Louise Charron

The appellants' properties were damaged by a gas explosion caused by the intentional criminal act (arson) of the defendant David Gordon.

The respondent insurer denied coverage to both David Gordon and his wife, Dora Gordon, under a homeowner's policy exclusion for damage caused by the criminal act of 'any person insured by this policy'.

The appellants opposed the insurer's summary judgment motion to protect their potential rights of recovery.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's finding that the clear and unambiguous language of the exclusion clause bound the innocent co-insured to the misconduct of her spouse, thereby excluding coverage for both defendants.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict dismissing their crossclaim against the respondent trailer manufacturer following a fatal motor vehicle accident.

The jury found the accident was caused solely by the negligence of the appellant driver and transport company.

On appeal, the appellants argued the verdict was unreasonable and challenged several evidentiary rulings, including the admission of a deceased driver's statement and log book entries, and the exclusion of coroner's inquest findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury's verdict was amply supported by the evidence and the trial judge made no errors in his evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sought leave to appeal his sentence of two years less a day.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting similar act evidence, failing to resolve an alleged recantation by a witness, and failing to properly consider collusion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the admission of the similar act evidence and noting the verdict was amply supported by the uncontradicted evidence of the complainant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant was in a position of trust, the abuse occurred over six years, and he had a prior criminal record.

The appellants pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death, abandoning children, and fraud after leaving their five children in the care of a 10-year-old, during which time their six-month-old infant choked to death.

On appeal, they sought to introduce fresh evidence claiming they had left the children with an adult relative, which the court rejected as not reasonably capable of belief.

The court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the guilty pleas were properly accepted.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal on a joint submission, finding the sentencing judge erred in holding that a conditional sentence was unavailable for fraud involving a breach of trust, and imposed a nine-month conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, threatening death, unlawful confinement, and breach of undertaking, as well as his designation as a long-term offender.

The offences were committed against his wife over an eight-day period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the complainant's evidence and the verdict was not unreasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the long-term offender designation was well founded on evidence of a pattern of spousal abuse and a substantial risk of re-offending.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against his step-daughter.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on reasonable doubt and seeking to introduce fresh evidence of post-trial statements by the complainant and her mother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions complied with W.(D.) and Lifchus, and the proposed fresh evidence was not credible, reliable, or capable of affecting the verdict.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence of eight years for assault causing bodily harm, robbery, extortion, forcible confinement, aggravated assault, and theft over.

The charges arose from a vicious beating and robbery where the appellant was identified by eyewitnesses and ATM surveillance footage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to exclude the appellant's criminal record under Corbett, the admission of evidence regarding a child witness's identification, or the handling of a Crown interruption during closing arguments.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the disparity between the appellant's sentence and his co-accused's was justified by the appellant's role as the instigator and his prior record.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board directing his detention at a mental health facility with limited community access and a driving prohibition.

The disposition was made despite expert evidence indicating the appellant's risk of violence from alcohol abuse could be managed through supervised administration of antabuse while living in the community.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the expert evidence and did not explain why the imposed conditions satisfied the criteria under section 672.54(c) of the Criminal Code.

A new hearing was ordered.

The Assistant Commissioner applied for leave to appeal, raising issues regarding the standard of review by the Divisional Court.

The appellant moved to quash the application, arguing the Assistant Commissioner lacked standing.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and adjourned the motion to quash to be determined by the panel hearing the appeal.

The plaintiff employer settled a claim arising from its employee's fraudulent issuance of a performance bond, providing a release to the third-party contractor.

The release promised not to sue anyone who might claim contribution or indemnity from the contractor.

The plaintiff subsequently sued the employee, who then third-partied the contractor.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to stay the plaintiff's action and the third-party claim as an abuse of process, finding that the plaintiff's undertaking not to seek amounts recoverable from the contractor was an impermissible unilateral amendment to the clear terms of the release.

The respondent was acquitted of operating a heavy diesel-fuelled motor vehicle that contravened emission standards under O. Reg. 361/98.

The justice of the peace acquitted the respondent because the Crown had not proved the Drive Clean Guide, which was incorporated by reference into the regulation.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under s. 5(4) of the Regulations Act, the justice of the peace was required to take judicial notice of the regulation and the Guide incorporated within it.

The acquittal was set aside and a conviction entered.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent employee 18 months' notice for wrongful dismissal, damages for mental distress, punitive damages, and solicitor-and-client costs.

The employee had suffered a workplace injury and was persistently harassed by the employer to return to work, causing her severe emotional distress and physical illness.

The Court of Appeal reduced the notice period to 12 months and set aside the punitive damages and costs awards.

However, the Court upheld the $15,000 award for mental distress, finding that the employer's extreme and insensitive harassment constituted the independent tort of intentional infliction of mental suffering.

The appellant appealed a custodial sentence imposed after a guilty plea to historical indecent assaults against a young male.

Applying the conditional sentence framework from Proulx, the court considered both the risk of reoffending and the gravity of potential harm, together with the extent to which strict community conditions could reduce any danger.

Fresh psychiatric and psychological evidence, coupled with lengthy compliance on bail under house arrest and sustained treatment participation, demonstrated that the appellant had become a low risk to reoffend and was suitable for management in the community.

The court held that rehabilitation remained a primary sentencing objective in this type of case where it was realistically achievable, allowed the appeal, and substituted a further two-month conditional sentence plus probation.

The Ontario Energy Board stated a case to the Divisional Court regarding the applicability of O. Reg. 365/00 to applications under s. 92 of the Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998.

The Divisional Court quashed the stated case, finding the Board was functus officio, had not made necessary findings of fact, and lacked jurisdiction to ask if a regulation is valid.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that s. 32(1) allows the Board to state a case even if not tied to a pending application, does not strictly require prior findings of fact, and permits questions regarding the boundaries of the Board's jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing its action for payment for installing a subsurface drainage system and awarding damages on the respondent's counterclaim for crop losses due to improper drainage.

The trial judge found the system inadequate due to soil conditions, the filter used, and installation in wet conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable error in the trial judge's factual findings.

The Court also upheld the damages award, noting the limitation of liability clause was not incorporated into the agreement or pleaded.

The Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal appealed a Superior Court decision quashing its interim order that allowed a subset of tenants to testify on behalf of over 300 tenants in a rent abatement application.

The Superior Court had ruled the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to authorize what it characterized as a representative action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal's order did not create a representative action but rather approved an expeditious procedural method for introducing oral evidence in a combined multi-party application, which was within its jurisdiction under the Tenant Protection Act, 1997 and the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The appellants appealed a judgment dismissing their claims for damages after the appellant slipped and fell in her apartment building's parking lot.

They argued the trial judge erred in admitting hospital and ambulance records regarding the mechanism of the fall, allowing them to be used as prior inconsistent statements, and in instructing the jury on the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the records were properly admitted as circumstantial evidence of prior inconsistent statements and the jury instructions on reasonable care were appropriate.

Following the release of the court's judgment, the appellant failed to file written submissions regarding the remaining property issues affected by the respondent's bankruptcy.

Consequently, the appeal with respect to all remaining issues was dismissed as abandoned.

The court fixed the costs of the appeal payable to the respondent at $12,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after shooting a 16-year-old girl with a sawed-off shotgun during a home invasion robbery.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructions regarding planning and deliberation, forcible confinement, re-examination of a Crown witness, and the limited use of a defence witness's preliminary inquiry testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the first three grounds.

While the trial judge erred in failing to give a limiting instruction on the preliminary inquiry testimony, the Court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding the error caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

Following the release of reasons for judgment on May 17, 2002, the Court of Appeal received the respondents' Bill of Costs and written submissions from the parties.

Having regard to the success on appeal, the legal issues raised, and the submissions, the court awarded the respondents their costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $10,500 inclusive of Goods and Services Tax and disbursements.