Zarnett

Five organizations brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of provincial legislation that required the removal of bicycle lanes in Toronto.

The underlying judgment found the legislation violated section 7 of the Charter.

The motion judge granted leave to all five proposed interveners, but limited the scope of their interventions to specific issues such as the positive/negative rights dichotomy, the interpretation of recent section 7 jurisprudence, and the application of equality and child-interest principles to the gross disproportionality analysis.

The interveners were restricted to 10-page factums and brief oral submissions.

The appellants, private practice oral surgeons, appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing their application for judicial review of a hospital board's decision to cancel their operating room access and hospital privileges.

The board made the decision without a hearing, relying on s. 44 of the Public Hospitals Act, which allows a hospital to revoke privileges when ceasing to provide a service.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the board's interpretation of s. 44 was reasonable, that the termination of the specific operating room access constituted ceasing a 'service', and that the board was not required to hold a hearing or consider the appellants' affidavits.

A case management conference was held to set the timetable for two grouped appeals arising from a decision certifying a class action against the Province of Ontario but declining to certify it against 49 Children's Aid Societies regarding the use of 'Birth Alerts'.

The appeals will be heard by a five-judge panel to consider whether the court should depart from the Ragoonanan principle.

The case management judge set the schedule for responding materials, intervention motions, and factums.

The representative plaintiffs in a class action alleging a price-fixing conspiracy for packaged bread sought to amend their pleadings and the Certification Order to add Maple Leaf Foods Inc. as a certified defendant.

The original Certification Order had refused certification against Maple Leaf on the basis that the pleadings disclosed no cause of action against it, and this decision was not appealed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's dismissal of the motion, finding that the original refusal to certify was a final order that gave rise to res judicata.

The court held that the Class Proceedings Act does not permit relitigation of matters finally decided, and the motion judge did not err in refusing to exercise his limited discretion to bypass res judicata.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay $520,096.35 under a mortgage loan.

He argued the mortgages were forged, the respondent failed to provide required statements, and the respondent lost the right to sue for the debt by selling the properties after commencing the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and noting the appellant failed to provide trial transcripts.

The Court also clarified that exercising a power of sale, unlike foreclosure, does not preclude a mortgagee from suing for the debt.

The applicant, convicted of firearms offences, applied for a review of a decision denying him bail pending appeal under s. 680 of the Criminal Code.

Despite the Crown consenting to release, the bail judge had denied bail based on the seriousness of the offence and the perceived weakness of the sentence appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the bail judge erred in principle by failing to consider the merit of the conviction appeal and the numerous public safety factors supporting release.

The application was granted and bail was ordered on the terms proposed by the parties.

The applicant sought bail pending his appeal of convictions and a 78-month sentence for serious offences involving intimate partner violence committed while on release.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous but opposed release on public interest grounds.

The court applied the Oland framework, balancing the reviewability interest against the enforceability interest.

Although the applicant raised an arguable ground of appeal regarding restrictions on cross-examination, the court found the enforceability interest predominated due to the gravity of the offences, the breach of a prior release order, and residual public safety concerns.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, and mischief arising from a lengthy relationship with the complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred by requiring corroboration, improperly relying on bad character evidence, and misapprehending evidence regarding his motivation for lying to police.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not require corroboration, did not engage in propensity reasoning, and made no material misapprehension of evidence.

The appellant appealed a trial decision ordering specific performance of an oral agreement to sell land to the respondent for $4.1 million.

The appellant argued the oral agreement was unenforceable under s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, contending the detrimental reliance aspect of the doctrine of part performance was not met because the respondent's only obligation was to pay the purchase price, which was tendered but refused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in concluding the respondent irremediably carried out its obligations to its detriment by taking all necessary steps to close the transaction while the appellant stood by.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order and a trial decision upholding a separation agreement.

The motion judge had found the agreement was signed but directed a trial on whether an escrow condition requiring corporate counsel's approval was met.

The trial judge found the appellant waived the condition by her conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant was out of time to appeal the motion judge's order and that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding waiver by conduct.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder by a jury.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by refusing to leave the included offence of manslaughter with the jury, by directing the jury to find he had the state of mind for murder if they concluded he was the shooter, and by improperly instructing the jury on after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in removing manslaughter, as there was no air of reality to an unintentional killing.

While the trial judge erred in directing the jury on the state of mind for murder, the error was harmless and cured by the proviso, as the jury's finding of planning and deliberation necessarily included an intention to kill.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent, a retired teacher, commenced a defamation action against the school board and its chair after the chair stopped her presentation at a public meeting and subsequently made media statements characterizing her comments as transphobic and questioning the right of trans people to exist.

The appellants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, allowing the defamation claim to proceed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge erred in his weighing analysis by failing to consider the public interest in the appellants' speech, a fresh weighing demonstrated that the harm suffered by the respondent outweighed the public interest in the chair's speech, which had mischaracterized her actual remarks.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants challenged the constitutional validity of the Tamil Genocide Education Week Act, 2021, arguing it was ultra vires Ontario and infringed their rights to free expression and equality under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Act, finding its dominant purpose was to affirm and commemorate the Tamil-Ontarian community's experience, which falls within Ontario's power over local matters under s. 92(16) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court also dismissed the Charter claims, concluding the Act does not suppress expression or draw a discriminatory distinction against Sinhala-Buddhists.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its motion for summary judgment, which sought to dismiss the respondent's action for false arrest, false imprisonment, and Charter breaches as statute-barred.

The respondent had been detained by the CBSA for 467 days before being deported, but only discovered evidence of alleged CBSA misconduct years later when internal notes were disclosed in separate litigation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the presumptive limitation period starting on the date of arrest was rebutted, as the respondent did not have sufficient material facts to discover his claim until the internal notes were disclosed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of agreeing to bribe a foreign public official, the Indian Minister of Civil Aviation, contrary to the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, including unreasonable delay, lack of territorial jurisdiction, and the trial judge's refusal to declare a mistrial following late Crown disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the jurisdictional and delay arguments but allowed the appeal on the basis of the mistrial application.

The Court found that the Crown's late disclosure of communications with a key witness and information regarding a central defence exhibit impaired the overall fairness of the trial process.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by the Superior Court of Justice.

No one appeared for the appellant at the hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.