Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Court File No.: CR-22-11401034
Date: 2025/05/29
Between:
His Majesty the King
and
Chawn Lemieux, Accused
Siobhain Wetscher for the Crown
Alison Craig for Mr. Lemieux
Heard: Sentencing Submissions December 12, 2024, oral decision given May 5, 2025
Reasons for Sentence
Anne London-Weinstein
Introduction
[1] On June 27, 2024, Chawn Lemieux was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder in relation to the shooting death of Abdulhamid Haji Ragab.
[2] By virtue of ss. 235(1) and 745(c) of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, Mr. Lemieux automatically receives a life sentence without eligibility for parole until he has served at least 10 years. Pursuant to s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code, the court is permitted, after considering Mr. Lemieux’s character, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence and the recommendation of the jury, to increase the period of parole ineligibility from 10 years to a maximum of 25 years.
[3] In R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 237, para 27, Iacobucci J. made the following comment regarding the exercise of this discretion:
[A]s a general rule, the period of parole ineligibility should be for 10 years but this can be ousted by a determination of the trial judge that, according to the criteria enumerated in s. 744, the offender should wait a longer period before having his suitability to be released into the general public assessed. To this end an extension of the period of parole ineligibility would not be “unusual”, although it may well be that, in the median number of cases, a period of 10 years might still be awarded.
The Statutory Considerations
i. The Nature of the Offence and the Circumstances Surrounding Its Commission
[4] I begin the analysis with a consideration of the nature of the offence itself and the circumstances surrounding its commission.
[5] Mr. Lemieux testified in his own defence that on July 5, 2022, he drove a rented Chevrolet Malibu, which he had rented in Toronto on June 26, 2022, from his mother’s home in Alfred, Ontario to sell cocaine. He received a call from a “Randy Hoskins” which brought him to the Ledbury-Banff neighbourhood. He testified that he wore a COVID-19 mask after being in a store and must have forgotten to take it off. He sold the cocaine to Mr. Hoskins and then after checking his phone, went on his way. However, he testified that he missed the turn off onto Bank Street and had to turn back. After he did so, he drove by what he called an alleyway, but which is clearly a pathway with cement posts in the centre of it to prevent cars from driving through. Mr. Abdulhamid Haji Ragab was walking along the pathway.
[6] Mr. Lemieux fired five shots out of the passenger window of the rental vehicle he was driving. Mr. Haji Ragab was struck in the forehead, abdomen and thigh.
[7] The shooting was captured on video. Mr. Haji Ragab succumbed to his injuries. Mr. Lemieux admitted that he shot Mr. Haji Ragab, but testified that it was an accident, that he was merely test-firing the Glock pistol to see if it worked. He testified that he had been previously shot himself and carried the gun for protection as part of his dangerous work as a drug dealer.
[8] The community of Ledbury-Banff is an economically disadvantaged community. Gun violence is not unheard of. Residents who testified in this trial testified that they recognized the sound of gun fire, having heard it previously.
[9] On the day in question, members of the community were going about their daily lives. The court heard evidence from workers at a community centre that staff training was underway for a summer camp. Children were outside playing. People were walking around on the community walkways. Moments before Mr. Haji Ragab was shot, a child was captured on video, walking, in the very spot where Mr. Haji Ragab was murdered.
[10] In the aftermath of the shooting, Mr. Lemieux shopped for luxury watches and was trying to arrange a short stay at an Airbnb with his girlfriend.
[11] Mr. Lemieux now faces sentencing by this court.
[12] The court must observe the sentencing principle of proportionality; crafting a sentence which, on the facts of the case, reflects the moral culpability of the offender and the gravity of the offence. The need for denunciation and deterrence is obvious in a case like this one, which was a drive-by shooting in a busy residential neighbourhood in the middle of a sunny summer day when people were outside. However, I must not lose sight of Mr. Lemieux’s prospects for rehabilitation, although I have placed less weight on that factor in this case given the strong need for denunciation and deterrence.
[13] Pursuant to s. 724(2) of the Criminal Code, I must accept as proven all facts, express or implied, that are essential to the jury’s verdict of guilty of second-degree murder.
[14] The jury rejected the defence of intoxication and the rolled-up charge which would have reduced murder to manslaughter.
[15] Section 724(2) further provides that in addition to accepting any facts that were essential to the jury’s verdict, the judge may find to be proven any other relevant fact that was disclosed by the evidence during the trial. Generally, disputed facts must be established on a balance of probabilities. However, if the fact is an aggravated fact, the judge must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there is a dispute with respect to any “other relevant fact”, further evidence is required unless the sentencing judge is satisfied that sufficient evidence was adduced at trial.
[16] Sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to convince me of the following additional facts:
I. Mr. Lemieux armed himself with a loaded handgun which he carried with him somewhere in his vehicle before making his way to the Ledbury-Banff neighbourhood on July 5, 2022.
II. Mr. Haji Ragab was walking on a public path in the community and was unarmed. Moments before the shooting, a young child was in the very spot where Mr. Haji Ragab was shot.
III. One of the bullets fired from Mr. Lemieux’s gun pierced a kitchen window at 1255A Ledbury Street. Moments earlier, a young man had been standing in that spot and microwaving his lunch, after taking a break from studying.
IV. The community was busy that morning. Staff were present to train for the summer camp offered to the children of the community. People can be seen on the timeline video walking through the neighbourhood.
V. When Mr. Lemieux was arrested, he had $20,060 in his possession.
VI. He was a trafficker of cocaine at the time of the shooting.
VII. He carried his gun for protection.
VIII. The passenger seat of the vehicle was pushed back to give Mr. Lemieux access to the window to shoot the victim.
IX. Mr. Lemieux wore a mask to conceal his identity when he shot the victim. Mr. Lemieux testified that he must have simply forgotten to remove his mask, which was worn for protection against COVID-19. I rejected his evidence on this issue, and I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Lemieux wore the mask to conceal his identity at the time of the shooting.
X. Mr. Lemieux discarded the firearm after the shooting.
ii. The Character of the Offender
[17] The pre-sentence report filed in this matter, along with letters filed on behalf of Mr. Lemieux, provided insight into his character and background.
[18] Mr. Lemieux had a difficult upbringing, having been raised by his mother alone. His childhood was described as “rough and filled with many barriers and difficulties.” This was also evidenced by Mr. Lemieux’s evidence. His mother also indicated in writing that she believed that her son grew up believing that his father had rejected him. As a child, he was exposed to violence within the family home due to his mother’s abusive partnerships. Mr. Lemieux was removed from his mother’s care at age 13 and placed in group homes.
[19] He has youth entries, including for breaching an undertaking when he was just 13 years old. He has multiple convictions for violent crimes, including robberies, various forms of assault as well as drug and firearms offences. He received his first adult conviction in 2014 when he was 18. He received a penitentiary sentence. It was while serving this sentence that he was convicted of assault causing bodily harm for throwing hot water on another inmate causing that individual serious injury in the form of burns. This resulted in a further period of incarceration.
[20] Mr. Lemieux was not able to complete his high school diploma in Cornwall. He was also enrolled in the St. John Bosch Achievement Center at the completion of his youth probationary period but was removed from the Center as a result of absenteeism. Mr. Lemieux’s probation officer registered him in summer school for July of 2016, but he did not attend.
[21] Mr. Lemieux has a history of refusing assistance in the form of counselling. For example, the author of the pre-sentence report noted that Mr. Lemieux had what the author described as a “macho man” attitude, and he was resistant to support from numerous agencies which might have been of benefit to him.
[22] He informed his probation officer in 2018 that he did not believe that seeing a psychologist or doing counselling would benefit him, but would only bring him down. He was shot in 2018 and experienced depression and post-traumatic stress disorder.
[23] At the time of the murder, Mr. Lemieux was 22 years old and was addicted to drugs, specifically opiates like Percocet. Mr. Lemieux has a criminal record, including a 2018 conviction for possession of a firearm for which he received a sentence of 392 days.
[24] Mr. Lemieux testified that he was a drug dealer who carried the Glock pistol used in this case for personal protection due to the dangerous nature of his work.
Valerie Pichette
[25] Ms. Pichette is a friend of Mr. Lemieux’s sister, Paige. Ms. Pichette visited Mr. Lemieux at the Ottawa Carleton Detention Centre (OCDC). She is of the view, based on her meeting with Mr. Lemieux, that he takes responsibility for his “reckless actions” and is committed to making positive changes in his life.
[26] I note that the jury rejected the notion that Mr. Lemieux was simply test-firing his gun and recklessly struck Mr. Haji Ragab in so doing. The jury found that Mr. Lemieux had the specific intent to kill.
Sarah Dobson
[27] Ms. Dobson said that she has known Mr. Lemieux since he was a young boy and described him as a kind and caring person. She expressed her deepest condolences to the victim’s family, who she noted had suffered an unimaginable loss.
[28] Ms. Dobson was a close friend of Mr. Lemieux’s sister growing up and spent time with the Lemieux family. Ms. Dobson indicated that Mr. Lemieux grew up in a challenging neighbourhood. Ms. Dobson lost touch with him over the years, but upon learning of his imprisonment, has spoken with him several times a week and visited him on multiple occasions at the OCDC.
[29] Ms. Dobson said that Mr. Lemieux felt immense remorse for his actions. She asked the court to consider his age, 25, his remorse and his rehabilitation plan when determining his parole ineligibility.
Suzanne Lemieux
[30] Mr. Lemieux’s mother asked the court to demonstrate compassion when sentencing her son. She indicated she was overwhelmed with grief and sadness at what has transpired and found it hard to write to the court to express her feelings.
[31] She strongly believes in her son’s goodness in his heart and soul. She believes that her son may become a positive motivator and role model for youth in the future. She pointed out that her son loves his family and animals. She confirmed what Ms. Dobson said about her son having a difficult childhood. She expressed love for her son and expressed her condolences to Mr. Haji Ragab’s family.
Huzaifah Mangera
[32] Mr. Mangera is the president of the Islamic Academy in Windsor, Ontario. He was introduced to Mr. Lemieux through a chaplain friend in Toronto, Imam Habib Ali, who advised Mr. Mangera that Mr. Lemieux would be coming to a halfway house in Windsor and asked Mr. Mangera to take care of Mr. Lemieux.
[33] Mr. Lemieux stayed with him for a good period of time, and Mr. Mangera found Mr. Lemieux to be a very caring person, who was gentle and shy, who would get annoyed at times, but overall is a very good human being. Mr. Lemieux helped remove copper pipes from the school. Mr. Mangera opined that had Mr. Lemieux remained in Windsor, rather than returning to Ottawa, he was on track to having a bright future. Mr. Mangera felt that the move back to Ottawa had caused Mr. Lemieux to become reintegrated with negative influences, contributing to his incarceration.
Paulette and Claude Lemieux
[34] Mr. Lemieux’s grandparents are now in their 80s. They described their grandson as kind and helpful. They say they had many visits from him before things started to go wrong for him.
[35] His grandmother believed that the lack of a supportive father contributed to his difficulties.
Abdirizak Warsame
[36] Mr. Warsame is a Multicultural Inmate Liaison Officer at the OCDC. He has known Mr. Lemieux since 2018. He pointed out that Mr. Lemieux has finished his education and is actively seeking employment. Mr. Lemieux expressed a strong desire to return to school and remains in close contact with his family. Mr. Warsame described Mr. Lemieux as a family-oriented individual who maintains a close relationship with his mother and sister.
Chantal P.
[37] This individual has known Mr. Lemieux since he was a young child. She described him as having a heart of gold who would do anything to help someone in need. She felt that he fell in with the wrong crowd. Mr. Lemieux and his mother did not have a lot of money when he was growing up and his mother was always working to try and earn enough money to take care of him.
iii. The Recommendations of the Jury
[38] The third factor that a sentencing judge must consider when determining an appropriate period of parole ineligibility after a conviction in a murder trial is any recommendation made by the jury. In this case, two jurors made no recommendation. Two jurors recommended a period of 10 years of parole ineligibility. One juror recommended a period of 15 years of parole ineligibility. One juror recommended 18 years, three jurors recommended 20 years and three jurors recommended 25 years. The majority of jurors recommended periods of parole ineligibility above the statutory minimum, and of those jurors, seven recommended sentences at the high end of the range. These recommendations were made without knowledge of some of the details of Mr. Lemieux’s criminal record.
iv. The Victim Impact Statements
[39] The victim’s family submitted a letter signed on behalf of all family members. They wrote, “Words cannot capture the depth of our sorrow and the void that resides where his laughter once filled our home. He was the cornerstone of our family, a beacon of hope and love in our lives. His presence brought warmth and joy to everyone who knew him. His sudden, violent departure has left a wound that will never heal.” The victim’s family sense of safety and security has been compromised and some have relocated in the aftermath of the shooting. The murder also left Mr. Haji Ragab’s three-year-old daughter without her father. The victim was a single father and the mother of his daughter, according to his family, was not involved in his daughter’s upbringing.
The Positions of the Parties
[40] On behalf of the Crown, Ms. Wetscher submitted that the appropriate period of parole ineligibility in this case is 18 to 20 years. On behalf of Mr. Lemieux, Ms. Craig submitted that the period of parole ineligibility in this case should be only moderately elevated from the statutory minimum to 11 or 12 years.
The Applicable Principles
[41] A period of parole ineligibility is part of the life sentence of imprisonment that is mandatory for an offender convicted of second-degree murder. Therefore, in determining what period of ineligibility should be imposed, the general sentencing principles set forth in Part XXIII of the Criminal Code must be considered: Shropshire, at paras. 23-24; R. v. Millard, 2018 ONSC 1299, para 29; and R. v. Granados-Arana, 2018 ONSC 1756, para 34.
[42] The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to “contribute … to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of [six] objectives”: Criminal Code, s. 718.
[43] These objectives include the denunciation of unlawful conduct, deterrence of the offender and others who might be similarly tempted, separation of the offender from society where necessary, rehabilitation and the promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender: Criminal Code, s. 718. Whatever sanction is imposed must comport with the fundamental principle that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender: Criminal Code, s. 718.1. In addition, a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances: Criminal Code, s. 718.2(b).
[44] In light of the requirement that a sentence imposed should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences in similar circumstances, counsel provided me a number of cases in relation to cases which are similar to this one, which I would describe as cases involving public shootings. The Crown provided me with a plethora of cases. The defence also provided me with case law. I read all of the cases provided, but have only reviewed here the cases I found to be most salient to the facts of this case here.
The Case Law
Cases at the Low End of the Range
[45] This case involved a public shooting by someone who has a prior conviction for possession of a firearm. The shooting also falls generally into the category of cases which has been described in the case law as a brazen public shooting: see R. v. Hayles-Wilson, 2018 ONSC 4337, para 18. In R. v. Danvers, the Court of Appeal for Ontario endorsed the observation of the trial judge that the use of firearms in public places cries out for lengthy increased periods of parole ineligibility in order to protect the public. The court, at para. 78, stated that: “There is no question that our courts have to address the principles of denunciation and deterrence for gun related crimes in the strongest possible terms.”
[46] Like many other offenders in these types of offences, Mr. Lemieux was relatively youthful at the time of the offence and had a difficult upbringing. He was also on a weapons prohibition at the time of the offence. No case is a perfect analogy for this one. Each case must be decided on its own facts with reference to the relevant case law.
[47] In my view, the range of sentence for a case similar to this one by someone who has a prior firearm conviction is 14 to 17 years. As will be discussed, R. v. Gibb, 2020 ONSC 3548, is an outlier where 13 years of parole ineligibility was imposed, and COVID-19 was factored into that decision.
[48] Cases which are at the lower end of the range, such as those where 11 to 13 years of parole ineligibility were imposed, are distinguishable as having fewer aggravating factors related to the offence or to the character of the offender. For example, in R. v. Paredes, 2014 ONCA 910, the Court of Appeal substituted a parole ineligibility period of 15 years imposed by the trial judge for a period of 12 years. The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge, Benotto J. (as she then was), lost sight of the offender’s personal circumstances and his real potential for rehabilitation. She concentrated exclusively on the need for denunciation and deterrence. That case is distinguishable from the case at bar. The offender in Paredes had no criminal record and had a licence for the firearm in question. That distinguishes the case from the one before me, as Mr. Lemieux has a serious record, including convictions for robbery and a prior firearm conviction.
[49] In another example of a case with a lower parole ineligibility period imposed for a shooting of this type, MacDonnell J. imposed a 12-year sentence of ineligibility for a public shooting in R. v. Suthakaran, 2024 ONCA 50, which was not disturbed on appeal. The offender in that case had no criminal antecedents and had significant prospects for rehabilitation.
[50] Similarly, in R. v. Grant, 2016 ONCA 639, the offenders, Anthony Grant and Devon Vivian, were originally charged with first-degree murder, but acquitted of that charge. Grant was convicted of second-degree murder and attempted murder. Vivian was convicted of second-degree murder and aggravated assault. On appeal, Grant received a sentence of 14 years of parole ineligibility, and Vivian received 11 years. Grant discharged his firearm 13 times at a smaller car and hit the car 12 times. Nine of the shots hit four occupants in the smaller car. Vivian positioned the offenders’ car so that Grant could kill the deceased and endanger the lives of the others in the car. Neither Grant nor Vivian had a record for any previous offence of serious violence. Grant had a record for simple assault for which he received a suspended sentence and probation. Vivian only had a prior youth offence for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking. The lack of a serious criminal record for the offenders distinguishes Grant from Mr. Lemieux’s case.
[51] In R. v. Gibb, 2020 ONSC 3548, the offender was convicted after trial of second-degree murder. The offender attended a strip club with a group of friends. At some point, a dispute arose between the offender’s friend and the victim. During an altercation, on three different occasions, the offender was observed on video exposing a gun tucked into the waist of his pants. The offender and his friends decided to leave the area in a car that someone else was driving. The victim approached the car while the offender was standing next to it, at which point, the offender fired a number of shots, five of which struck the victim. The offender continued firing even after the victim had fallen. Immediately following the shooting, the offender and his friends fled the area. The offender claimed that the victim tried to rob him of an expensive necklace that he was wearing. The mitigating factors on sentence were that the offender expressed great remorse and apologized to the family. He had a difficult childhood and had never had the presence of a father figure in his life, but had the support of his family. He was a youthful offender with great prospects for rehabilitation. He completed high school and one semester in college. The aggravating factors were that the offender fatally shot an unarmed man who posed no threat to him. The offender also continued firing even after the victim was falling to the ground. The offender had a criminal record with numerous convictions for violence. He earlier displayed the gun on scene prior to the shooting. The jury rejected the offender’s defence of provocation. The trial judge found that gun violence and deaths caused by gun violence had significantly increased in the jurisdiction between 2014 and 2019. A parole ineligibility period of 13 years was imposed. The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the resultant more onerous restrictions imposed in custody as a result was also considered as part of the sentencing process. Justice Irwin noted that conditions in jail would make Mr. Gibb’s time in custody much more onerous. In considering the impact of COVID-19 on imposing a sentence, Irwin J. noted that the consideration of the impact of COVID-19 could not reduce the sentence to the point that it was disproportionate to the gravity of the offence. In this case, conditions in the jail as a result of COVID-19 were not part of the considerations before me. Further, in contrast to this case, in Gibb, nine members of the jury recommended 10 years of parole ineligibility, one recommended 12 years, one recommended 13 years and one recommended 15 years.
Cases at the High End of the Range
[52] The Crown produced a number of cases where 18 to 22 years of parole ineligibility was imposed. Those cases are distinguishable either because the circumstances of the offence or the offender are more aggravating than in this case.
[53] For example, in R. v. Weese, 2016 ONCA 449, the offender fired at least 14 bullets outside a bar injuring a number of people and killing the deceased who was an innocent bystander. The offender had a criminal record including violence and a prior shooting. He showed no possibility of rehabilitation and was a significant threat to public safety. He was found to have opened fire with a semi-automatic weapon outside of a bar injuring multiple people. He continued shooting even after being informed that he had shot the deceased and displayed a wanton disregard for human life. The trial judge imposed a period of parole ineligibility of 22 years which was upheld by the Court of Appeal. Mr. Lemieux does have potential for rehabilitation, and in this case, there was only one victim.
[54] In R. v. Fattah, 2009 ABCA 229, the circumstances of the offence are also more aggravating than in this case. In that case, the offender had been involved in an escalating feud with the deceased and the victim marked by various incidents of confrontation and violence. The offender had a criminal record and was on probation and subject to a weapons prohibition. The offence was committed with a handgun. There were multiple victims. The murder was described as an execution by a “firing squad of one”. A period of parole ineligibility of 21 years was imposed, which was upheld on appeal.
[55] In R. v. Murray, 2021 ONSC 597, a period of parole ineligibility of 20 years was imposed. The co-offenders were brothers, Curtis Murray and Corey Murray, involved in an escalating feud. The victim was not involved in the feud. Curtis Murray fired several shots at the victim from a handgun. Corey Murray also chased the victim. While the victim was huddled in a small space, Curtis Murray shot him. Corey Murray stabbed the victim twice, killing him. Both offenders had criminal records. The trial judge found that the murder was planned and deliberate and not an impulsive act, stopping just short of the required mens rea for first-degree murder. The trial judge agreed with the Crown that the culpability of the offenders was largely indistinguishable from that of an offender found guilty of first-degree murder.
[56] In R. v. Lane, 2008 ONCA 841, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s sentence of 20 years of parole ineligibility, finding that this type of sentence is appropriate for those offenders who have “an established pattern of violence in their lives from which it can be reasonably inferred that they present a high risk to reoffend in a violent manner”: at para. 90. The circumstances relating to the character of the offender in that case are worse than those in this case. The offender had prior convictions for assault and discharging a firearm with intent to wound. He had previously shot another man with a 9mm handgun, striking the victim in the chest and the leg. The victim survived the shooting. The offender was sentenced to seven years in a penitentiary for aggravated assault. He was observed to be a danger to society and his chances for rehabilitation were slim.
[57] In R. v. Chambers, 2023 ONCA 444, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s imposition of an 18-year period of parole ineligibility. The offender was convicted after trial of second-degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault. His co-offender was convicted of manslaughter and aggravated assault. The offender was youthful and had a difficult upbringing. He had a lengthy criminal record and was on a weapons prohibition at the time of the offence. He concealed and discharged a loaded firearm. He engaged in a series of unprovoked confrontations. He threatened to use a weapon before the shooting. He shot unarmed victims. The multiple victims in this case distinguish it from the case at bar.
[58] In R. v. Gager, 2020 ONCA 274, there were two convicted offenders, Jermaine Gager and Corey Leonard Smelie. Gager was convicted of first-degree murder and Smelie was convicted of second-degree murder. Both offenders were in a stolen van that drove into a community housing area in Toronto known to be inhabited by gangs. Several men, including both offenders exited the van and opened fire. The deceased was shot in the back. Smelie had a criminal record with previous convictions for possession of an imitation firearm. The trial judge found that Smelie had the intent to kill as many people as possible at the time of the murder. Smelie was just 20 at the time of the murder. The murder took place in a public area and Smelie fled from the scene and discarded his firearm in a dangerous manner. There was a gang-related motive. A period of parole ineligibility of 18 years was imposed by the trial judge and upheld by the Court of Appeal. This case is somewhat factually similar to Mr. Lemieux’s case but is distinguishable as Mr. Lemieux did not have the intent to kill as many people as possible, and there was no gang-related motive established in Mr. Lemieux’s case. Mr. Lemieux also acted alone.
Cases Where 14 to 17 Years Parole Ineligibility Imposed
[59] This body of cases most closely aligns with the facts in the case before me.
[60] In R. v. Berry, 2017 ONCA 17, the offender was convicted after trial of second-degree murder and found not guilty of first-degree murder. The offender and victim were associates in the drug trade, but there was conflicting evidence on this issue. The victim and the offender had an encounter in the grocery store and an argument occurred about a drug debt. That same day, the offender and victim had another encounter where the victim held a gun to the offender’s neck, which left the offender shaken and angry. The offender later showed up at the victim’s door and shot him six times, killing him when he came to the door. Following the shooting, the offender fled the building, threw the gun in a sewer and disappeared. The mitigating factors included the offender being 20 at the time of the offence and having a difficult upbringing. The aggravating factors included the offender’s criminal record of violence and the elements of planning in the way the offender armed himself and elicited the aid of a friend and concealed himself outside the victim’s door. The location of the gunshot wounds resulted in a brutal execution. The firearm was illegal, and the murder occurred while the offender was subject to a weapons prohibition order. A period of parole ineligibility of 17 years was upheld by the Court of Appeal.
[61] In R. v. Van Every, 2016 ONCA 87, the offender was convicted after trial of second-degree murder. The offender was a lifelong friend of the deceased who was a drug dealer and father of three. The offender was second in command of the victim’s drug dealing business. The offender shot the victim in the chest as he stood in his hallway. The defence was raised that the offender was too intoxicated to be the killer, and, in the alternative, he was too intoxicated to have the requisite intent for second-degree murder. The mitigating factors were that the offender was Indigenous and had a difficult upbringing. The aggravating factors included the offender’s criminal record, including crimes of violence, and the circumstances of the offence, which was described as “the summary execution of an unarmed man” in front of his child in his own home, followed by a robbery of the victim of his drug proceeds and gold chain. No real prospects for rehabilitation were noted. A period of parole ineligibility of 16 years was upheld by the Court of Appeal.
[62] In R. v. Granados-Arana, 2018 ONCA 826, the offender attended a party and learned of a dispute between the victim and another individual. The offender followed the victim and there was a confrontation. The offender shot the victim in the feet and then shot him in the back as he walked away. The mitigating factors included the youthfulness of the offender, who was 22 at the time of the offence, and his efforts at rehabilitation, which included completing educational sessions while awaiting trial. The relevant aggravating factors included the offender’s criminal record with crimes of violence, the fact that the offender brought the loaded gun to a crowded party, the offender fired a gun across a city street in the early hours of the morning and the victim was not confronting the offender when he was killed. The trial judge imposed a period of parole ineligibility of 16 years, noting that the offender’s actions in callously gunning down a fleeing victim called for a sentence that denounced the conduct and protected the public. The Court of Appeal upheld this period of parole ineligibility.
[63] In R. v. Stewart, the offender brought a loaded handgun to the Caribana celebration in Toronto and fired two shots into a crowded public square. The offender’s first shot hit a sign and the second shot killed the victim. The mitigating factors were that the offender was just 23 at the time of the offence, had strong family support and made progress toward rehabilitation. The aggravating factors were that the offender had a criminal record with two convictions for possession of a weapon, a knife. He brought a loaded handgun to a public gathering in downtown Toronto. He discharged a weapon twice in a crowded square putting the lives of innocent people and police officers at risk. Chaos ensued with hundreds of people fleeing after the shooting. The trial judge imposed a parole ineligibility period of 16 years.
[64] In R. v. Abdulle, 2023 ONCA 32, the offender was convicted after trial of second-degree murder having been arraigned on a charge of first-degree murder. A period of parole ineligibility of 15 years was upheld on appeal. The facts in the case are that the offenders, Yasin Abdulle and Michael Monney, fired shots at the victim and his companions. One of the shots struck the victim in the neck, killing him. The trial judge interpreted the jury’s conviction of second-degree murder as a compromise demonstrating that the jury did not accept the Crown nor the offender’s theory of liability in full. The trial judge found that the offenders did not go to the neighbourhood with the intent to do a drug deal as claimed, but instead went with a definite plan to shoot someone. The trial judge also found that the murder was motivated by rivalry. The mitigating factors noted in the sentencing decision are set out in R. v. Monney, 2016 ONSC 1007 and included that Abdulle was a youthful offender, just 18 at the time of the offence, had strong family support and apologized to the victim’s family. The mitigating factors with regard to Monney included his youthfulness, as he was 21 at the time of the offence, he had a supportive family and community and he made good use of his time in custody, including completing school credits, writing a novel and discovering hobbies. He also apologized to the victim’s family. The aggravating factors for Abdulle included that he had a criminal record, his principal occupation was drug dealing and he was a member of a criminal organization. Within three days of being released from youth detention for the offence of possession of a firearm, the offender resumed dealing drugs and carrying a firearm. He also exhibited violent behaviour when incarcerated. Monney had a criminal record; his principal occupation was drug dealing and he was a member of a criminal organization and engaged in violent behaviour when incarcerated. Both offenders were motivated by gang rivalry and assertion of gang domination. Both shots had been fired in a public area about 30 seconds after leaving a car. There was no time for a disagreement to develop that would have led to the shooting. Rather, there was a plan in place to shoot someone.
[65] In R. v. Hayles-Wilson, 2022 ONCA 790, the trial judge, Code J., imposed a period of parole ineligibility of 15 years after a thorough review of the Ontario authorities. The offender was charged with first-degree murder but convicted of second-degree murder. The salient facts are that the offender attended a community centre to watch his cousin play in a basketball game. While there, he encountered the victim in the lobby. A few moments later, the offender fired on the victim outside the community centre multiple times, killing him. The offender claimed provocation. The victim was the offender’s drug dealer and threatened him over an unpaid debt. The offender lost control, drew his gun and opened fire after feeling enraged and terrified by the threat made by the victim. Justice Code found that the mitigating factors were the fact that the offender was youthful, he was 23 at the time of the offence, and that he had no criminal record. He had pro-social tendencies and had the benefit of a supportive pro-social family. He engaged in constructive programs while in custody and apologized to the victim’s family and asked for forgiveness. The aggravating factors included the fact that the offender fled after the shooting, disposing of the gun and hiding from police for 10 months. The murder was found to be planned, but not deliberated upon in light of the jury’s verdict; in other words, it was found to be “a near first degree murder”. The offender carried a loaded hidden handgun in a public place with the obvious intention to use it. He fired multiple shots from a handgun in a public space. The danger to the public was great, given the number of shots and the relatively close presence of other members of the public. The 15-year parole ineligibility period imposed by Code J. was upheld by the Court of Appeal.
[66] This case has some similarities to the case before me. The offender was the same age as Mr. Lemieux. They both discarded their firearm after the shooting. However, Mr. Lemieux did not hide. Further, in both cases, the presence of the public aggravated the risk to public safety. Although in Hayles-Wilson, the public was much more at risk as they were contained in a community centre, notably, the offender in Hayles-Wilson did not have a criminal record, which distinguishes that case from this one.
[67] In R. v. Mills, 2019 ONCA 940, there were two convicted offenders, Lavare Williams and Chael Mills. Williams was convicted of second-degree murder and Mills was convicted of first-degree murder. The victim was walking with someone through an area controlled by a gang when he was approached by a woman asking if he was “S.K.” The victim asked the woman how she knew his name and a short time later, he was approached by two men, one of whom was Williams. The men asked the victim why he was wearing blue and told him that wearing blue was not allowed in the area. Tensions escalated and the victims started running away and the men chased them. Mills shot the victim in the back. Williams was found guilty on the basis that he aided and abetted Mills. The mitigating factors included his relative youth, his strong family and community support and his historical involvement in a church community. The aggravating factors included that the crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal organization, that the killing was motivated by hatred of a rival street gang, that the killing took place in circumstances that placed many innocent people at risk and that the offender had a prior criminal record for possession of marijuana. The trial judge placed less weight on the principle of rehabilitation given the fact that a lengthy period of custody was mandated. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s imposition of a 15-year period of parole ineligibility.
[68] In R. v. Palmer, 2010 ONCA 804, the offender was convicted after trial of second-degree murder and acquitted of first-degree murder. The offender had asked the victim for a cigarette. The victim refused, so the offender took some cannabis from a park table where the victim was seated. The victim demanded that the offender return the cannabis and there was a physical fight. At some point, the offender retrieved a gun from his waist band and shot the victim. The mitigating factors included the offender’s age at the time of the shooting, 18, and there was some evidence of his remorse. The aggravating factors included a criminal record with numerous convictions for failing to comply with court orders, robberies and assault causing bodily harm. The offender had a history of bullying and a significant escalating pattern of violent behaviour and was at high risk to reoffend. He consistently refused to follow court orders and be subject to family guidance and care. A period of parole ineligibility of 15 years was imposed and upheld on appeal.
[69] In R. v. Danvers, the offender was convicted of second-degree murder after trial. The victim was a security employee at a nightclub. The victim asked an individual to leave the club and that person refused. The offender then shot the victim as the victim tried to grab the other person. Following the shooting, the offender tucked the gun inside his pants and left the area with two other patrons of the bar. The mitigating factors included that the offender was 19 at the time of the offence and had a challenging life. The aggravating factors included the offender’s criminal record, including several weapons convictions. At the time of the offence, the offender was on probation and was subject to a weapons prohibition. The offender killed the victim, who was only doing his job on his last night of work. The offender attended a night club armed with a lethal weapon and fired into a room filled with 400 to 500 people. The Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge’s imposition of an 18-year parole ineligibility period, finding that the trial judge erred in misapprehending the evidence in relation to an aggravating factor that played a significant role in sentencing. The Court of Appeal also found that in light of the offender’s age, 18 years of parole ineligibility was an excessive sentence. A period of parole ineligibility of 15 years was imposed.
[70] In R. v. Sinclair, 2010 ONSC 7256, the offender was convicted after trial of second-degree murder. The offender shot the victim through the heart as he stood waiting at a bus shelter. The shooting was the result of a gang feud. Initially, there was a verbal altercation and a firearm was displayed. The victim ran into his apartment building to retrieve a firearm in response to what was perceived as a slight. The shooting took place within a few feet of several citizens, including children who were sitting in the bus shelter or walking on the sidewalk. The mitigating factors were that the offender was 18 at the time of the shooting and he expressed remorse. The aggravating factors included an extensive youth record, including firearms offences, the fact that the offender was subject to two firearm prohibition orders at the time of the offence, and that he carried a loaded handgun during drug dealing activities the day prior and indicated by gesture that he was prepared to use the firearm. The shooting happened in the middle of the afternoon, in a public area, within feet of other people including young children. No thought was given to the lives and safety of innocent bystanders. A period of parole ineligibility of 14 years was imposed.
[71] Finally, in R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 237, the offender pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and received a period of parole ineligibility of 12 years from the trial judge. This period was lowered to 10 years by the Court of Appeal and restored to 12 years by the Supreme Court of Canada. The facts were that the shooting occurred during a drug transaction at the offender’s home, where the offender shot the victim three times in the chest as they were about to complete a drug deal. Two days later, the offender turned himself in to police. Following the preliminary hearing, the offender entered a plea of guilt and expressed his remorse, stating that he was unable to explain his actions. No motive was ever established. The mitigating factors included the plea of guilt, the remorse demonstrated, the family support and the youthfulness of the offender. The aggravating factors included the criminal record of the offender, including youth entries for robbery, an impaired driving conviction, and two convictions for drugs, the use of a weapon while on a weapons prohibition; and that the circumstances of the killing were strange in that they provided no definitive explanation as to why the murder took place and the offender could not or would not explain why the murder was committed during the course of a drug transaction.
Motive
[72] I wish to say something about motive, or more accurately, the absence of motive in this case. In R. v. Hussein, 2023 ONCA 253, para 86, the trial judge noted an absence of an apparent motive can be treated as an aggravating factor on sentencing. In some circumstances, a proved absence of motive can support a finding of enhanced dangerousness: Hussein, at para. 86; R. v. Kravchenko, 2020 MBCA 30, para 65; R. v. Botticelli, 2022 BCCA 344, para 27.
[73] In the case before me, the motive for murder is not proven. The reason for the shooting will never be known. The shooting has some factual context which suggests a possible motive for the shooting. I have my suspicions as to what may have motivated this murder, but my suspicions do not matter in the analysis. There was no evidence which established beyond a reasonable doubt what the motive was for this shooting.
[74] There is a distinction between a proven absence of motive, the randomness of which suggests a finding of enhanced dangerousness, and an unproven motive. This case falls into the latter category. The shooting was not random in that there was no discernible rationale motive for the killing, but rather, there is a lack of evidence to establish a motive, which no doubt exists but has not been proven to the requisite degree. In a nutshell, the absence of motive is not treated as an aggravating factor on sentence.
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
[75] In this case, I found that there were elements of planning, which is an aggravating factor. Mr. Lemieux wore a mask when he was in the Ledbury-Banff neighbourhood. I find as a fact that this was not because he put it on in a store and forgot to remove it, but rather that it was to conceal his identity when he shot the victim. Mr. Lemieux pulled his gun out, loaded and at the ready, but did not raise it until he had driven to the point where he was abreast of the victim, firing five shots in rapid succession. The passenger seat of the car was pushed back. I found as a fact that this was done for ease of access to the passenger window, to permit Mr. Lemieux a clearer shot at the victim.
[76] The aggravating factors in this case also include Mr. Lemieux’s criminal record, including a prior conviction involving a firearm. The fact that a firearm was used in this murder is aggravating. The fact that five shots were fired into a residential neighbourhood in the middle of a summer day when there were children present and people outside walking around is aggravating. The residents of this neighbourhood testified they recognized the sound of gunfire, having heard it on other occasions. Members of economically disadvantaged neighbourhoods have a right to an expectation of safety and security while they go about their lives, without being victimized by gun violence brought about by drug dealers. The fact that a bullet pierced a window where a young man had been standing moments before, which could have struck him dead, speaks to the sheer wanton dangerousness of Mr. Lemieux’ actions in this case. Further, Mr. Lemieux was prohibited from possessing a weapon at the time of the offence.
[77] The mitigating factors in this case include Mr. Lemieux’s youthfulness at the time of the offence. He was just 22 years old. It is also mitigating that he had a difficult upbringing and was placed in foster care. His father was present in his life until he was 10, but the evidence before me is that Mr. Lemieux did not have a good relationship with his father and then his father disappeared. Mr. Lemieux was then exposed to familial violence as his mother had two partners who were violent in Mr. Lemieux’s presence. Mr. Lemieux also expressed remorse in this courtroom and I believe that he was sincere and genuine at that point in time. He did not qualify his response. However, I also weighed his expressed remorse to me along with the evidence that he continued shopping for a luxury watch after the homicide. In my view, his shopping for a luxury watch demonstrated a callousness, a lack of remorse in the aftermath of the shooting. To be clear, I did not use the evidence that Mr. Lemieux shopped for a luxury watch in the aftermath of the shooting to find that this was a contract killing and that Mr. Lemieux had been paid after the murder and was in the market for luxury jewelry. The evidence did not establish that fact, but the evidence was relevant to my assessment of his remorse at that time. Therefore, while I find that Mr. Lemieux sincerely expressed remorse for his actions in court, in the immediate aftermath of the killing, he was more concerned about his own creature comforts.
[78] Mr. Lemieux also has the support of his family and a circle of friends who think well of him, love him and are willing to support him. This factor is relevant to his prospects for rehabilitation. I note that when he was in Windsor, away from the negative influences in Ottawa, he was in the most pro-social period of his life. He was able to finish his high school education while in custody. This weighs in favour of his rehabilitative prospects. He has struggled with addiction. He also has post-traumatic stress disorder, which was untreated, and depression after he was shot in 2018. I consider his mental health to be a mitigating factor, but it must be pointed out that after experiencing the havoc wreaked by gun violence as a shooting victim himself, he chose to unleash death by firearm on another human being.
Conclusion
[79] Bearing in mind, then, the nature and circumstances of the offence, the character of the offender and the recommendations of the jury, what is the appropriate period of parole ineligibility for Mr. Lemieux? The answer to this question encompasses all of the principles and objectives of sentencing, including that a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances.
[80] On the count of second-degree murder, Mr. Lemieux is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for life without eligibility for parole until he has served 16 years of his sentence.
[81] Murder is an offence listed in paragraph (a) of the definition of “primary designated offence” in s. 487.04 of the Criminal Code. Accordingly, a DNA order is mandatory. Pursuant to s. 487.051(1), I authorize the taking of the number of bodily samples required for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis.
[82] As Mr. Lemieux was convicted of an indictable offence involving the use of violence that is punishable by imprisonment for 10 years or more, an order under s. 109(1)(a) of the Criminal Code is mandatory although the duration of the order is discretionary. In the circumstances of this case, I direct that the order be for life.
Anne London-Weinstein
Released: May 29, 2025

