Louise Charron

The appellant's former solicitor obtained a charging order under the Solicitors Act against all sums receivable by the appellant under a divorce judgment, including spousal support arrears, for unpaid legal fees.

The appellant appealed the order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that as a matter of law and public policy, charging orders should not be made against spousal support payments, as support is distinct from property and is intended to address demonstrable need.

The appellant appealed his manslaughter conviction, arguing his statements to the police were involuntary.

The trial judge found that an officer had assaulted the appellant in an elevator prior to the interview but ruled the subsequent statements voluntary because they were not temporally connected to the assault.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge misapprehended the test for voluntariness, as the assault undermined the officers' credibility and the temporal connection was not broken.

The statements were ruled involuntary and inadmissible.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder after shooting the victim in the back of the head outside a courthouse.

At trial, the appellant claimed he acted in self-defence, fearing the victim would attack him due to previous gang-related shootings.

The trial judge refused to leave self-defence to the jury and excluded expert psychological evidence regarding post-traumatic stress disorder.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no air of reality to the defence of self-defence because there was no evidence of an imminent or reasonably apprehended attack at the time of the shooting.

The court also upheld the exclusion of the expert evidence and dismissed the sentence appeal, affirming the 8-year imprisonment term.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action arising from a perforated bowel suffered during a colonoscopy and polypectomy.

They argued the trial judge erred by failing to determine the exact cause of the injury before concluding the standard of care was met.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly rejected the appellants' theory that the electrocautery machine was set too high, and reasonably concluded the injury resulted from an inherent risk of the procedure.

The appellant appealed an order of the Divisional Court regarding the partition of property.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the standard to refuse partition under s. 2 of the Partition Act requires malicious, vexatious, or oppressive conduct, as established in Silva v. Silva.

The court agreed with the Divisional Court that the appellant failed to demonstrate such conduct.

An alternative argument regarding child support under s. 32 of the Family Law Act was dismissed as it was not raised before the motions judge and lacked an evidentiary record.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $7,500.

The 68-year-old appellant pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The sentencing judge rejected a joint submission for a conditional sentence of two years less a day, citing a lack of community resources to supervise the sentence, and imposed 18 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred by relying on his own knowledge of community resources without a record and by expecting surveillance officers to enforce the sentence.

The appeal was allowed and a 14-month conditional sentence was imposed.

The respondents, who operated a horse farm, were sued by a horse trainer who sustained injuries after falling from a horse.

The trainer initially pleaded she was an employee, but later amended her claim to remove references to employment, as the respondents' farm liability insurance policy excluded coverage for employees.

The insurer refused to defend the action, arguing the pleadings were manipulated and seeking to introduce extrinsic evidence to prove the trainer was an employee.

The applications judge declared the insurer had a duty to defend and declined to consider the extrinsic evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal, holding that the duty to defend is determined by the pleadings and the policy, and that extrinsic evidence cannot be used to make premature findings of fact on matters at issue in the underlying tort litigation.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexual offences.

He argued the trial judge rendered inconsistent verdicts by convicting him of some acts and acquitting him of others based on the same complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the allegations were logically severable and the acquittals did not imply the complainant was untruthful.

The court also dismissed grounds relating to incomplete Crown disclosure and the trial judge's approach to a conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed an order precluding him from contesting the respondent's financial claims due to his blatant disregard for court orders, specifically his refusal to make financial disclosure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the preclusion regarding financial claims and found his claim for custody unrealistic, as he had not seen the nine-year-old child in almost five years.

However, the Court modified the order to allow the appellant to maintain his answer to the counter-petition solely on the question of access.

Following the release of its decision on the appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario received and considered written submissions on costs.

The court awarded costs of the appeal to the respondent, fixed at $4,500 inclusive of GST.

The appellant husband appealed the dismissal of his motion for judgment based on an alleged settlement between the parties.

The Court of Appeal found that the wife's Offer to Settle and the husband's acceptance did not constitute a binding contract, as the offer left open the future negotiation of a shareholders agreement and was conditional upon further documentation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was convicted of possession of instruments adapted and intended to be used to commit forgery and sentenced to 11 months' imprisonment followed by one year of probation.

After the Supreme Court of Canada restored his convictions, the Court of Appeal considered his sentence appeal.

The Court found no error in principle by the trial judge but reduced the sentence to six months' imprisonment to account for the almost five years the appellant spent on bail pending appeal without breaching his conditions.

The appellant appealed a finding that she breached a condition of her conditional sentence by failing to report to a drug rehabilitation program.

She argued the appeal was moot, the hearing did not commence within the 30-day statutory limit under s. 742.6(3) of the Criminal Code, and the judge erred in finding a breach.

The Court of Appeal held the appeal was not moot, the hearing commenced within the required time when the judge took jurisdiction, and the obligation to attend the program was continuous.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a successful appeal, the appellants submitted a Bill of Costs which the respondents consented to.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the appellants on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $13,293.91 inclusive of GST and disbursements.

The court also directed an amendment to the reasons for judgment to add co-counsel for the respondents.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict that dismissed his motor vehicle accident claim, finding no negligence on the part of the respondent driver and assessing damages at zero.

The appellant argued the verdict was perverse and that the trial judge made several procedural and instructional errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury was entitled to reject the appellant's evidence based on credibility issues and that the trial judge made no errors in the conduct of the trial or her instructions to the jury.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of indecent assault against his two step-daughters for incidents occurring between 1975 and 1980.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in treating the complainants' evidence as mutually confirmatory, in assessing credibility, and in dismissing an application for third-party records from the Children's Aid Society.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence's probative value outweighed its prejudice and that the third-party records did not meet the test for likely relevance.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant's sleep apnea was adequately accommodated in custody.

The parties, two dentists, practised together under a Cost Sharing Agreement containing an arbitration clause.

After their relationship broke down, the respondent sued for breach of contract, conversion, and malicious prosecution.

The appellant moved for a stay of proceedings under s. 7 of the Arbitration Act, which the motions judge dismissed on the basis that the malicious prosecution claim fell outside the arbitration agreement and the matters could not easily be separated.

The Court of Appeal held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal because a finding that a dispute falls outside an arbitration agreement is not barred by s. 7(6).

The Court upheld the motions judge's decision, finding no error in the refusal to grant a partial stay.

The parties separated in 1989.

The husband, a disbarred lawyer who had been incarcerated for fraud, brought a claim for equalization of net family property in 1997, two years after the limitation period expired.

He moved for an extension of time under s. 2(8) of the Family Law Act.

The motions judge dismissed the motion, finding the husband did not meet the requirements of good faith and lack of substantial prejudice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the husband's appeal, finding that he failed to show apparent grounds for relief given the wife's overwhelming claim for an unequal division, and that his delay was not incurred in good faith.

Following the release of the majority reasons for judgment dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal received written submissions on costs.

Having regard to the respondents' success, the complexity and novelty of the issues, and the equities between the parties, the court awarded the respondents their costs on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $38,000 all inclusive.

The respondent operated a public parking garage as a legal non-conforming use under a new comprehensive zoning by-law.

The new by-law contained performance standards identical to those in the former by-law.

The respondent introduced valet parking, which contravened these performance standards, and was convicted of breaching the by-law.

The conviction was quashed on appeal, but the Court of Appeal allowed the municipality's appeal and restored the conviction.

The Court held that subjecting a legal non-conforming use to performance standards identical to those in place when the use was acquired does not prevent the use of the property within the meaning of the Planning Act.