Kevin A. McGivney

The respondent, a retired teacher, commenced a defamation action against the school board and its chair after the chair stopped her presentation at a public meeting and subsequently made media statements characterizing her comments as transphobic and questioning the right of trans people to exist.

The appellants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, allowing the defamation claim to proceed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge erred in his weighing analysis by failing to consider the public interest in the appellants' speech, a fresh weighing demonstrated that the harm suffered by the respondent outweighed the public interest in the chair's speech, which had mischaracterized her actual remarks.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a retired teacher, brought an action for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional suffering against a school board and its chairman after she was stopped from presenting at a board meeting and the chairman subsequently made public comments characterizing her presentation as transphobic and hateful.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The court dismissed the motion regarding the defamation claim, finding it had substantial merit, there were no valid defences, and the harm to the plaintiff outweighed the public interest in protecting the chairman's expression.

The claim for intentional infliction of mental suffering was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a former Toronto police officer, sued the defendants for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, misfeasance in public office, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and Charter breaches following his arrest and prosecution for corruption and other offences.

The criminal charges were ultimately stayed or withdrawn.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiff failed to prove the absence of reasonable and probable grounds for the charges, which was fatal to the malicious prosecution and negligent investigation claims.

The court also found no evidence of malice, deliberate unlawful conduct intended to harm, or conduct calculated to cause mental suffering.

The claim for Charter damages was also dismissed.

The plaintiff, a nightclub operator, brought an action against the City of Toronto and a city councillor for misfeasance in public office, abuse of public office, unlawful interference with economic relations, and conspiracy to defame and injure.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants conspired with the Toronto Police Service to target the nightclub with searches and inspections to force its closure.

The court dismissed the action, finding no evidence of a conspiracy, bad faith, or unlawful conduct by the defendants.

The court held that the city councillor's statements were protected by qualified privilege and statutory immunity, and that the City was not liable for the actions of the police.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a civil claim alleging negligent police investigation and failure to test the contents of a needle that punctured the plaintiff while she was working at a women’s shelter.

The plaintiff alleged the police negligently failed to lay criminal charges and failed to arrange testing of the needle’s blood contents, causing prolonged anxiety about possible infection with communicable diseases.

The court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and applied the summary judgment framework articulated in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The evidence demonstrated the police had consulted Crown attorneys who advised there were no reasonable grounds to prosecute, and the police had no authority under the Mandatory Blood Testing Act, 2006 to compel testing.

Any failure to obtain testing was attributable to the plaintiff’s own inaction rather than negligence by the defendants.