the condition that she return to Ottawa, finding that uprooting the children from their established environment in Stoney Creek was not in their best interests.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and kidnapping and sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment.

At trial, the defence argued the complainant was a willing participant in an insurance fraud scheme, relying on the appellant's statement to police.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt, motive, and the failure to give a Vetrovec warning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 5-year sentence was not manifestly unreasonable despite the appellant being a first offender.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' imprisonment for a sophisticated fraud committed while on probation for another crime of dishonesty.

The majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding it was not demonstrably unfit given the aggravating circumstances, including the appellant's prior record and lack of remorse.

Laskin J.A. dissented, finding the sentence unfit based on recent sentencing decisions.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the appeal judge exhibited bias during the hearing.

The Court of Appeal found that while the appeal judge's remarks were rude and intemperate, they did not reach the level of actual or apparent bias.

The Court further held that there was no basis to interfere with the trial decision, as the Justice of the Peace was entitled to accept the police officer's testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent, a partner in an accounting firm, accepted a directorship with a corporate client of the firm.

While he disclosed the directorship and remitted his director's fees to the partnership, he failed to disclose his entitlement to shares and stock options under the client's key employee stock plan.

After the partnership dissolved, the appellants sought an accounting of these benefits.

The Court of Appeal held that the respondent breached his fiduciary duty and his statutory duty of disclosure under the Partnerships Act.

The court found that the shares and options were compensatory benefits derived from a transaction concerning the partnership and from the use of a partnership business connection.

The respondent was ordered to account to his former partners for their proportionate share of the benefits realized.

The appellant, a youth, was convicted of sexual interference and breach of probation involving a 5-year-old complainant.

The trial judge framed the central issue as a credibility contest between the complainant and the appellant, ultimately rejecting the appellant's testimony on the basis that he had a motive to lie to avoid conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred by failing to apply the W.(D.) test for assessing credibility and reasonable doubt, and by erroneously assuming the appellant's testimony was inherently suspect, which violated the presumption of innocence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, as well as his four-year sentence.

The offences arose from an altercation at a party where the complainant was attacked with broken beer bottles.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt, the absence of a witness, the response to a jury question, and the use of the complainant's criminal record.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the jury instructions, noting that the charge as a whole properly conveyed the burden of proof.

The court also upheld the sentence, finding that the disparity between the appellant's sentence and his co-accused's conditional sentence was justified by their differing levels of involvement and personal circumstances.

The appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their wrongful dismissal claim against the individual respondent, a corporate officer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the statement of claim failed to plead material facts giving rise to an independent claim against the officer in his individual capacity.

The allegations of inducing breach of contract and tortious misrepresentation were deemed insufficient to establish personal liability.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual interference against his former partner's son.

The appellant argued the trial judge made several errors, including improperly using neutral evidence to buttress the complainant's credibility, applying an uneven standard to criminal records, improperly using a prior consistent statement, and misapprehending evidence regarding inconsistencies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material errors in the trial judge's assessment of credibility or evidence.

The appellant father appealed an order requiring him to pay child support in accordance with the Ontario Child Support Guidelines.

A 1985 court order had previously required him to pay a $4,000 lump sum for child support and denied him access.

The mother later married and her new husband assumed financial responsibility for the child.

Following her separation from the new husband, the mother applied for child support from the appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the enactment of the Guidelines created an automatic right to vary pre-existing child support orders without needing to prove a material change in circumstances.

The Court also found that while the prior arrangements could constitute 'special provisions' under s. 37(2.3) of the Family Law Act, it would not be inequitable to apply the Guidelines in this case.

The appellant condominium corporation and the original developer entered into a reciprocal agreement to share expenses for a recreational facility.

The developer's successor in title, the respondent, refused to pay the interim expenses.

The appellant argued that the positive covenant to pay expenses ran with the land or was enforceable under the English benefit and burden or conditional grant exceptions.

The Court of Appeal held that positive covenants do not run with freehold land and declined to adopt the English exceptions, stating that any reform to this area of property law must be undertaken by the legislature.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant solicitor appealed an order requiring him to fulfill a solicitor's undertaking to repay a $50,000 loan to the respondent from mortgage financing.

The appellant breached the undertaking by paying the funds directly to the debtor.

The appellant argued the debt had already been paid by the debtor but provided only an affidavit based on information and belief, contrary to Rule 39.01(5).

The applications judge refused an adjournment to summons the debtor and ordered the appellant to pay the sum plus prejudgment interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that solicitors must be strictly accountable for their undertakings and noting the lack of admissible evidence supporting the appellant's claims.

The provincial government cancelled the Niagara Tender Fruit Lands Program and breached a contract to purchase a restrictive covenant from the respondent landowners.

The arbitrator awarded the landowners the full purchase price of the covenant plus consequential damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that awarding the full purchase price amounted to double recovery, as the landowners retained their unencumbered land and regained the freedom to sell it.

The award for the purchase price was deleted, but the award for consequential interest costs was upheld and increased.

The appellant mother appealed an order varying a consent order and awarding custody of her seven-year-old son to the respondent father.

The trial judge had found a material change in circumstances based on the father disclosing the child's existence to his wife, and relied on an assessor's report criticizing the mother's attitude towards the father.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the disclosure did not constitute a material change in circumstances.

Furthermore, the Court held that the trial judge erred by placing undue emphasis on the mother's conduct without sufficient evidence that it had a detrimental effect on the child, who was developing well.

Custody was restored to the mother with generous access to the father.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed after guilty pleas to two counts of sexual interference and one count of sexual assault involving young adolescent victims.

The court held that the sentence was manifestly unfit given the serious and repeated sexual violations, the sentencing judge's improper attribution of blame to the victims, and the respondent's repeated breaches of court-imposed release conditions.

The respondent's admitted attraction to young men, absence of a relevant treatment plan, and poor compliance history made him a poor candidate for a community-based sentence.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to 18 months' imprisonment less credit for time served under the conditional sentence, resulting in 6 months' incarceration.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial.

During cross-examination, the Crown questioned the appellant about his association with two individuals who had been convicted of drug importing, despite no evidence linking them to the appellant's charges.

The trial judge failed to caution the jury against drawing an adverse inference of guilt by association.

The Court of Appeal held that the improper cross-examination and lack of a limiting instruction resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.