Reasonable doubt

The appellants were convicted of attempted murder and robbery following a home invasion where a 72-year-old victim was severely beaten and left bound.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on aiding and abetting, and by omitting the D.W. instruction from written materials provided to the jury.

One appellant also appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the jury instructions were adequate in context, the verdicts were reasonable, and the 13-year sentence was fit given the viciousness of the crime and the intent to kill.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and his summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

He appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and failed to properly apply the W. (D.) test for assessing credibility and reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge's reasons suggested a credibility contest, misstated the standard of proof, and misapprehended key evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed her conviction for uttering a threat to cause death or bodily harm, arguing that the Crown failed to prove her identity as the caller and that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to rely on the complainant's voice recognition evidence to establish identity.

The Court also found no reversal of the burden of proof and that the trial judge properly applied the reasonable doubt standard.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder based on circumstantial evidence, including traces of his blood and a footwear impression found at the scene.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that his statement to police and running shoes should have been excluded under the Charter, that expert footwear evidence was inadmissible, that the jury instructions were flawed, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was not detained when he gave his statement, the expert evidence was properly admitted, the jury instructions were fair, and the verdict was one a reasonable jury could reach.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge failed to consider his statement to police about waving a cell phone and failed to properly apply the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a witness's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that defence counsel at trial had tactically withdrawn the statement from consideration to avoid reply evidence.

The Court also found no error in the trial judge's application of the W.(D.) principles to the defence evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof by treating the case as a credibility contest between him and the police officer.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the trial judge's reasons adequately explained why the appellant's evidence was rejected and that it was implicit she found his testimony incredible, leaving no reasonable doubt.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in crack cocaine and possession of the proceeds of crime.

At trial, he admitted to being a drug dealer but denied selling to the undercover officer.

The trial judge failed to provide a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the appellant's admission that he was a drug dealer.

The Court of Appeal held that this failure constituted a reversible error, as there was a real risk the jury could infer guilt based solely on the admission.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for an offence involving pushing the complainant off a roof.

The trial judge had assessed credibility by comparing the evidence of the complainant and the accused on an either/or basis, and failed to consider whether the accepted evidence proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal found these to be errors, allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for sexual offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's approach to corroborative evidence, position of trust, or reasonable doubt.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the sentences, finding that the trial judge failed to give sufficient credit for pre-trial custody given the unique circumstances, including delays from an abandoned dangerous offender application.

The sentences were varied to time served.

The appellants, a mother and son, were convicted of first-degree murder in the death of the mother's husband.

The son admitted to killing the deceased but claimed self-defence, defence of his mother, or provocation, citing a history of severe domestic abuse by the deceased.

The Crown's theory was that the appellants conspired to kill the deceased for insurance money.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding self-defence, party liability, the use of co-accused statements, the standard of proof for reasonable doubt, and the need for a Vetrovec warning for unsavoury Crown witnesses.

The son also argued the Crown's cross-examination was abusive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge and concluding that the cross-examination, while aggressive, did not compromise trial fairness.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the trial judge's jury instructions on reasonable doubt and credibility were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on how reasonable doubt applies to credibility, omitting the necessary W.(D.) formula or equivalent instructions.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with 13 years' parole ineligibility.

He appealed both conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by delivering an improper jury exhortation, admitting out-of-court statements, failing to relate evidence to the defence theory, improperly instructing on reasonable doubt, and giving inadequate Vetrovec warnings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings, and upholding the period of parole ineligibility as fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction on four counts of indecent assault and sought leave to appeal his 18-month sentence.

The appeal on conviction was based on the trial judge's charge to the jury regarding credibility, identity, and reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the jury charge and dismissed the conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the trial judge erred in principle by stating inadequate supervision made a conditional sentence inappropriate, but ultimately held that an 18-month custodial sentence was fit given the nature of the historical offences against a young child.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing that the trial judge failed to properly apply the third step of the W.D. framework by not fully assessing and reconciling the evidence of the police officers after rejecting the appellant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge gave full reasons, properly articulated his application of W.D., and made clear findings of fact based on the accepted and reliable evidence of the police.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and kidnapping and sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment.

At trial, the defence argued the complainant was a willing participant in an insurance fraud scheme, relying on the appellant's statement to police.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt, motive, and the failure to give a Vetrovec warning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 5-year sentence was not manifestly unreasonable despite the appellant being a first offender.

The appellant was convicted of discharging a firearm with intent to endanger the life of a police officer and related offences after firing a handgun while fleeing from an attempted stop.

He appealed his convictions on several grounds relating to jury instructions, including the elements of the offence, reasonable doubt, and jury exhortation, all of which were dismissed.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by allowing the police officer to make an improper victim impact statement at the sentencing hearing and by imposing an unduly harsh sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the sentence appeal, finding the victim impact statement procedurally and substantively improper, and reduced the sentence to better reflect the principle of rehabilitation.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction, raising several grounds including errors in the jury charge regarding reasonable doubt, failure to give a Vetrovec warning, improper comments on the evidence, and the admission of crime scene photographs and prior statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The appellant appealed his convictions for indecent assault and gross indecency, arguing errors in the jury charge, improper cross-examination by the Crown, and the improper admission of expert evidence regarding delayed disclosure.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge departed from the Lifchus standard, failed to adequately relate the defence's position, and failed to caution against propensity reasoning.

The Court also found the Crown's cross-examination improper and the expert evidence inadmissible under the necessity requirement.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after the deceased was shot and dismembered.

The appellant appealed on several grounds, including the trial judge's refusal to direct a verdict of acquittal on first degree murder, the admission of his criminal record, and the trial judge's decision to provide the jury with a written copy of part of the jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that after-the-fact conduct was relevant to planning and deliberation, the errors regarding the criminal record did not prejudice the appellant, and the provision of written jury instructions was appropriate and did not result in prejudice.

The appellant appealed his first-degree murder conviction, arguing that DNA evidence obtained from discarded chewing gum and a subsequent blood sample should have been excluded.

The police had tricked the appellant into chewing and discarding gum to obtain his DNA after he refused to provide a sample.

The Court of Appeal held that while the warrantless seizure of the gum violated section 8 of the Charter, the evidence was admissible under section 24(2).

The court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the voluntariness of a police statement and the jury instruction on reasonable doubt, finding any errors to be harmless or in substantial compliance with legal standards.

The appeal was dismissed.