W. Cory Wanless

The appellants brought actions in Ontario against Barrick Gold Corporation for alleged human rights abuses committed by Tanzanian police at a mine in Tanzania.

The motion judge dismissed the actions for lack of jurisdiction and alternatively stayed them on the basis of forum non conveniens, finding Tanzania to be the clearly more appropriate forum.

On appeal, the appellants argued the motion judge erred in his forum non conveniens analysis by misapprehending the location of Barrick's head office, applying the wrong evidentiary standard, and failing to properly assess the risk of unfairness in Tanzania.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's discretionary weighing of factors, particularly given that the vast majority of witnesses and evidence were located in Tanzania.

The plaintiff, Justin Ngan, brought a motion to partially discontinue his claim, amend his pleadings, and certify the action as a class proceeding regarding the calculation of holiday and vacation pay by The Bank of Nova Scotia.

The defendant consented to the motion.

The court granted the orders, finding the amendments and discontinuance reasonable and the class action appropriate for certification.

The class includes employees who received incentive or variable compensation, and the common issues focus on whether such compensation should be included in statutory pay calculations under the Canada Labour Code.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against Canada on behalf of immigration detainees who were incarcerated in provincial prisons.

The plaintiffs alleged that the practice of detaining immigration detainees in provincial prisons, where they are subjected to penal conditions such as co-mingling with criminal inmates, strip searches, and the use of restraints, violates sections 7, 9, 12, and 15 of the Charter and constitutes systemic negligence.

The court dismissed all of Canada's objections, finding that the pleadings disclosed reasonable causes of action, the class was identifiable, the common issues could be determined in common, a class action was the preferable procedure, and the representative plaintiffs were adequate.

The motion for certification was granted.

The defendant, the Attorney General of Canada, brought a motion to defer filing its statement of defence until after the certification motion in a proposed class proceeding regarding immigration detention.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the presumption that a defendant must file a statement of defence before certification unless special circumstances justify a deferral.

The court found that the legal issues were well-defined and the defendant's concerns about the complexity and resources required to prepare the defence conflated pleading preparation with discovery or trial preparation.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its motion for summary judgment, which sought to dismiss the respondent's action for false arrest, false imprisonment, and Charter breaches as statute-barred.

The respondent had been detained by the CBSA for 467 days before being deported, but only discovered evidence of alleged CBSA misconduct years later when internal notes were disclosed in separate litigation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the presumptive limitation period starting on the date of arrest was rebutted, as the respondent did not have sufficient material facts to discover his claim until the internal notes were disclosed.

The appeal was dismissed.

Three competing groups of law firms sought carriage of a proposed class action against LifeLabs following a massive data breach affecting 15 million patients.

The court evaluated the competing proposals based on factors including the experience of counsel, overall approach, and proposed fee arrangements.

Carriage was awarded to the McPhadden Group (the Carter action) because their proposal for a single national class action was preferred over parallel actions, and their proposed contingency fee arrangement was significantly more cost-effective for the class.

The appellants, lawyers and the Attorney General of Canada, appealed a motion judge's dismissal of their motion to dismiss an action brought by an Indian Residential School survivor.

The appellants argued the survivor's action was barred by a release and cause of action bar contained in the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA) approval order.

The survivor's action alleged psychological harm due to the initial dismissal of his Independent Assessment Process (IAP) claim, stemming from Canada's alleged failure to disclose relevant documents and the lawyers' negligence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the release did not encompass claims arising from Canada's failure to fulfill its obligations under the IRSSA, nor did it bar the survivor's claim against his former lawyers.

The plaintiff, an Indian Residential School survivor, sued his former lawyers (the Wallbridge defendants) for negligence.

The negligence claim arose after the defendants initially failed to secure him compensation through an IAP claim for sexual abuse, causing him significant psychological harm.

The plaintiff later succeeded in obtaining compensation with new counsel.

The defendants moved to dismiss the negligence action as an abuse of process, arguing it was barred by the 2006 Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA) Approval Order.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the release provisions in the Approval Order did not encompass causes of action that arose after its effective date, nor could claims of solicitor's negligence in the prosecution of an IAP claim have been within the contemplation of the parties to the IRSSA.

The Attorney General of Canada moved to dismiss or stay an action brought by an Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA) claimant, arguing abuse of process based on release, re-litigation, requirement for leave, and improper forum.

The court rejected the arguments regarding release and re-litigation of certain disclosure issues.

However, it found that the action against Canada, which sought damages for breach of IRSSA disclosure obligations, involved the implementation and enforcement of the IRSSA and should have been initiated as a Request for Directions before the Eastern Administrative Judge under the Court Administration Protocol.

The action against Canada was stayed, while the action against the other defendants (solicitors) was deemed properly brought outside the IRSSA provisions.

The moving parties, a Children's Aid Society and its employees, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the responding party father's claims of slander, intentional wrongdoing, and negligence.

The claims arose from the Society's handling of false allegations made by the mother and police that the father was a terrorist and cult leader.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the slander claim, as the alleged defamatory statements were written, not spoken.

However, the court dismissed the motion regarding the negligence and intentional tort claims, finding that the Society may owe a duty of care to a parent in a negligent investigation context, and that evidence of potential bad faith precluded the application of statutory immunity or the Syl Apps immunity doctrine.

The matter was directed to proceed to trial.