Reasonable doubt

The appellant appealed his conviction for mischief over $5,000 relating to property damage where his plumbing company had worked.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons regarding his alibi defence, misapplied the W.(D.) test, and improperly relied on photo line-up evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge adequately explained her credibility findings, properly directed her mind to whether the defence evidence raised a reasonable doubt, and placed little to no weight on the photo line-up.

The appellant appealed his conviction for the sexual assault of a 15-year-old complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred by relying on hearsay evidence, permitting improper cross-examination about whether he found the complainant attractive, and failing to properly apply the W.D. principles for assessing credibility.

Both parties also sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the applications to introduce fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the Palmer test.

The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the hearsay evidence was properly used to infer state of mind, the cross-examination was permissible to rebut the appellant's assertion of good character, and the trial judge correctly applied the burden of proof.

The appellant was convicted of incest and 46 counts of forgery.

The Crown alleged that the appellant's co-accused and husband was actually her son, and that they had fathered children together, including a deceased child.

The appellant appealed, arguing that DNA warrants used to compare their blood with the deceased child's blood violated her Charter rights, and that the trial judge erred in failing to give a W.(D.) charge regarding exculpatory defence evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that while the DNA comparison between the two accused breached section 8, the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2).

Furthermore, although the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding reasonable doubt and credibility, the curative proviso applied due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine and importing 270 kilograms of cocaine, and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

He appealed both the conviction and the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that despite the trial judge's problematic 'pit of the stomach' instruction on reasonable doubt, the jury charge as a whole was adequate.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The Court found that a life sentence was manifestly unfit for a youthful first offender, especially given that a more culpable co-accused received a 19-year sentence.

The sentence was reduced to 19 years' imprisonment.

The appellants, a father and stepmother, appealed their convictions for the first and second degree murder of their five-year-old daughter, respectively.

The stepmother also appealed her 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that post-offence conduct (including dismemberment and concealment of the body) was properly admitted as evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's refusal to grant a judge-alone trial without Crown consent under s. 473(1) of the Criminal Code, affirming that the statutory requirement for a jury trial in murder cases should only be overridden in the clearest of cases where standard safeguards are insufficient to ensure a fair trial.

The stepmother's sentence was upheld due to the horrific nature of the crime and her egregious post-offence conduct.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge improperly treated the trial as a credibility contest and engaged in improper propensity reasoning based on the appellant's criminal record, contrary to the requirements of R. v. W.D. The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for production of marijuana and theft of electricity.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal rejected the unreasonable verdict argument but agreed that the trial judge erred by requiring the appellant's exculpatory testimony to satisfy a balance of probabilities standard, rather than merely raising a reasonable doubt as required by R. v. W.(D.).

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after his common-law wife drowned when his truck went into a river.

The Crown alleged he staged the accident to collect life insurance.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on his out-of-court statements, reasonable doubt, after-the-fact conduct, and the admission of photographs from an unrelated accident.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge committed reversible error by characterizing the appellant's exculpatory statements as 'excuses' that carried less weight than 'admissions', thereby reversing the burden of proof and denigrating the defence of accident.

The trial judge also erred in his instructions regarding the appellant's failure to contact the police.

The appellant, a taxi driver, was convicted of sexually assaulting a passenger who was confined to a wheelchair.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, stating he found the accused's evidence incredible based on the complainant's believability.

The summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence as required by Sheppard.

The appellant, a young person, appealed his convictions for robbery, extortion, assault, and uttering threats.

He argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework, treated the case as a credibility contest, and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly instructed himself on the burden of proof, did not decide the case wholly on demeanour, and reasonably relied on corroborating evidence.

The verdict was found not to be unreasonable.

The young person appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) principles regarding credibility and reasonable doubt.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant on the basis that the complainant withdrew her initial consent to sexual intercourse, but the appellant continued the sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the entirety of the evidence, including inconsistencies and corroborating evidence such as bruising, and made a credibility assessment that was open to him.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found several errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury, including the failure to give a limiting instruction on the complainant's prior consistent statements, using an outdated version of the Lifchus charge on reasonable doubt, and improperly limiting the defence's alternative perpetrator theory.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered, with a note that the appellant had already served his sentence.

The appellant was convicted of the first-degree murder of a three-and-a-half-year-old child.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding reasonable doubt, the assessment of evidence, and consciousness of guilt based on post-offence statements to the police.

The Court of Appeal found that the reasonable doubt instruction substantially complied with the law, the jury was properly instructed to consider all evidence, and any shortcomings in the consciousness of guilt instruction did not prejudice the appellant given the overwhelming DNA and forensic evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended his evidence and misapplied the W.(D.) framework by approaching the case on an 'either/or' basis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly weighed all the evidence, rejected the appellant's testimony, and accepted the evidence of the two young complainants who described similar incidents without collusion.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the reasonable doubt standard.

The Summary Conviction Appeal judge affirmed the conviction, finding the trial judge properly instructed himself to decide credibility in light of the entire evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding no error by the trial judge or the Summary Conviction Appeal judge, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder of his girlfriend and sentenced to life imprisonment with 10 years of parole ineligibility.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the jury charge on motive and reasonable doubt was flawed.

The Crown appealed the sentence, seeking an increased period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions.

The Court allowed the Crown's sentence appeal, holding the trial judge erred in minimizing the aggravating features of intimate partner violence and indignities to the victim's body.

The period of parole ineligibility was increased to 12 years.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of robbery, wearing a disguise, attempted robbery, and possession of a dangerous weapon, all relating to incidents involving fast food deliverymen in an apartment building.

The Crown relied on similar fact evidence to prove identity and intent.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding similar fact evidence, reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the reasoning process for similar fact evidence, provided a deficient explanation of reasonable doubt that failed to comply with Lifchus, and improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defence.

The appellant was convicted of first and second-degree murder.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred by failing to give a Vetrovec warning regarding the principal Crown witness, an alleged accomplice who had originally been charged with the murders.

The Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge erred in law by failing to give the mandatory warning, the error was cured by the application of the proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, as the jury was sufficiently alerted to the dangers of the witness's evidence.

The court also dismissed several other grounds of appeal relating to bad character evidence, criminal records, reply evidence, post-offence conduct, reasonable doubt, and self-defence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and possession of stolen property arising from the robbery of a taxi driver.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury not to speculate on the absence of forensic evidence linking the appellant to the stolen items, and permitted the jury to rely on the taxi driver's in-dock identification.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that an absence of evidence can raise a reasonable doubt, and by failing to adequately warn the jury about the dangers and lack of probative value of in-dock identification.

The appellant appealed his conviction for arson.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the first two grounds of appeal, holding there was sufficient evidence that the fire threatened firefighters and was of incendiary origin caused by the appellant.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on the third ground, finding the trial judge improperly treated the case as a credibility contest and failed to apply the W.(D.) framework.

The trial judge erred by inferring guilt directly from his rejection of the appellant's evidence without analyzing the Crown's evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.