Court of Appeal for Ontario

CITATION: R. v. H.G., 2025 ONCA 128[^1]

DATE: 2025-02-20

DOCKET: C70257

BEFORE: Fairburn A.C.J.O., Zarnett and Wilson JJ.A.

BETWEEN

His Majesty the King Respondent

and

H.G. Appellant

COUNSEL: Ravin Pillay, for the appellant Meghan Tait, for the respondent

Heard and released orally: February 18, 2025

On appeal from the convictions entered by Justice Nancy S. Kastner of the Ontario Court of Justice on November 15, 2021.

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1] The appellant and complainant were involved in a lengthy relationship. He was convicted of two assaults, sexual assault and mischief. The appellant raises three grounds of appeal, all alleged errors in the reasons for judgment.

[2] First, he argues that, read as a whole, the trial judge thought that corroboration was necessary in order to convict; he submits that despite the trial judge having required it, independent corroboration was in fact lacking. He leans on the following passage for purposes of advancing this argument.

Each count must be separately considered. Though I believe the complainant, I think it is appropriate to look for evidence that is supportive of her allegations. Where the evidence of L.S. is either corroborated or there was consistent external evidence, it may augment the weight to be given to it.

[3] We disagree that the trial judge required corroboration or that any corroboration was necessary in this case. She clearly explained why she accepted the credibility of the complainant and rejected the appellant’s evidence. The fact that she thought it appropriate to look to other supporting evidence does not mean that it was legally required or that she deemed it necessary to convict.

[4] Although the trial judge acquitted the appellant on the threatening count, she explained how she arrived at that verdict, including that she simply was not sure under the third branch of R. v. W.D., 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742. We see nothing inconsistent arising from this verdict as it informs the issue of corroboration.

[5] Second, the appellant maintains that the trial judge erroneously relied on bad character evidence by placing too much emphasis on the appellant’s admitted lies concerning his extramarital relationship with the complainant. We see no error.

[6] The weight placed on this evidence was for the trial judge to determine. She did not engage in improper propensity reasoning. She only used the evidence as one of many factors when rejecting the appellant’s credibility.

[7] Finally, the appellant claims that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding his motivation behind lying to the police. Even if the trial judge misapprehended an aspect of that evidence, bearing in mind the reasons as a whole, it was not material to her credibility findings or to the verdicts.

[8] The appeal against conviction is dismissed. The appellant’s appeal against sentence has been abandoned.

"Fairburn A.C.J.O."

"B. Zarnett J.A."

"D.A. Wilson J.A."

[^1]: This appeal is subject to a publication ban pursuant to s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.