Misha Feldmann

The accused, Osman, applied for a directed verdict on a charge of accessory after the fact to murder.

Osman had assisted the principal offender in escaping after a shooting, but the victim did not die until three days later.

The Crown conceded the accused could not be convicted of the charged offence since the victim was alive at the time of assistance, but argued for a conviction on the included offence of accessory after the fact to attempt murder.

The court rejected the Crown's arguments, finding that accessory after the fact to attempt murder is not an included offence under s. 662(1) and cannot be applied via s. 660 in these circumstances.

The application was granted and a directed verdict of acquittal was entered.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence of drugs found in his bedroom, arguing his s. 8 Charter rights were violated.

Police responded to a 911 call about a domestic assault and forced entry into the applicant's locked bedroom out of concern for the safety of anyone inside.

Inside, they found a dead dog and drugs in plain view.

The court held the entry was a justifiable use of police powers to protect life and safety, and the search was lawful.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for possession of cocaine after pleading guilty in the Ontario Court of Justice and receiving a $100 fine.

He argued that his plea should be set aside because he misunderstood the consequences, believing he would receive a conditional discharge rather than a conviction that created a criminal record affecting employment prospects.

The court reviewed the requirements for a valid guilty plea under s. 606 of the Criminal Code and the governing jurisprudence that a plea must be voluntary, unequivocal, and informed.

The record showed the trial judge conducted a plea comprehension inquiry confirming the accused understood the consequences and that sentencing remained within the court’s discretion.

The court held that dissatisfaction with collateral consequences, such as employment impacts, does not invalidate a properly entered guilty plea.

In a second‑degree murder prosecution, the accused brought a motion to exclude proposed in‑dock identification evidence from a Crown witness.

The witness first identified the accused approximately ten and a half months after the homicide during testimony at another individual’s preliminary inquiry, after seeing the accused’s photograph in media reports following his arrest.

The identification arose through leading questions and occurred in circumstances suggesting contamination and suggestion.

The court held that the identification did not qualify as reliable recognition evidence and had no meaningful probative value while posing a substantial risk of prejudice.

Exercising its discretion, the court excluded the evidence from the jury.

During a jury trial for aggravated assault and weapons offences, the accused young person brought an application to exclude his adult criminal record, which consisted of a single conviction for first degree murder.

The defence had vigorously cross-examined the primary Crown witness on his extensive criminal record.

The court applied the Corbett framework and dismissed the application, finding that the probative value of the murder conviction on the accused's credibility outweighed its prejudicial effect, and that excluding it would create a serious imbalance given the attack on the Crown witness's credibility.