Reasonable doubt

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a home invasion at a university residence and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in jury selection, misdirected the jury on reasonable doubt, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended an expert opinion on his likelihood of re-offending.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's jury screening or instructions, and upheld the sentence as eminently fit given the gravity of the offence and the appellant's extensive criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of importing heroin after 1.8 kilograms of the drug were found hidden in his suitcase.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions on circumstantial evidence by failing to explicitly state that exculpatory inferences need not arise from proven facts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury was adequately and sufficiently instructed in accordance with the principles in Villaroman, and that the charge as a whole did not shift the burden of proof to the accused.

The appellants, Dellen Millard and Mark Smich, appealed their convictions for the first-degree murder of Laura Babcock.

The Crown's theory was that Millard killed Babcock due to a love triangle, and Smich assisted him, including by incinerating her body.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt, party liability, after-the-fact conduct, or the use of rap lyrics as adopted admissions.

However, applying the Supreme Court's decision in Bissonnette, the court allowed the sentence appeals solely to quash the consecutive parole ineligibility periods imposed under s. 745.51 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after strangling a man during a sexual encounter in a park.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge made several errors in the jury instructions, specifically regarding the required state of mind for murder, the appellant's mental health, intoxication, the application of reasonable doubt to exculpatory statements, and after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge, when read as a whole and in the context of the trial, properly equipped the jury to decide the case and contained no reversible errors.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference involving a child.

At trial, the evidence of the complainant and the appellant was diametrically opposed.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, stating that the two versions could not both be true and rejecting the appellant's evidence based on her acceptance of the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred by treating the case as a credibility contest rather than assessing whether the evidence as a whole raised a reasonable doubt, and by misapplying the principles for rejecting an accused's evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) test.

The appellant had grabbed the complainant from behind, claiming he mistakenly believed she was his girlfriend.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence and convicted him.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge failed to properly apply the second step of the W.(D.) test by not considering whether the exculpatory evidence of the appellant's girlfriend raised a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm-related offences, arguing that his identification as the person who threw a package containing a handgun from a balcony was not established beyond a reasonable doubt.

The trial judge relied on circumstantial evidence, including police observations during the execution of a warrant, to conclude that the appellant was the only person who could have thrown the package.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the only reasonable inference was that the appellant possessed and threw the firearm, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately address the jury's questions regarding the absence of forensic evidence linking him to the fire.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's answer was complete, legally accurate, and properly reminded the jury that a reasonable doubt can arise from an absence of evidence.

The respondent, a commercial truck driver, was acquitted at trial of importing and possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after 39 kilograms of cocaine were found in his trailer at the border.

The trial judge accepted the respondent's 'blind courier' defence.

The Crown appealed the acquittal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge made speculative findings of fact unsupported by evidence and committed a legal error by applying a piecemeal approach to the evidence rather than considering its cumulative effect.

The appellant, a high school teacher, appealed her conviction and 13-month sentence for sexual exploitation of a 17-year-old student.

The trial judge found that the appellant engaged in a prolonged, sexually charged relationship with the student and had sexual intercourse with him while he was intoxicated, relying on the student's testimony, corroborating witness testimony, and telecommunications data.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentencing judge did not err in treating character reference letters as evidence of the appellant's position of trust rather than as mitigating factors.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace following the stabbing death of his girlfriend.

At trial, the Crown relied heavily on an eyewitness who was highly intoxicated at the time of the offence.

The appellant was also found in a near-comatose state of alcohol intoxication at the scene.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on how the eyewitness's reliability and the appellant's extreme intoxication related to reasonable doubt and the requisite intent for murder.

The appellant also argued the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate and the verdict was one a properly instructed jury could reasonably render.

The appellant appealed his conviction for theft.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's receipt being found in the complainant's stolen purse and the complainant's wallet being found near the appellant's residence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the only rational inference was the appellant's guilt.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon arising from an incident outside a bar.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing his police statements under the W.D. principles and in assessing witness testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the reasonable doubt standard, correctly rejected the appellant's inconsistent statements, and was entitled to accept the consistent evidence of the key witnesses identifying the appellant as the assailant.

On a summary conviction appeal from a sexual assault conviction, the appellant argued that the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof in a case turning on credibility and conflicting evidence arising from the Crown's own witnesses.

The appeal court held that the trial judge erred in law by stating that no W.(D.) analysis was required because the accused did not testify, and by failing to recognize that defence-favourable evidence in the Crown's case could still raise a reasonable doubt.

The reasons did not adequately demonstrate that the reasonable doubt standard was applied to vital credibility conflicts, including evidence bearing on whether the alleged assault could have occurred as described.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered before a different trial court.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired care or control arising from a single-vehicle collision where he was found passed out partly in the driver's seat with keys accessible in the console.

He argued that the trial judge erred in the use of circumstantial evidence, misapplied the W.(D.) framework to the defence witness, and reversed the burden of proof.

The appeal court held that the trial judge properly rejected the statutory presumption yet correctly proceeded to assess de facto care or control on the evidence as a whole.

Applying the deferential summary conviction appeal standard, the court found the factual inferences were reasonably open to the trial judge and upheld the conviction.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual touching of a person under 14 and sexual assault arising from allegations made by a former child music student concerning conduct said to have occurred during private lessons over several years.

The court reviewed the presumption of innocence, the reasonable doubt standard, and the W.(D.) framework in assessing competing testimony from the complainant and the accused.

Although the complainant testified in a generally forthright manner, the court found reliability concerns arising from delayed disclosure, memory that appeared to improve over time, aspects of her post-offence conduct, and the absence of confirming evidence.

The accused's denial, supported in part by contextual evidence about others being present in the apartment, left the court with a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The accused was tried before a judge alone on multiple counts of sexual interference and sexual assault involving his young biological son.

The court addressed delayed disclosure, possible taint from family conflict, and inconsistencies in the complainant’s written and oral accounts, but found the complainant truthful and his explanation for non-disclosure credible.

The court also admitted prior discreditable conduct evidence concerning the accused’s prior conviction involving another child, finding the probative value sufficiently high to outweigh prejudice.

Applying the criminal burden of proof and the W(D.) framework, the court rejected the defence theory as speculative and entered convictions on all counts.

Judge-alone criminal trial on historical sexual assault-related charges involving two complainants who alleged abuse by a parental figure in the family home.

The Crown sought to rely on each complainant's evidence as similar fact evidence for the other, but the court held the Crown had not disproved an air of reality to collusion on a balance of probabilities.

After extensive review of inconsistencies, motive to fabricate, delayed disclosure, and reliability concerns, the court found the complainants' evidence did not satisfy the criminal standard.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over .80, arguing that the intoxilyzer was not proven to be functioning properly because the technician used an external printer and did not check the internal printer.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the intoxilyzer was in proper working order.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of marijuana production and firearms offences based on circumstantial evidence found at a house he co-owned.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapplied the rule in Hodge's Case by requiring alternative explanations to be based on 'proven facts' rather than available inferences.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge improperly shifted the burden of proof.

The Court also found the firearms convictions unreasonable, as the evidence did not exclude the possibility that another person involved in the grow operation hid the handgun without the appellant's knowledge.

The appeal was allowed, with a new trial ordered for the grow operation charges and acquittals entered for the firearms charges.