Second degree murder

The court determines the appropriate period of parole ineligibility for Craig Brooks, convicted of second-degree murder.

After reviewing the facts, victim impact statements, the character of the offender, and relevant case law, the court imposes a 15-year period of parole ineligibility, considering both aggravating and mitigating factors, including the lack of remorse and pretrial custody conditions.

The court sentenced Ciro Garofano to life imprisonment with 18 years of parole ineligibility for second-degree murder, and concurrent 10-year sentences for two counts of aggravated assault.

The decision details the circumstances of the offences, the impact on the victims and their families, and the aggravating and mitigating factors considered.

The court reviewed the statutory framework for parole ineligibility, relevant case law, and the fit sentence in light of the facts and sentencing principles.

The court sentenced Chawn Lemieux for second-degree murder following a public shooting in Ottawa.

The decision reviews the statutory and case law considerations for setting the period of parole ineligibility, including the nature and circumstances of the offence, the character of the offender, jury recommendations, and victim impact statements.

After reviewing comparable case law, the court imposed a life sentence with 16 years of parole ineligibility, emphasizing the aggravating factors of public danger, prior record, and use of a firearm, while also considering Lemieux’s youth, difficult upbringing, and prospects for rehabilitation.

The court sentenced Daniel Keefe to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility for 10 years after a jury found him guilty of second degree murder.

The decision reviews the facts of the offence, the impact on the victim’s family, the legal parameters for sentencing, and the positions of Crown and defence.

The court accepted a joint submission for the minimum period of parole ineligibility, citing the offender’s youth, lack of criminal record, and absence of aggravating factors.

Ancillary orders were also imposed, including a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, and non-communication orders.

The accused, Khalid Mohamed, was charged with second degree murder in the stabbing death of Steven Burns.

The facts were largely undisputed: Mohamed stabbed Burns, causing his death.

The central issue was whether Mohamed acted in self-defence or whether provocation would reduce the charge to manslaughter.

The court found that Mohamed had been robbed and assaulted by Burns and others, and that Mohamed stabbed Burns during a struggle for control of a knife.

The court concluded that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mohamed’s actions were unreasonable in the circumstances, and acquitted him of second degree murder.

The court found Dylan Sherief not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for the second-degree murder of Nicola Maiorano.

The decision reviews the legal test for criminal responsibility, the psychiatric evidence, and the facts of the case, concluding that Mr. Sherief’s schizoaffective disorder rendered him incapable of assessing the moral wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the offence.

The court ordered that Mr. Sherief be remanded to the Ontario Review Board for disposition.

The decision concerns the actus reus of two counts of second degree murder and one count of attempted murder.

Alpha Henry was found guilty of unlawfully causing the deaths of his parents, Veronica and Colin Henry, and attempting to murder his brother, Daniel Henry.

The court found the evidence against the accused overwhelming, including forensic, video, and circumstantial evidence, and rejected the defence theory that Daniel was the true perpetrator.

This decision concerns the sentencing of Mr. Brad Southwind for second-degree murder.

The court determined the period of parole ineligibility, which is set at 15 years.

The judge considered aggravating factors such as the brutal nature of the crime (17 stab wounds), elements of planning, and the offender's lengthy criminal record with violent entries.

Mitigating factors included the offender's indigenous background (Gladue factors), severe mental health issues (drug-induced psychosis), and substance abuse, which impacted his ability to participate in reports.

Despite the need for judicial restraint for Indigenous offenders, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence due to the heinous nature of the crime and the offender's violent history.

This decision concerns a youth sentence review for N.M., who pleaded guilty to second-degree murder.

N.M. sought to convert the balance of his custodial term to community supervision, which the Crown opposed.

The court granted N.M.'s application, finding that he met the high standard required for early conditional supervision.

The judge emphasized N.M.'s significant rehabilitative progress, strong personal support network, and criticized the provincial government's handling of his transition from youth to adult correctional facilities, which hindered his rehabilitation.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to admit three videos and the victim's criminal record to support a self-defence claim.

The defence argued this evidence would demonstrate the victim's violent disposition and the reasonableness of the accused's apprehension of violence.

The Crown conceded the admissibility of two videos but opposed the third and the criminal record.

The court granted the application, finding the evidence highly probative of the victim's propensity for violence and the risk of harm perceived by the accused, concluding that its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The appellant, Emmanuel Owusu-Ansah, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and the imposed sentence of life imprisonment with a 22-year parole ineligibility period.

The appeal raised four issues: reasonable apprehension of judicial bias due to repeated interjections, erroneous admission of prior discreditable conduct evidence, incorrect and inadequate jury instruction on provocation, and an unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, upholding the admission of prior conduct evidence as probative of motive and context, affirming the jury instruction on provocation, and deeming the sentence fit given the horrific nature of the murder and the appellant's prior domestic abuse convictions.

N.M., a young person convicted of second-degree murder, sought a variation of his youth sentence under s. 94 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, requesting release into the community.

The Crown sought to confirm the sentence.

The court reviewed N.M.'s progress and institutional conduct, noting significant issues with his placement in adult maximum security facilities post-sentence, which hindered his rehabilitation.

Despite these systemic failures and N.M.'s positive attitude, the court found that N.M. had not yet met the burden to justify a sentence variation.

The sentence was confirmed, but an earlier optional review was scheduled for June 2024, acknowledging N.M.'s progress and the system's shortcomings.

The appellant, Awale Hussein, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and sought leave to appeal the parole ineligibility component of his sentence.

The conviction appeal was based on alleged errors in dismissing a Corbett application (allowing cross-examination on his criminal record) and in the jury charge regarding police investigation inadequacies.

The sentence appeal argued errors in disregarding juror recommendations for parole ineligibility and treating absence of motive as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in principle or unreasonable exercises of discretion by the trial judge.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed on three grounds: the trial judge's alleged errors in jury instructions regarding after-the-fact conduct evidence and the relationship between intoxication and accident, and the unreasonableness of the verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's comprehensive and fair instructions on after-the-fact conduct, which were vetted by the parties and relevant to the appellant's state of mind.

The court also found no reversible error in the intoxication instructions, noting that the jury was properly equipped to consider all evidence.

Finally, the court concluded that the second-degree murder verdict was reasonable, as there was sufficient inculpatory evidence for a properly instructed jury to reach that conclusion.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with 15 years parole ineligibility.

He appealed his conviction, arguing errors in admitting his utterance to police, the Crown's improper firearm demonstration during closing arguments, and confusing jury instructions on motive.

He also appealed his sentence as unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, finding no error in the admission of the utterance (appellant was not detained), no unfairness regarding the firearm demonstration, and no confusion in motive instructions.

The Court also dismissed the appeal from sentence, finding it fit and within the appropriate range, considering aggravating factors such as intimate partner violence and breach of trust.

The appellant, Michael Laforme, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and sought leave to appeal his sentence of life imprisonment with a 16-year period of parole ineligibility.

The conviction appeal alleged errors in the trial judge's jury charge, specifically regarding the understanding of legal principles, fairness, balance, and warnings about post-offence conduct evidence.

The sentence appeal argued that the trial judge failed to give meaningful effect to Gladue principles, resulting in an unduly harsh sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge and affirming that the sentencing judge properly considered Gladue principles while balancing other relevant factors, including the brutality of the offence and the appellant's extensive criminal record.

The applicant sought a review of a bail judge's order denying bail pending trial for second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal found that the bail judge erred in principle by failing to adequately consider the proposed release plan, which included strict house arrest, electronic monitoring, and committed sureties, when assessing the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

The court allowed the application, set aside the detention order, and ordered the applicant's release on approved terms.

The appellants, Jasmine and Richard Doxtator, appealed their first-degree murder convictions.

Their primary argument was that the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury on the included offences of second-degree murder and manslaughter for Jasmine Doxtator, which they argued also impacted Richard Doxtator's trial.

The Court of Appeal, in a majority decision, agreed that there was an "air of reality" to the lesser included offences for Jasmine Doxtator, and the trial judge's failure to leave these options to the jury constituted a legal error that tainted the verdict for both appellants.

The court rejected the Crown's argument to apply the curative proviso.

Consequently, the appeals were allowed, and a new trial was ordered for both Jasmine and Richard Doxtator.

This decision concerns a bail application by Isaah Picody-Naveau, who is charged with second-degree murder and other criminal code offences, including domestic violence.

The applicant sought bail under sections 515 and 522 of the Criminal Code, while the Crown applied under section 524(8) to cancel his prior release.

The court considered the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for detention.

Despite the applicant's history of breaching release orders and violent temper, the court granted bail.

Key factors influencing the decision included the significant time spent in custody (over 315 days), a compelling Gladue report highlighting intergenerational trauma and a difficult upbringing, a strong proposed release plan relying on family sureties and GPS monitoring, and the perceived weakness of the Crown's second-degree murder case, particularly regarding the mens rea element.

The court emphasized the presumption of innocence and the right to reasonable bail as articulated in R. v. Antic.

The appellant, Jessy Herlichka, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing three errors by the trial judge: flawed instructions on the defence of intoxication, refusal to qualify a proposed defence expert in a specific area of expertise, and an inadequate curative instruction after a Crown witness suggested the appellant murdered the victim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions on intoxication, the limitation of expert testimony, or the curative instruction, concluding that the jury was properly equipped to determine the requisite state of mind for murder.