Freedom of expression

The appellant, a coalition of landlords, appealed the dismissal of its application to quash a municipal residential rental licensing by-law enacted as a pilot project.

The appellant argued the by-law was arbitrary, enacted in bad faith, and ultra vires due to alleged violations of the Charter, the Residential Tenancies Act, and privacy legislation.

The Court of Appeal applied a deferential standard of review to municipal decisions and found the by-law was passed in good faith for valid health and safety purposes.

The court dismissed all constitutional and statutory challenges, concluding the by-law did not restrict marketing, permit unlawful entry, interfere with subletting, encroach on criminal law powers, or require disclosure of protected personal information.

The appellants, Charles McVety and Canada Christian College, appealed a motion judge's decision to dismiss their anti-SLAPP motion against a defamation action brought by Kory Teneycke and Rubicon Strategy Inc. The defamation claim alleged that McVety publicly stated Teneycke acted in a conflict of interest regarding Ontario's vaccine passport policy and profited from it, and that Teneycke was prejudiced against Christians.

The motion judge found substantial merit to the defamation action and that the appellants had no viable defences, partly due to potential malice, and that the public interest favored allowing the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's analysis of the claim's merits and defences, and while agreeing the balancing analysis was flawed, a fresh analysis led to the same conclusion that the public interest in allowing the action outweighed the public interest in protecting the appellants' expression, given the low quality and malicious motivation of the speech.

The request for leave to appeal costs was also dismissed.

Purolator Inc. sought and was granted an injunction against unknown persons, including members of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW), who were obstructing access to and egress from its Scarborough facility.

The court determined that the special rules for labour injunctions under section 102 of the Courts of Justice Act did not apply, as Purolator was a third party to the Canada Post-CUPW labour dispute and not an alter ego of Canada Post.

Applying the conventional test for an interim injunction, the court found a strong prima facie case of nuisance due to prolonged obstruction, irreparable harm to Purolator's critical delivery services, and that the balance of convenience favored granting the injunction.

The court also addressed the lack of prior notice to CUPW for the initial ex parte order, noting it was problematic but did not warrant refusing the injunction given the strength of Purolator's case.

The respondent, a retired teacher, commenced a defamation action against the school board and its chair after the chair stopped her presentation at a public meeting and subsequently made media statements characterizing her comments as transphobic and questioning the right of trans people to exist.

The appellants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, allowing the defamation claim to proceed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge erred in his weighing analysis by failing to consider the public interest in the appellants' speech, a fresh weighing demonstrated that the harm suffered by the respondent outweighed the public interest in the chair's speech, which had mischaracterized her actual remarks.

The appeal was dismissed.

This case concerns an anti-SLAPP motion brought by the Canadian Anti-Hate Network (CAHN) and Bernie Farber against multiple plaintiffs who initiated a $44 million action following the Ottawa protests and the invocation of the Emergencies Act.

The plaintiffs alleged defamation and civil conspiracy, claiming CAHN provided false information to government and police, influencing the emergency measures and freezing of assets.

The court dismissed the action against CAHN, finding the plaintiffs failed to particularize their claims, lacked substantial merit, and could not overcome valid defences such as non-compliance with notice periods under the Libel and Slander Act and the Limitations Act.

The court also determined that the public interest in protecting CAHN's expression on a matter of public interest outweighed the harm alleged by the plaintiffs, and declined to award damages to CAHN.

The appellants challenged the constitutional validity of the Tamil Genocide Education Week Act, 2021, arguing it was ultra vires Ontario and infringed their rights to free expression and equality under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Act, finding its dominant purpose was to affirm and commemorate the Tamil-Ontarian community's experience, which falls within Ontario's power over local matters under s. 92(16) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court also dismissed the Charter claims, concluding the Act does not suppress expression or draw a discriminatory distinction against Sinhala-Buddhists.

The defendant, Theodorus Deboer, pleaded guilty to mischief after evidence was led at trial regarding his participation in the Ambassador Bridge blockade.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted a conditional discharge, but the Court rejected this, finding it contrary to the public interest and that it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Court emphasized the gravity of the offence, the significant disruption caused, and the need for denunciation and deterrence, particularly given the defendant's defiant conduct and the late plea.

The Court imposed a suspended sentence with 12 months probation and 20 hours of community service, including a term prohibiting impeding international border crossings.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their defamation action under an anti-SLAPP motion, which arose from the respondent briefly sharing a Facebook post alleging theft of charitable funds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the expression related to a matter of public interest and that the appellants failed to demonstrate sufficient harm to outweigh the public interest in protecting the expression.

The court emphasized the lack of evidence of actual harm beyond a legal presumption and the brief duration of the impugned post.

Nobul Technologies Inc. brought a motion for a prospective order to restrain a former director, Michael Cappuccitti, from contravening a non-disparagement provision by communicating with shareholders.

Cappuccitti had sent emails to shareholders attaching his statement of claim in a separate action against Nobul, after Nobul refused to circulate it, despite having circulated its own statement of claim against Cappuccitti.

The court found that Cappuccitti's email was not disparaging, noting it was a cover note to circulate a statement of claim with a clear caveat that allegations were unproven.

The court emphasized shareholders' right to communicate and questioned Nobul's "clean hands" in seeking the injunction.

The motion was dismissed as there was no serious issue to be tried regarding a breach of the non-disparagement clause.

The Township of Clearview appealed a motion decision that largely dismissed its anti-SLAPP application against an action for defamation, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty brought by the respondents.

The action stemmed from the Township posting resident letters on its website that contained negative comments about the respondents' farming practices and proposed micro-brewery.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal regarding the defamation claim, finding that the motion judge erred in his analysis of the qualified privilege and indemnity defences, which had a real prospect of success.

The negligence claim dismissal was not appealed.

The breach of fiduciary duty claim dismissal was upheld.

The appellant, Myriam Michail, appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing her anti-SLAPP motion against the London District Catholic School Board's application to declare her a vexatious litigant.

The motion judge found that Michail had not established that the Board's application related to a matter of public interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the determination that vexatious proceedings do not relate to a matter of public interest and that the Board's application aimed to prevent vexatious litigation, not to suppress expression.

The Court also upheld the costs award against Michail and declined to consider new constitutional questions raised for the first time on appeal.

The Corporation of the City of Windsor sought to continue an injunction against "Persons Unknown" who were blocking the Ambassador Bridge.

The court had previously granted an interim injunction.

The City argued that protesters continued to breach municipal by-laws and the prior court order, and there was a risk of continued blockades.

The court found that the City established a strong prima facie case of by-law breaches and defiance of the prior order.

Applying the test for statutory injunctions under s. 440 of the Municipal Act, 2001, the court granted a permanent injunction, emphasizing the public interest in upholding the rule of law and that Charter rights do not protect unlawful conduct.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario refused leave to appeal a sealing order issued by a CCAA supervising judge in the Laurentian University insolvency proceedings.

The moving parties, including faculty unions, sought access to confidential documents (letters between Laurentian and the Ministry of Colleges and Universities) that were sealed to protect restructuring efforts.

The Court applied the Sierra Club test for sealing orders and the four-factor test for leave to appeal in CCAA cases, finding the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious, would unduly hinder the time-sensitive restructuring, and was not of sufficient significance to the action.

The court emphasized deference to the supervising judge's discretion in complex CCAA matters.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act and the granting of summary judgment and broad injunctive relief in a defamation action brought by the respondent union and its members.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the anti-SLAPP motion, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the harm suffered by the respondents outweighed the low public interest in the appellant's expression.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding the injunctive relief, narrowing the publication ban to prohibit only defamatory statements and setting aside the restrictions on the appellant's movements and communications as overly broad and unjustified by the defamation findings.

The appellant, a former university professor, appealed a jury verdict finding him liable for defaming the respondent in his blog posts.

The appellant had abandoned the trial on the second day and called no evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed his arguments regarding fair comment, limitation periods, and freedom of expression, noting his failure to lead evidence.

The court also upheld the trial judge's order for a broad permanent injunction, finding it justified by the appellant's persistent defamatory campaign and likelihood of continuation.

The appellant, a manager at a provincial jail, filed a human rights complaint after the respondent union president posted sexist comments about her on a union blog during a labour dispute.

The Human Rights Tribunal dismissed the complaint, finding the conduct did not constitute discrimination 'with respect to employment' under s. 5(1) of the Human Rights Code, after balancing the Code's objectives with the respondent's Charter rights to freedom of expression and association.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that administrative tribunals must consider Charter values when interpreting their home statutes, even absent ambiguity, and that the Tribunal's balancing of these rights was reasonable.

The appellants were convicted of attempted mischief for blocking cattle trucks during a peaceful protest and received a conditional discharge.

Their summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

They sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing their protest was protected expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave, holding that the appellants failed to serve a mandatory notice of constitutional question under s. 109 of the Courts of Justice Act, depriving the court of jurisdiction to grant a Charter remedy.

The plaintiff, a municipal councillor, brought an action for defamation against other councillors based on statements made during a council meeting.

The defendants moved to strike the allegations, arguing their statements were protected by absolute privilege.

The motion judge held that absolute privilege does not apply to municipal councillors, who instead enjoy qualified privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that Canadian law applies qualified privilege to municipal council speech and declining to extend absolute privilege without a full evidentiary record demonstrating its necessity.

The appellants, representing the Haudenosaunee Development Institute, challenged two municipal by-laws passed by the City of Brantford to prohibit unauthorized interference with development and the imposition of unauthorized fees.

The appellants argued the by-laws were passed in bad faith, violated the open meeting requirements of the Municipal Act, 2001, infringed sections 2(b) and 15 of the Charter, and were ultra vires the province under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court of Appeal dismissed most of the appeal, finding the by-laws were validly passed and did not target the Haudenosaunee.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, striking the words 'invite', 'request', and 'sign' from the by-laws as they unjustifiably limited freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.

The Commissioner of Competition brought an application against Rogers and Chatr alleging that their advertising claims of 'fewer dropped calls than new wireless carriers' and 'no worries about dropped calls' were false, misleading, and made without adequate and proper testing, contrary to the Competition Act.

The court found that the applicant failed to prove the claims were false or misleading.

However, the court found that the respondents failed to conduct adequate and proper testing in certain cities prior to launching the advertising campaign, thereby engaging in reviewable conduct under s. 74.01(1)(b).

The court also dismissed the respondents' constitutional challenges, finding that s. 74.01(1)(b) is a justified limit on freedom of expression and that the administrative monetary penalty does not engage s. 11 of the Charter.