D.M. Brown

The applicants, minority shareholders, commenced an oppression application against the respondents, the majority shareholders and the corporation.

The parties consented to a trial to determine the value of the applicants' shares, which the respondents would purchase.

The court resolved several methodological disputes between the parties' expert valuators regarding maintainable earnings, capitalization rates, and redundant assets.

Crucially, the court held that no minority discount should be applied to the valuation of the applicants' shares, as the purchase was a compulsory consolidation of the majority's position rather than an open market transaction.

The applicants and respondents entered into joint venture agreements to invest in commercial real estate projects through jointly owned companies.

The applicants discovered that the respondents were commingling funds, failing to make their required equity contributions, and diverting the applicants' funds to their own personal benefit and to companies they solely owned.

The court found that the respondents breached their contractual and fiduciary duties and were unjustly enriched.

The court imposed constructive trusts over several properties owned by the respondents, appointed a receiver over the respondents' assets, and cancelled the respondents' shares in the jointly owned companies where they had not contributed equity.

The applicant settlor applied to rectify a 1992 family trust indenture, claiming it failed to reflect his original intention to allow for a tax-deferred transfer of assets to his children due to a drafting mistake by his lawyers.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to establish his specific tax-planning intention and the alleged mistake on a balance of probabilities.

The court noted the lack of corroborating evidence from the legal advisors who drafted the trust and the ambiguity of contemporaneous documents.

The plaintiff railway company sought an ex parte interim injunction to restrain protestors from blockading its Toronto-Montreal main line.

The protestors, who were members of a First Nation, claimed to be showing support for First Nations chiefs in an upcoming meeting with the Prime Minister.

The court granted the injunction, finding that the plaintiff had established a strong case of trespass and tortious interference, and that the blockade was causing irreparable harm to the plaintiff and its customers.

The court held that neither the expressive nature of the protest nor the aboriginal identity of the protestors altered the balance of convenience, which overwhelmingly favoured the plaintiff.

The plaintiff railway company sought to continue an interim injunction restraining aboriginal protesters from blockading its spur line.

The blockade was causing irreparable economic harm to the plaintiff and its customers.

The local police had refused to enforce the initial injunction, citing a desire to negotiate a peaceful resolution and maintain goodwill with the aboriginal community.

The court found that the protesters were trespassing and that the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff.

The court continued the injunction, removing a clause that explicitly recognized police tactical discretion, but declined to schedule contempt proceedings due to the police's unwillingness to enforce the court's orders.

The court heard two separate motions to strike or stay pending summary judgment motions on the Commercial List.

Applying the principles from Combined Air and the proportionality requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that concerns about the appropriateness of summary judgment motions should be addressed through case management rather than formal motions to strike.

The court reviewed the proposed summary judgment motions in both actions and concluded that neither was an appropriate candidate for summary judgment due to the complexity of the issues, the voluminous records, and the need for a full trial to appreciate the evidence.

Both summary judgment motions were directed not to proceed, and the parties were ordered to prepare for trial.

The plaintiff real estate agent sued the defendant for a commission under a listing agreement after introducing a purchaser.

The defendant cancelled the property sale and instead structured the transaction as a sale of shares by its parent company to the purchaser.

The plaintiff moved to amend its claim to add the parent company, plead an indirect sale and breach of good faith, and add an oppression claim under the Business Corporations Act.

The defendant moved to strike the claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion to amend and dismissed the defendant's motion to strike, finding that the proposed claims were tenable at law and not plain and obvious to fail.

The applicant shareholders sought an oppression remedy and a court-ordered shareholder meeting, arguing that the company's Special Quorum Requirement for electing directors was invalid and oppressive.

The requirement mandated a 50% quorum, which had not been met for 15 years, preventing the election of directors.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the board complied with its legal obligations, the quorum requirement was publicly known and approved by shareholders, and the applicants had not attempted to use statutory tools like requisitioning a meeting or soliciting dissident proxies.

The court declined to order a meeting under s. 106 of the OBCA, as it was not impracticable for the shareholders to call one themselves.