Aggravated assault

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following a bar fight where the complainant was stabbed.

The appellant admitted to being present and involved in the fight but denied stabbing the complainant.

The conviction relied heavily on the complainant's eyewitness testimony.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to provide a specific jury instruction on the frailties of eyewitness identification.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge was obligated to specifically call the jury's attention to the dangers of eyewitness identification, both generally and in the specific circumstances of the case.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault as a party to a robbery and sentenced to an effective term of five and one-half years.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by capping pre-sentence custody credit at 1.5 days without considering the harsh lockdown conditions he endured, and by imposing a longer sentence than his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal agreed the trial judge erred in law regarding the cap on credit for harsh conditions, but declined to grant enhanced credit due to a lack of evidence showing an adverse impact on the appellant.

The court also found no error regarding parity, noting the co-accused's guilty plea.

The appeal was allowed only to correct a 23-day calculation error in the pre-sentence credit.

The appellants attended a house party armed with loaded handguns.

During an altercation, shots were fired, resulting in one death and two injuries.

Both were convicted of second degree murder and aggravated assault.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea for aiding and abetting murder, failed to leave manslaughter as a lesser included offence for the aider or abettor, and improperly instructed the jury on the use of post-offence conduct evidence.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and assault following a brawl in a restaurant where he brandished a knife and a patron was stabbed.

The appellant testified he brandished the knife in self-defence and the stabbing was accidental.

The trial judge refused to leave self-defence to the jury, finding it incompatible with accident, and directed the jury that the first two elements of the weapons charge were proven.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge usurped the jury's fact-finding function, erred in finding self-defence and accident incompatible, and improperly directed a verdict on essential elements.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for an unprovoked and brutal aggravated assault, arguing it was manifestly unfit and failed to give proper effect to denunciation and deterrence.

The sentencing judge had effectively imposed a low penitentiary sentence after giving credit for pre-sentence custody, emphasizing the principle of rehabilitation to give the respondent one last chance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion regarding the respondent's rehabilitative prospects and seeing no basis for appellate intervention.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, arguing the trial judge unfairly commented on his evidence and failed to relate the evidence to the elements of the offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's caution regarding the appellant's after-the-fact theory was fair and the review of the evidence was sufficient.

The Court also noted the lack of objection at trial and the overwhelming case against the appellant.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault following a group swarming attack and was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by finding he was a direct participant rather than merely a party to the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge was entitled to make independent factual findings where the jury's verdict was ambiguous, and that the 12-month sentence was entirely proper given the planned and organized nature of the attack.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose and aggravated assault following an altercation where he slashed the victim with a knife.

He raised four grounds of appeal, including fresh evidence of interpreter deficiencies, misapprehension of evidence, improper admission of bad character evidence, and erroneous inferences of credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding the fresh evidence immaterial, the trial judge's conclusions reasonable, the bad character evidence properly contextualized as part of the defence theory, and the credibility inferences appropriate.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, forcible confinement, and breaking and entering, relying on fresh evidence and asserting ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that while fresh expert evidence showed the blood pattern on the screen door was not caused by a baseball bat, the presence of the appellant's blood and fingerprints inside the house and on the door provided ample evidence of his participation.

The court also rejected the ineffective assistance claim regarding a height disparity, noting it was a deliberate tactical decision by trial counsel.

The application to adduce fresh evidence and the appeal were dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of common assault and aggravated assault following a bar fight.

They appealed their aggravated assault convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to properly instruct the jury on the doctrine of common purpose under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code, despite the Crown heavily relying on it.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge's brief reference to a 'joint criminal enterprise' without a full explanation of the elements of common purpose left the jury without adequate guidance.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions for aggravated assault were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge applied unequal scrutiny to the evidence and improperly drew an adverse inference from his right to silence upon arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were well-reasoned and that the trial judge permissibly considered the inconsistency between the appellant's statement to police and his trial testimony.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon after stabbing an unarmed victim.

He appealed his convictions on several grounds, including allegations of juror coercion and outside influence, the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on self-defence under section 37 of the Criminal Code, and the trial judge's review of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the juror's allegations of coercion were protected by juror secrecy, the alleged outside influence was not capable of influencing the jury, and there was no air of reality to a self-defence claim under section 37.

The young person appealed his convictions for robbery and aggravated assault, as well as his sentence, which included a 'serious violent offence' designation under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The convictions arose from an incident where the young person robbed the victim of a cell phone and subsequently assaulted him, resulting in the victim's finger being severed on a chain-link fence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the risk of bodily harm was objectively foreseeable.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the preliminary threshold for a serious violent offence designation is automatically met when serious bodily harm is caused, with foreseeability remaining a factor at the discretionary stage.

The appellant appealed her convictions for assault with a weapon and aggravated assault, and her sentence.

The convictions arose from an incident where the appellant poured scalding tea on the complainant, causing severe burns and permanent hearing loss.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, applying reasonable doubt, and reaching inconsistent verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of legal principles.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was within the appropriate range for the vicious assault.

The appellant pled guilty to aggravated assault and breach of probation after attacking a man with a tire iron who intervened when the appellant approached his ex-wife.

He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment less pre-trial custody.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by treating a lack of remorse as an aggravating factor and by finding a high risk to reoffend without expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge merely rejected remorse as a mitigating factor and reasonably inferred a high risk of reoffending from the appellant's escalating aggressive conduct.

The Crown appealed a 14-month conditional sentence imposed for aggravated assault.

The respondent conceded that a conditional sentence was not legally available for this offence.

The Court of Appeal agreed that a sentence of incarceration was appropriate but, noting the respondent had already served 11 months of the sentence, his strong rehabilitative potential, and Gladue principles, varied the sentence to 11 months' time served plus 12 months' probation.

The appellant pleaded guilty to attempted murder, aggravated assault, break and enter, and other offences arising from a home invasion.

He appealed his nine-year sentence, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing proceedings.

The Court of Appeal assumed without deciding that representation was ineffective, thereby reviewing the sentence without deference.

The Court found the nine-year sentence entirely fit, noting it already reflected significant mitigating factors such as the guilty plea, lack of prior record, and rehabilitation efforts, which reduced what would otherwise be a double-digit penitentiary term.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and was sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

He appealed his conviction, seeking to introduce fresh evidence to argue his guilty plea was involuntary because a co-accused allegedly threatened to kill him if he did not plead guilty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to introduce fresh evidence and the appeal, finding the appellant's claims lacked credibility and were contradicted by the record, including his own letter of apology and the withdrawal of charges against the co-accused.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, as well as his 18-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence and applied an unequal standard of scrutiny to his testimony.

He also argued the sentence failed to account for his unblemished character and charitable works.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the record did not support the appellant's claims.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed as the sentence was within range and the trial judge had properly considered the mitigating factors.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace.

He argued the trial judge misapplied the self-defence provisions of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly concluded the appellant became the aggressor when he exited his vehicle, vitiating his self-defence claim and changing his purpose for possessing the knife to a dangerous one.