Drug trafficking

The applicant, having been convicted of drug trafficking and weapons offences and sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Crown opposed bail on the public interest ground, citing the seriousness of the fentanyl trafficking offences.

The motion judge granted bail, finding that the applicant was not a flight or safety risk, and that his appeal grounds—alleging the trial judge erred in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis by failing to consider s. 8 and s. 10 breaches holistically—were of moderate strength.

Balancing the reviewability and enforceability interests, the court concluded that public confidence in the administration of justice favoured release.

The Crown appealed directed verdicts of acquittal on drug and firearm possession and conspiracy charges arising from contraband found in a storage locker and hidden vehicle compartments.

The accused had repeatedly accompanied a co‑conspirator to a storage locker used as a drug stash house and later exercised exclusive control over the co‑conspirator’s vehicle containing large quantities of cocaine, fentanyl, and a handgun.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in removing the case from the trier of fact.

Applying the directed verdict framework, the circumstantial evidence could support reasonable inferences of participation in the drug conspiracy.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking offences after police found cocaine during a search incident to arrest.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding no section 10(b) Charter breach when police delayed his access to counsel for 3.5 hours while preparing a search warrant for his residence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the delay was justified by officer and public safety concerns due to credible information that the appellant possessed a long firearm.

The appellants were convicted of trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking in cocaine following a lengthy police surveillance operation dubbed 'Project Odyssey'.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in his handling of a confidential informant privilege application, in refusing to stay proceedings for alleged police misconduct, and in rendering unreasonable verdicts based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the in camera, ex parte procedure used for the privilege claim, upholding the trial judge's factual findings regarding police conduct, and concluding the circumstantial evidence overwhelmingly supported the convictions.

The appellant was convicted of various firearm and drug offences, as well as possession of the proceeds of crime, after police executed a search warrant at his apartment and found firearms, drugs, and cash.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdicts were unreasonable as they relied on circumstantial evidence that failed to prove his knowledge and control over the contraband.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the convictions for possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of a prohibited device, finding the evidence insufficient to establish the requisite knowledge and control.

The conviction for possession of the proceeds of crime was upheld, and the global sentence was reduced to five years.

A youth was charged with two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police entered a small apartment where several adults possessed large quantities of drugs.

Officers observed the accused subtly move a plastic bag containing nearly 90 grams of cocaine with his foot, while he personally carried a small quantity of crack cocaine sewn into his clothing.

Applying the Beaver test for possession and the Villaroman framework for circumstantial evidence, the court found the Crown proved personal possession of the crack cocaine but failed to prove possession or control over the larger quantity in the bag.

The court held that the accused’s movement of the bag was reasonably explained as an attempt to conceal drugs to avoid implication rather than evidence of possession or trafficking.

The Crown also failed to establish joint or constructive possession or party liability for the drugs possessed by others in the apartment.

The appellant was arrested for drug trafficking and subjected to a 'bedpan vigil' search authorized by a general warrant.

He was detained for 43 hours, handcuffed to cell bars, and experienced severe withdrawal symptoms without medical supervision.

The Court of Appeal held that while a general warrant can authorize a bedpan vigil search, the warrant was defective because it purported to authorize indefinite detention, violating the requirement to bring an arrested person before a justice without unreasonable delay.

The court also found the search was conducted in an unreasonable manner, violating the appellant's Charter rights.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the convictions were set aside, and an acquittal was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime, as well as his 18-month sentence.

He had facilitated a $40 sale of crack cocaine to an undercover police officer.

At trial, he argued he was merely an agent of the purchaser.

The trial judge rejected this defence, finding his actions fell within the definition of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, noting the appellant located the seller, transported and delivered the drugs, and obtained the purchase price.

The sentence was also upheld as fit for a mature recidivist with a lengthy record of trafficking convictions.

The appellants appealed their sentences for drug trafficking to avoid deportation resulting from the retrospective application of the Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the first appellant's appeal on Crown consent, reducing his sentence to six months less a day as it remained fit.

The Court dismissed the second appellant's appeal, finding that the requested reduction would render his sentence unfit given his criminal record and the aggravating factors, and would circumvent parliamentary intent.

The Crown appealed a sentence order directing it to pay a $200 victim surcharge out of $170 seized from the offender upon his arrest for drug trafficking, with the balance forfeited.

The Court of Appeal held that a trial judge cannot order a victim surcharge paid out of funds forfeited as proceeds of crime, as the obligation rests on the offender.

Furthermore, the Court found the trial judge erred by reversing the onus regarding the forfeiture of the remaining $150, as there was no finding beyond a reasonable doubt that it constituted proceeds of crime.

The appeal was allowed, the offender was ordered to pay the $200 surcharge, $20 in buy money was forfeited, and the remaining $150 was returned to the offender.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging a residential search conducted under a s. 11 CDSA warrant in a prosecution for cocaine trafficking and marijuana possession.

The court held that, although the information to obtain suggested possible drug dealing, it failed to establish reasonable grounds to believe the residence contained evidence or contraband, relying instead on unsupported conclusory assertions and generalized propensity reasoning.

The search of the residence therefore violated s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court found the breach significant, the privacy impact serious, and excluded the evidence seized from inside and in the backyard of the residence under s. 24(2).

The appellant was convicted of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that evidence obtained during a search of his stash house should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter and that the search warrant was unlawfully obtained.

He also appealed his sentence of six years' imprisonment, a $500,000 fine, and delayed parole eligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the Charter breaches were minor and the warrant was validly issued.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part: the delayed parole eligibility order was removed for the proceeds of crime conviction, and the fine was reduced to $75,000 due to a lack of evidence regarding the appellant's ability to pay.

The appellants were convicted of trafficking and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest one of the appellants, and therefore the evidence obtained during the search incident to arrest should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the arresting officer had the requisite reasonable and probable grounds based on confidential information and police surveillance of a suspected drug transaction.

The accused applied to quash a telewarrant authorizing the search of his apartment in a drug trafficking investigation and sought exclusion of the seized drugs and related paraphernalia.

The court held that the telewarrant was invalid because the ITO contained no statement of the circumstances making it impracticable for the affiant to appear personally before a justice, as required by s. 487.1 of the Criminal Code and s. 11(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

However, the court found the ITO, as amplified, established reasonable grounds to search, and the police acted in good faith despite drafting errors and omissions regarding the confidential informant.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court held the evidence was admissible notwithstanding the s. 8 breach.

The appellant was arrested without a warrant for possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police received tips from confidential informants and observed him discarding a digital scale with cocaine residue.

A frisk search yielded cellphones and money but no drugs, prompting a strip search at the police station which uncovered drugs hidden between his buttocks.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the arrest and the decision to strip search were lawful.

However, the Court found that the strip search was conducted in an unreasonable manner, violating section 8 of the Charter, because the door was left open, the search was videotaped without consent, and the appellant was not given the option to remove the drugs himself.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a 5-year sentence for a drug offence.

The trial judge found the appellant was a trusted courier and not part of a criminal organization.

The co-accused, an active drug trafficker with a criminal record, received a 4-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the 5-year sentence offended the parity principle, noting the appellant was a youthful first offender.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to 42 months.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of nine years in custody for possession of cocaine, methamphetamine, and MDMA for the purpose of trafficking, and conspiracy to traffic cocaine.

He argued the sentence exceeded the range for a first offender, violated the parity principle compared to his co-accused, and overemphasized denunciation and deterrence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was justified by the totality principle, the appellant's role as a supplier with a higher quantum of drugs, and the trial judge's proper consideration of mitigating factors.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking, arguing that the trial judge failed to warn the jury about the dangers of in-dock identification evidence.

The Crown conceded this error for two of the counts, but the appellant further argued that the verdicts were unreasonable and acquittals should be entered.

The Court of Appeal accepted the Crown's concession and ordered a new trial on the two counts, but rejected the argument that the verdicts were unreasonable or that the conviction on the remaining count should be overturned.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on drug trafficking and conspiracy charges.

The accused was arrested after police observed a co-accused place a duffle bag containing drugs into the trunk of his car.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding the Crown failed to prove he knew the bag contained drugs.

On appeal, the Crown argued the trial judge erred in applying the Carter test for co-conspirator hearsay and in applying the reasonable doubt standard piecemeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred on the first step of the Carter test, the ambiguous hearsay evidence would not have changed the outcome, and the trial judge properly considered the evidence as a whole.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime, challenging the search warrant for his home.

He argued the trial judge erred in restricting cross-examination of the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) and that the ITO lacked sufficient information to justify the warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly restricted cross-examination to avoid a fishing expedition and that the corroborated information from a confidential informant, combined with surveillance evidence, provided reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant.