Daniel Santoro

Following a jury conviction for sexual interference, the accused applied for a stay of proceedings based on the loss of the complainant's diary and the late disclosure of a police officer's email regarding the diary.

The trial judge assumed jurisdiction to hear the post-verdict application but dismissed it on the merits.

The court found that the police acted reasonably in photographing rather than seizing the diary, and that while the late disclosure of the email breached the accused's section 7 Charter rights, it was not a deliberate attempt to undermine the trial's fairness and did not warrant the drastic remedy of a stay of proceedings.

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion alleging violations of his Charter rights under ss. 8 and 10(b) and seeking the exclusion of cocaine and cash seized from his residence.

The court found a minor s. 10(b) breach due to a brief delay in advising the applicant of his right to counsel upon arrest.

However, the court dismissed the s. 8 claims, finding that exigent circumstances justified the initial warrantless entry to freeze the residence, and that the subsequent search warrant was valid despite errors in the Information to Obtain.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute and dismissed the application to exclude the evidence.

The appellant appealed a conviction for disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code arising from conduct outside an abortion clinic.

The alleged breach involved a civil injunction prohibiting certain activities within 500 feet of the clinic, including intimidation of patients and others.

The appeal court held that criminal liability for breach of an order requires proof that the accused violated a specific term of the order.

The evidence established only peaceful leafleting and silent protest, which did not constitute intimidation or other prohibited conduct within the meaning of the injunction.

The conviction was therefore unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence.

Accused persons charged following a large police investigation sought disclosure of source materials underlying wiretap authorizations to support anticipated Garofoli and Dawson applications.

The defence argued that all investigative materials, including pre‑Part VI materials referenced or relied upon by the affiant, were presumptively relevant and disclosable under Stinchcombe principles.

The Attorney General of Ontario argued that disclosure should be limited to materials relevant to the accused’s ability to make full answer and defence at trial unless the defence first demonstrated a reasonable possibility that additional materials would assist in challenging the authorization.

The court acknowledged conceptual difficulties with the Crown’s narrower approach but held that existing authorities required an accused to meet a minimal relevance threshold before obtaining additional disclosure beyond what was before the authorizing judge.

Applying principles of judicial comity and following prior decisions adopting that approach, the court dismissed the disclosure applications.

Pre‑trial evidentiary rulings in a first‑degree murder prosecution concerning the admissibility of the accused’s statements and post‑offence conduct.

The accused attempted to plead guilty to manslaughter, but the Crown rejected the plea and pursued first‑degree murder based on an alleged killing during or in connection with sexual assault.

The court held that a rejected guilty plea and unaccepted defence admissions do not remove issues from the jury unless the Crown agrees to a formal admission under s. 655 of the Criminal Code.

Evidence of post‑offence conduct remained relevant to actus reus and identification issues but could not be used to determine the level of intent between manslaughter and murder.

The accused’s statement to police was admitted, subject to limited redactions and jury instructions, while a statement to a friend about “going to jail for life” was excluded for minimal probative value and high prejudicial effect.

The Crown sought estreatment and forfeiture of a $30,000 recognizance after the accused breached a house arrest condition by leaving his residence without a surety.

The accused had been released on bail with two sureties and strict conditions addressing substance abuse risks.

One surety temporarily delegated supervisory responsibilities to the other while leaving on vacation, without seeking a formal bail variation.

The court held that sureties cannot unilaterally delegate or restructure bail supervision and must seek formal variation where circumstances change.

Partial forfeiture was ordered against the accused and both sureties, balancing the importance of maintaining the “pull of bail” with the relatively limited harm caused by the brief breach.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a minor complainant.

The appeal argued that the trial judge provided inadequate reasons, improperly scrutinized the accused’s evidence more strictly than the complainant’s, failed to address a major inconsistency arising from statements allegedly made to a friend, and failed to consider possible collusion between the complainant and the witness.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge correctly applied the credibility framework from R. v. W.D. and that appellate courts must defer to credibility findings where the judge has addressed the substance of the issues.

The court found the trial judge had recognized and analyzed the alleged inconsistencies and witness interactions and that the reasons sufficiently explained the credibility conclusions.

The convictions were therefore upheld.