Huscroft

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

At trial, a key Crown witness recanted her videorecorded police statement in which she described witnessing the respondent sell cocaine.

The trial judge permitted the Crown to cross-examine the witness under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act but dismissed the Crown's application to admit the statement for the truth of its contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made multiple errors in his hearsay analysis, including improperly assessing necessity based on the overall strength of the Crown's case, failing to recognize the witness's availability for cross-examination as a procedural safeguard, and improperly exercising his residual discretion.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving causing bodily harm and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

He argued the trial judge erred in inferring from circumstantial evidence that he was the driver of the vehicle and that he was impaired.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Villaroman test for circumstantial evidence and concluding that the totality of the evidence supported the findings that the appellant was the driver and was impaired.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual assault causing bodily harm against two young boys, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender and indeterminate sentence.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, improperly used circumstantial evidence, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

He also challenged the dangerous offender finding, arguing the trial judge unduly relied on psychiatric evidence and erred in finding a pattern of repetitive behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in its entirety, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, concluding that trial counsel's representation was competent, and upholding the dangerous offender designation based on the predicate offences and the appellant's high risk of re-offending.

The appellant obtained a British Columbia judgment against the respondent, which was registered in Ontario.

The appellant delayed enforcing the judgment for over six years because he believed there was little equity in the respondent's properties.

When the appellant sought leave to issue a writ of seizure and sale, the motion judge dismissed the motion, inferring that the appellant had waived his rights and that the respondent had detrimentally relied on the delay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors.

The appellant's explanation for the delay was plausible, and the respondent could not have reasonably believed the appellant waived his right to enforce the $333,717.50 judgment, nor did she detrimentally rely on such a belief.

The appellant appealed a decision finding it in breach of its commercial lease for leaving the building vacant for almost two years and denying it relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation of the lease or her discretionary decision to deny relief from forfeiture due to a pattern of non-compliance.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking after cocaine was found in her rental car at a border crossing.

She appealed her conviction, arguing the trial judge's jury charge was unfair due to rhetorical questions and a failure to fully present the defence position.

She also appealed her 5.5-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the jury charge and concluding the sentence was within the appropriate range for a first-time offender importing approximately 1.5 kilograms of cocaine.

The appellant pleaded guilty to five charges arising from a home invasion, including an imitation firearm charge carrying a mandatory minimum sentence.

He appealed to strike his guilty pleas, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the plea to the imitation firearm charge was uninformed because trial counsel failed to advise him of it.

Furthermore, the court found that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance on the remaining charges by failing to assess the strength of the Crown's case, review disclosure, or consider potential Charter claims before advising the appellant to plead guilty.

The guilty pleas were struck and a new trial was ordered.

In supplementary reasons following an appeal regarding property ownership, the Court of Appeal addressed outstanding financial issues between former spouses.

The court ordered the respondent to reimburse the appellant for mortgage and property tax payments she made on his half-interest in a jointly owned property, finding he would otherwise be unjustly enriched.

The court also awarded the appellant additional occupation rent for the post-trial period.

Given divided success on the main appeal issues, the court ordered the parties to bear their own costs for both the trial and the appeal.

The appellant, a pastor, appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual offences against his 14-year-old step-daughter.

He argued the trial judge placed undue reliance on the complainant's demeanour when assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly analyzed the substance of the evidence and did not overemphasize demeanour.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as no submissions were made and the sentence was fit.