Rouleau

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a 2013 consent dismissal and settlement agreement, as well as the dismissal of a new 2023 action claiming the same relief.

The motion judge found the appellant's motion and the new action were transparent attempts to relitigate issues that had been settled over a decade prior.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, confirming that the doctrine of abuse of process prevents the relitigation of settled issues and that the interests of finality prevail absent contractual problems like fraud or duress.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action.

The trial judge found that the respondent breached the standard of care by discharging the appellant without reviewing an MRA, but concluded that this negligence did not cause the appellant's second, severe stroke.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the admission of expert evidence and agreeing that the appellants failed to establish a prima facie case on causation, as the evidence did not show that treatment with Heparin would have been more effective than Aspirin in preventing the second stroke.

The respondent was injured while walking the appellant’s dog when the dog suffered a seizure, escaped its collar, fell down an icy embankment, and bit her while she attempted to retrieve it.

The motion judge held that the respondent was not an “owner” under the Dog Owners’ Liability Act because she did not exercise “dominion and control” over the dog, and therefore allowed her statutory claim but dismissed her negligence claim.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in interpreting “possesses” in the Act: possession includes physical possession and control immediately before a bite or attack.

Because the respondent was exercising actual control over the dog just prior to the incident, she fell within the statutory definition of “owner,” barring her claim under the Act.

The negligence claim was also properly dismissed because the injury was not reasonably foreseeable and the respondent’s voluntary decision to descend the icy slope constituted an intervening act breaking the chain of causation.