W. Graeme Cameron

The appellant appealed his murder conviction, raising several grounds including errors in the jury charge regarding reasonable doubt, failure to give a Vetrovec warning, improper comments on the evidence, and the admission of crime scene photographs and prior statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after the deceased was shot and dismembered.

The appellant appealed on several grounds, including the trial judge's refusal to direct a verdict of acquittal on first degree murder, the admission of his criminal record, and the trial judge's decision to provide the jury with a written copy of part of the jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that after-the-fact conduct was relevant to planning and deliberation, the errors regarding the criminal record did not prejudice the appellant, and the provision of written jury instructions was appropriate and did not result in prejudice.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree murder for drowning his two children.

The trial judge rejected a joint submission for a 12-year parole ineligibility period and imposed 23 years.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in rejecting the joint submission, as a 12-year period would bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the aggravating features of the crime.

However, the trial judge erred in imposing 23 years, as the appellant was not one of the worst offenders, had no prior record, suffered from severe depression, and showed remorse.

The parole ineligibility period was reduced to 17 years.

The appellant appealed his conviction, raising five issues regarding the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the pre-Lifchus charge on reasonable doubt was adequate and substantially complied with the requirements.

The Court also found no errors in the trial judge's review of evidence on intent, instructions on circumstantial evidence, handling of the deceased's statements, or conclusions regarding the appellant's character evidence.

The appellant appealed robbery convictions arising from a single incident and argued that the verdict was unreasonable, that the trial judge erred in assessing eyewitness identification evidence, and that she improperly treated a defence witness's evidence with caution.

The court held that the trial judge was alive to the dangers of eyewitness identification, carefully scrutinized the weaknesses in the Crown evidence, and was entitled to rely on one complainant's identification based on prior familiarity and close observation during the offence.

The court also held that it was open to the trial judge to approach the evidence of a defence witness, who faced an outstanding charge on the same matter, with caution because of the obvious potential for self-interest.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his arson conviction and sentence following a jury trial.

The court rejected arguments that fingerprint evidence was obtained without informed consent contrary to s. 8 of the Charter, that oral statements to insurance adjusters were made under statutory compulsion within s. 148(6) of the Insurance Act, and that a Crown misstatement in closing caused a miscarriage of justice.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

However, the court found the sentencing judge erred in principle by treating lack of remorse as an aggravating factor and reduced the penitentiary sentence from four years to two and a half years.

The appellant appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Canada, arguing that the trial judge misdirected the jury on consciousness of guilt.

The Court of Appeal had previously found no substantial wrong and upheld the verdict.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Dubin C.J. at the Court of Appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, agreeing with the dissenting reasons of Houlden J.A. in the Court of Appeal, which found that the trial judge unintentionally misled the jury regarding assistance on questions of fact and that the Crown's address to the jury was not a fair and dispassionate presentation of its case.